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homelab/kubernetes/apps/home-assistant/shelly-manager-deployment.yaml
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claude-botandClaude Opus 4.8 33283754ba feat(shelly-manager): ServiceAccount + RBAC for ESPHome firmware pipeline
shelly-manager will build+flash BLE proxies by spawning short-lived
esphome Jobs (on the shelly-manager-iot macvlan → mDNS → OTA:3232) and
streaming their logs. Give it a namespace-scoped identity to do so:

- ServiceAccount shelly-manager + Role shelly-manager-firmware
  (jobs: create/get/list/watch/delete; pods: get/list/watch;
   pods/log: get) + RoleBinding. No cluster-wide, secret, or exec rights.
- Wire serviceAccountName into the Deployment.
- Sync esphome/shelly-ble-proxy.yaml logger to the lean level already
  OTA'd to the device (esp32_ble_client DEBUG, not VERBOSE) so the PVC
  stops filling; VERBOSE is now an on-demand diagnostic via the pipeline.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-14 11:54:04 +02:00

119 lines
5.0 KiB
YAML

apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: shelly-manager
namespace: home-assistant
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: shelly-manager
spec:
replicas: 1
strategy:
type: Recreate
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: shelly-manager
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: shelly-manager
annotations:
# Multus attaches `net1` on v30iot with a DHCP-leased address (see
# shelly-manager-network-attachment.yaml). The mDNS resolver
# inside the app needs L2 presence on the IoT VLAN to browse
# for `_shelly._tcp.local.` — multicast doesn't cross the L3
# boundary between the cluster pod CIDR and v30iot.
#
# But net1 must carry ONLY multicast, not the admin HTTP server.
# The app has no auth of its own; its ingress is gated by Authentik
# (shelly-manager-gate). That gate only guards the Traefik path —
# macvlan traffic bypasses Cilium policy entirely, so a `0.0.0.0`
# bind exposes the unauthenticated UI on :8080 directly to every
# device on the IoT VLAN (verified 2026-07-10: GET http://<net1
# ip>:8080/ from the VLAN returned 200 and the full UI). See the
# ASPNETCORE_URLS binding below, which pins Kestrel to the pod
# (eth0) address so :8080 is not reachable over net1. The mDNS
# resolver is a separate ZeroconfResolver socket set and is
# unaffected.
k8s.v1.cni.cncf.io/networks: shelly-manager-iot
spec:
# eth0 (Cilium-managed pod network) is still the primary — it
# carries the ingress, mosquitto LB return path, etc. The macvlan
# above is additive. No explicit edge exclusion is needed: the
# `workload-class=pinned:NoSchedule` taint on k8s-edge already
# keeps this pod off there (we never tolerate it), and the NAD's
# `master: eth2` lines up with v30iot on every k8s-{1,2,3} worker.
enableServiceLinks: false
# Grants shelly-manager the in-cluster identity used by the firmware
# pipeline to create esphome flash Jobs and stream their logs. RBAC is
# namespace-scoped to home-assistant (shelly-manager-firmware-rbac.yaml).
serviceAccountName: shelly-manager
securityContext:
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: shelly-manager
image: gitea.renner.uno/k.renner/shelly-manager:build.1784021738 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:shelly-manager"}
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
ports:
- name: http
containerPort: 8080
env:
- name: TZ
value: Europe/Berlin
# Pin Kestrel to the pod's eth0 (cluster CIDR) address, not
# 0.0.0.0. The image's Dockerfile default is
# ASPNETCORE_URLS=http://0.0.0.0:8080, which also binds the
# macvlan net1 interface on the IoT VLAN — exposing the
# unauthenticated UI to that untrusted segment past the
# Authentik gate. POD_IP is the eth0 IPv4 (status.podIP); the
# Service, the Authentik outpost, and the kubelet httpGet
# probes all reach the app on that address. mDNS discovery is
# unaffected: ZeroconfResolver binds its own multicast sockets
# on net1 independently of Kestrel.
- name: POD_IP
valueFrom:
fieldRef:
fieldPath: status.podIP
- name: ASPNETCORE_URLS
value: "http://$(POD_IP):8080"
# BLE radios: ESP32 esphome bluetooth_proxy nodes (e.g. the M5 Atom
# Echo) are AUTO-DISCOVERED on the IoT VLAN via mDNS
# (_esphomelib._tcp) over the same net1 macvlan route as the Shellys —
# no static hostname/DNS (which the *.renner.uno wildcard would poison
# over IPv6). The shared fleet Noise key (= the dashboard's
# shelly_ble_proxy_api_key) lets shelly-manager complete the encrypted
# native-API handshake to each discovered proxy: DeviceInfo on
# /ble-radios today, the BLE scan/GATT provisioning path next.
- name: Ble__Discovery__Key
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: shelly-ble-proxy-key
key: api-key
volumeMounts:
- name: data
mountPath: /data
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /
port: http
initialDelaySeconds: 30
periodSeconds: 30
timeoutSeconds: 5
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /
port: http
initialDelaySeconds: 5
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
resources:
requests:
cpu: 50m
memory: 128Mi
limits:
memory: 512Mi
volumes:
- name: data
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: shelly-manager-data