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claude-botandClaude Fable 5.1 29c91769a7 feat(netbird-proxy-services): roll the PROXY-protocol build (2/2)
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Pins the controller image by digest. The registry tag is the build
date and pipeline 8452 rebuilt today's tag in place, so the tag alone
cannot carry a new build to the cluster; the digest can.

Merge only after the Traefik change from 1/2 has reconciled: from this
build on every service target sends a PROXY protocol v2 header, and
Traefik drops such connections unless websecure trusts the pod CIDRs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 13:32:06 +02:00
claude-botandClaude Fable 5.1 2c47c68a8b feat(netbird): carry the WAN client address through the passthrough edge
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TLS-passthrough services hand Traefik a raw TCP stream, so every WAN
request now logs the routing peer's pod IP (10.244.4.64/.112 in the
access log) instead of the client. CrowdSec's detection parses exactly
that log; with the HTTP-mode services gone it would attribute every
external request to two pod IPs, and a re-armed bouncer would repeat the
2026-06-27 mass ban.

The controller now sets options.proxy_protocol on every target (PROXY
protocol v2, TCP/TLS modes only per NetBird) and treats a service
without it as out of date, so the eleven existing services are updated
on the next pass. Traefik's websecure entrypoint accepts the header from
the pod CIDRs, mirroring forwardedHeaders.trustedIPs. Traefik takes
connections with or without a header from a trusted IP, so mesh and LAN
traffic that carries none is unaffected and the Traefik change can land
before the controller image.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 13:29:48 +02:00
k.renner ceff817d88 Merge pull request 'fix(netbird-proxy-services): numeric runAsUser so runAsNonRoot can be verified' (#815) from netbird-proxy-services-uid into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#815
2026-09-07 10:48:04 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Fable 5.1 ea1032e184 fix(netbird-proxy-services): numeric runAsUser so runAsNonRoot can be verified
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First rollout of #814 sat in CreateContainerConfigError: "container has
runAsNonRoot and image has non-numeric user (controller), cannot verify
user is non-root". The kubelet cannot resolve a named user; nobody/nogroup
in the pod spec is enough, the script needs no home and no writable path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 12:45:40 +02:00
k.renner 2856deb4f4 Merge pull request 'feat(netbird): deploy the reverse-proxy-services controller (2/2)' (#814) from netbird-proxy-services-deploy into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#814
2026-09-07 10:43:56 +00:00
k.renner 4d13acc9dd Merge pull request 'feat(netbird): controller for reverse-proxy services from public Ingresses (1/2: image)' (#813) from netbird-proxy-services into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#813
2026-09-07 10:43:47 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Fable 5.1 1d21196060 feat(netbird): deploy the reverse-proxy-services controller
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Deployment for the controller of the previous commit: openbao namespace
like the rotators (its default-deny already allows OpenBao, DNS, the
apiserver and world), own ServiceAccount with a read-only ClusterRole
(Ingresses list/watch, Services get), one replica, Recreate. The image tag
is the branch build that pushed this exact code.

The OpenBao role is applied once by hand (policies/netbird-proxy-services
.hcl); until then the pod logs an auth error per minute and changes nothing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 12:11:14 +02:00
k.renner 7e8077714e Merge pull request 'fix(netbird-proxy): watchdog restart cooldown 600 s → 60 s' (#812) from proxy-watchdog-cooldown into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#812
2026-09-07 09:43:20 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Fable 5.1 8e9eedfd16 fix(netbird-proxy): watchdog restart cooldown 600 s -> 60 s
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Every loss of the routing peer a proxy has pinned wedges its route
manager; the flood watchdog restarts the container within 2 s and the
public edge is back after one failed probe round. Inside the 600 s
cooldown the restart is suppressed and the URL watchdog three one-minute
rounds are the only recovery: 3.5 min of 000 on every public domain,
measured 2026-09-07 10:28 on proxy-2 ("restart suppressed, last restart
567s ago"). The morning node roll hit the same suppression on both
proxies at 06:58 and survived only because the routes recovered by luck.

Rolling reboots lose one peer every few minutes by design, so with 600 s
the second roll is always the unlucky one. A minute keeps the loop
protection (one restart per probe interval at most).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 10:38:28 +02:00
k.renner c7fd3e208a Merge pull request 'fix(infrastructure): LAPI ServersTransport behind the Traefik CRDs (phase 2/2, remove)' (#809) from lapi-transport-phase-2 into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#809
2026-09-07 06:09:31 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Fable 5.1 5d52e42887 fix(infrastructure): LAPI ServersTransport behind the Traefik CRDs (phase 2: remove)
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Phase 1 (#802) put the ServersTransport under post-crds and
infrastructure-crds has applied it. The copy in crowdsec/lapi-ingress.yaml
goes; the Ingress stays (core kind). With it, the infrastructure apply set
holds no traefik.io consumer any more, which is what a cold rebuild needs.

Prune: infrastructure reconciles first and skips the object if the last
applier label names infrastructure-crds; otherwise it deletes and
infrastructure-crds recreates it seconds later. Only the public LAPI
ingress used by the external bouncers is behind that transport.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 07:48:22 +02:00
8 changed files with 141 additions and 27 deletions
@@ -32,8 +32,13 @@ netbird_watchdog_fail_threshold: 3
# Minimum seconds between watchdog-issued restarts, so a genuinely broken
# backend can't put the proxy into a restart loop. Shared by both the URL-probe
# watchdog and the flood watchdog below.
netbird_watchdog_cooldown_seconds: 600
# watchdog and the flood watchdog below. One minute: the route-manager wedge
# recurs on every routing-peer loss, and rolling node reboots lose one peer
# every few minutes; a suppressed restart there leaves the wedge standing
# until the URL probe's three rounds fire (3.5 min of 000 on every domain,
# measured 2026-09-07). A minute still caps a loop at one restart per
# probe interval.
netbird_watchdog_cooldown_seconds: 60
# Log fingerprint of the reverse-proxy route-manager wedge, matched as a plain
# substring in the proxy's docker logs by the flood watchdog. On this build the
@@ -6,7 +6,9 @@ For each host on such an Ingress the NetBird management gets one reverse-proxy
service in TLS-passthrough mode on :443, targeting Traefik's ClusterIP through a
subnet resource that covers the cluster's service CIDR. SNI and Host reach
Traefik untouched, the proxy terminates nothing, and no domain resource is
involved -- the routing peers stay ordinary IP routers.
involved -- the routing peers stay ordinary IP routers. The target sends a
PROXY protocol v2 header so Traefik (and CrowdSec behind its access log) sees
the WAN client address instead of the routing peer's pod IP.
Ownership is derived from NetBird itself, not from local state: a service is
managed iff its mode is "tls" and its target is this controller's subnet
@@ -194,9 +196,12 @@ def ensure_policy(nb, resource, source_group):
def service_body(host, resource, target_ip):
# proxy_protocol: PROXY v2 header carries the WAN client address to
# Traefik (proxyProtocol.trustedIPs on websecure); TCP/TLS modes only.
return {"name": host, "domain": host, "mode": "tls", "listen_port": LISTEN_PORT, "enabled": True,
"targets": [{"target_type": "subnet", "target_id": resource, "protocol": "tcp",
"host": target_ip, "port": 443, "enabled": True}]}
"host": target_ip, "port": 443, "enabled": True,
"options": {"proxy_protocol": True}}]}
def is_managed(svc, resource):
@@ -208,7 +213,8 @@ def target_matches(svc, target_ip):
return False
ts = svc.get("targets") or []
return len(ts) == 1 and ts[0].get("host") == target_ip and ts[0].get("port") == 443 \
and ts[0].get("protocol") == "tcp" and ts[0].get("enabled")
and ts[0].get("protocol") == "tcp" and ts[0].get("enabled") \
and (ts[0].get("options") or {}).get("proxy_protocol") is True
def reconcile():
@@ -31,22 +31,12 @@
# serves read-only decision streams to a valid bouncer key and nothing else.
# The admin surface is cscli, in-cluster. If the source address ever becomes
# deterministic, an ipAllowList can be added on top.
---
#
# The LAPI serves HTTPS only once tls.enabled is set — there is no plaintext
# fallback and no second port; 8080 is the TLS port. Its certificate comes
# from the chart's own self-signed CA, so Traefik needs that CA to verify the
# backend. SANs include crowdsec-service.crowdsec.svc.cluster.local, which is
# what the Service resolves to.
apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
kind: ServersTransport
metadata:
name: crowdsec-lapi
namespace: crowdsec
spec:
serverName: crowdsec-service.crowdsec.svc.cluster.local
rootCAs:
- secret: crowdsec-root-secret
---
# backend; the ServersTransport carrying it is a traefik.io CRD consumer and
# lives in post-crds/crowdsec-lapi-serverstransport.yaml.
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ resources:
- cloudnative-pg/
- mariadb-operator/
- netbird-ingress/
- netbird-proxy-services/
- coredns-config/
- k8s-gateway/
- external-dns-unifi/
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
# Reconciles NetBird reverse-proxy services from Ingresses that carry
# dns.renner.uno/public: one TLS-passthrough service per host on :443,
# targeting Traefik's ClusterIP through a subnet resource over the service
# CIDR (ci/images/netbird-proxy-services/controller.py).
#
# openbao namespace, like the rotators: its default-deny already allows egress
# to OpenBao, DNS, the apiserver and `world` (netbird.renner.uno), and the
# NetBird PAT is read from OpenBao on every pass through the
# netbird-proxy-services role — policies/netbird-proxy-services.hcl, applied
# once by hand like the rotator roles. Until that role exists the pod logs an
# auth error each minute and does nothing.
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: netbird-proxy-services
namespace: openbao
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: netbird-proxy-services
---
# Read-only, cluster-wide: public Ingresses live in many namespaces, the
# Traefik Service in ingress/.
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRole
metadata:
name: netbird-proxy-services-read
rules:
- apiGroups: ["networking.k8s.io"]
resources: ["ingresses"]
verbs: ["get", "list", "watch"]
- apiGroups: [""]
resources: ["services"]
verbs: ["get"]
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
metadata:
name: netbird-proxy-services-read
roleRef:
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: ClusterRole
name: netbird-proxy-services-read
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: netbird-proxy-services
namespace: openbao
---
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: netbird-proxy-services
namespace: openbao
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: netbird-proxy-services
spec:
replicas: 1
# One writer against the management API at a time.
strategy:
type: Recreate
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: netbird-proxy-services
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: netbird-proxy-services
spec:
serviceAccountName: netbird-proxy-services
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
# Numeric, or the kubelet refuses the image's named user with
# "cannot verify user is non-root". The script needs no home and no
# writable path, so nobody/nogroup is enough.
runAsUser: 65534
runAsGroup: 65534
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: controller
# Pinned by digest: the date tag is rebuilt on every push of the
# image directory, so the tag alone cannot express a new build.
image: gitea.renner.uno/gitea_admin/netbird-proxy-services:2026-09-07@sha256:0d266b0288aec692c698ff5c05f76c826e247bfef365e0306a0b9a6541ebf180
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
env:
- name: NB_MANAGEMENT_URL
value: https://netbird.renner.uno
- name: BAO_ADDR
value: http://openbao.openbao.svc.cluster.local:8200
- name: BAO_ROLE
value: netbird-proxy-services
# Must match cluster.network.serviceSubnets in talos/patches/cluster.yaml.
- name: SERVICE_CIDR
value: "10.96.0.0/12"
- name: TRAEFIK_SERVICE
value: ingress/traefik
- name: INTERVAL_SECONDS
value: "60"
resources:
requests:
cpu: 10m
memory: 32Mi
limits:
memory: 64Mi
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
- deployment.yaml
@@ -31,7 +31,5 @@ resources:
- traefik-crowdsec-middleware.yaml
- traefik-rate-limit-middleware.yaml
- traefik-security-headers-middleware.yaml
# Phase 1 of a two-Kustomization move: also still in crowdsec/lapi-ingress.yaml
# until this layer has applied it once, so prune never runs ahead of apply.
- crowdsec-lapi-serverstransport.yaml
- ../network-policies/
@@ -93,13 +93,17 @@ spec:
# Real client-IP visibility. The netbird-ingress routing peer
# re-originates every mesh + WAN-via-proxy connection from its own
# pod IP (rootless userspace WireGuard), so Traefik's TCP peer for
# that traffic is always a pod IP (e.g. fd10:244::2de1) — collapsing
# all external clients to one source. The NetBird reverse-proxy
# (HTTP mode, on the VPS) sets X-Forwarded-For with the real WAN
# client IP; trust the pod CIDRs so Traefik reads it instead. Without
# this, a CrowdSec bouncer bans the shared pod IP and 403s everyone
# (the 2026-06-27 IPv6 outage). Harmless no-op when no XFF is present
# (direct LAN/mesh) — those keep their RemoteAddr.
# that traffic is always a pod IP — collapsing all external clients
# to one source. The NetBird reverse-proxy services are TLS
# passthrough and carry the WAN client address in a PROXY protocol
# v2 header (options.proxy_protocol, set by netbird-proxy-services);
# X-Forwarded-For stays trusted for HTTP-mode services. Both are
# accepted from the pod CIDRs only; connections without a header
# (direct LAN/mesh) keep their RemoteAddr.
proxyProtocol:
trustedIPs:
- "10.244.0.0/16"
- "fd10:244::/56"
forwardedHeaders:
trustedIPs:
- "10.244.0.0/16"