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Author SHA1 Message Date
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 f51eb8bf35 docs(runbook): drop the claim that a cold rebuild needs console access
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The rewrite earlier today stated, at the top and again in known gaps, that the
rebuild cannot be driven remotely: management is a tagged VLAN, a maintenance
mode node cannot configure VLANs, so it comes up unreachable and every machine
needs a keyboard.

That is wrong. A maintenance-mode node DHCPs untagged and is reachable at that
address — it is not on management, but it answers, and that is precisely the
address `apply-config --insecure` targets in Step 2. All three bare-metal
conversions were driven that way.

The claim came from #576 and was carried into this document without being
checked against what had actually happened days earlier in this repo. It is the
worst place to put an unverified constraint: a disaster-recovery runbook is read
when there is no capacity to discover that a stated prerequisite is fiction, and
"you need physical access to three machines" is exactly the kind of statement
that changes whether someone attempts a recovery at all.

What survives is narrower and true: MS-01 has no IPMI and nothing here does
PXE, so booting from USB is physical. Everything after the boot is remote.

Also removes the follow-on error from the first correction, which claimed the
switch port change on 2026-08-27 had fixed a reachability problem. There was no
reachability problem to fix. That change is real and useful — a maintenance mode
node now lands in management rather than the fallback network — but it did not
turn an impossible rebuild into a possible one.

#576 still carries the original claim and is flagged in known gaps as wrong.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 11:25:50 +02:00
k.renner d1e072146f Merge pull request 'docs(runbook): rewrite the cold rebuild for bare metal' (#661) from runbook-cold-rebuild-baremetal into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#661
2026-08-27 08:11:24 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 4678f73e9f docs(runbook): rewrite the cold rebuild for bare metal
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Step 1 was "tofu: provision the VMs" and there are no VMs. The OpenTofu stack
has no node definitions left — only the uninstantiated proxmox_vm module beside
DNS, object storage and UniFi — so `tofu apply` provisions nothing and Step 2
then has no cluster to form. The document was half-updated: it knew k8s-1 was
bare metal but still treated k8s-2 and k8s-3 as Proxmox VMs, which stopped
being true at the neptune conversion.

That matters more than an ordinary stale doc, because it is the document
someone reaches for when everything is gone — exactly when there is no capacity
to discover that step one is fiction.

Step 1 splits into two unrelated halves: a tofu apply for platform resources
that do still exist, and physically booting three machines from install media.

Step 2 stops calling `bootstrap.sh talos`, which cannot generate a config
(#581), and carries the procedure that actually works — the one
RUNBOOK-baremetal-conversion.md uses. Both traps it hides are now stated: the
whole cilium-cni.yaml cannot be passed as a patch, and the generated
HostnameConfig collides with the per-node hostname. So is the two-stage apply:
a config referencing an interface that does not exist yet hangs the install at
STAGE: Installing with nothing timing out.

Scoped that claim rather than repeating "bootstrap.sh is dead" wholesale — the
flux and wait-apps phases are still used in Steps 3, 5 and 6 and work. Only
config generation is broken, and saying otherwise would have left the runbook
contradicting itself three sections later.

Adds the constraint that decides whether this is even attemptable remotely, at
the top and again in known gaps: management is a tagged VLAN, a maintenance
mode node cannot configure VLANs, and MS-01 has no IPMI. Every node needs a
keyboard and a monitor until #576 puts VLAN 40 native on the I226-V port. That
was true before today and undocumented.

Also records what changed under the runbook recently: the schematic now carries
i915, Ceph's cluster network is a Multus attachment rather than host
networking, and OpenBao runs three replicas that each need unsealing
individually — a sealed server is neither a voter nor a standby, so doing one
leaves the cluster short of quorum.

Disk verification before install is now explicit. Talos enumerates NVMe in an
order that is not stable across boots, the per-node configs select by serial for
that reason, and the failure mode is the installer taking the Ceph OSD drive.

Closes #660.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 10:09:50 +02:00
k.renner 5f8c0115b5 Merge pull request 'fix(monitoring): raise VeleroBackupStale from 30h to 60h' (#658) from velero-stale-60h into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#658
2026-08-27 07:36:12 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 e2f3d67f79 fix(monitoring): raise VeleroBackupStale from 30h to 60h
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At 30h a single missed cycle pages critical, and a single missed cycle is the
normal cost of touching the nodes. Velero moves data through pods, so draining
a node kills whatever upload is in flight and the schedule is lost for that day
— it is not retried. Backup windows run 03:15 to 08:45 UTC, so any rolling node
work overlapping them produced a guaranteed critical alert per affected
schedule.

That is noise about planned work, not signal about backups. It fired for eleven
schedules during the bare-metal Talos upgrade and again today.

60h still catches what the rule exists for. Two consecutive failures is no
longer explicable by one maintenance window. Nothing is hidden in the meantime:
VeleroBackupFailed fires on the first failure regardless, so the first cycle is
still visible — only the escalation to critical waits for a second cycle to
confirm it.

Calibration against the current state: the four stale schedules sit at 46.8 to
48.5 hours since their last success, so the new threshold leaves roughly twelve
hours — exactly until today's runs. If those fail too, the alert fires, which
is the intended behaviour rather than a gap.

Verified: the rule passes a server-side dry run, the expression returns nothing
at 60h, and the same query at a lower bound returns the four affected schedules
with their ages — so the selector is known to match rather than merely silent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 09:35:09 +02:00
k.renner 7b0b664a46 Merge pull request 'chore(talos): move to v1.13.9' (#656) from talos-1-13-9 into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#656
2026-08-27 06:57:58 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 3abdeb2203 chore(talos): move to v1.13.9
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Nodes run v1.12.11, which is the last 1.12 patch — v1.12.12 does not exist.
v1.13.9 is current.

The upgrade path is the documented one rather than a shortcut. Migration is
only tested between adjacent minor releases, and the recommendation is to go
to the latest patch of each intermediate minor. 1.12.11 -> 1.13.9 satisfies
both: one minor step, taken from the last patch of the version being left. No
intermediate hop is needed.

Kubernetes is not forced along. Talos 1.13's support matrix lists 1.36, 1.35,
1.34, 1.33, 1.32 and 1.31, and the cluster runs 1.35.2 — so it stays there
until `talosctl upgrade-k8s` moves it as a separate decision. This was the one
open question before the jump and it is answered from the matrix rather than
assumed.

Deprecations in 1.13 were checked against this cluster, not just read:

  .machine.env -> EnvironmentConfig          not used
  .machine.network.kubespan -> KubeSpanConfig not used
  EtcdConfigs/KubeletConfigs protobuf change  no consumer in this repo
  legacy upgrade API -> LifecycleService      still functional; `talosctl
                                              upgrade` keeps working, this
                                              only matters once it is removed

Both the five machine-config files here and the live config on k8s-1 were
checked for the first two, because the running config is generated from a base
this repo only patches and could carry fields the patches never mention.
Neither appears in either.

The removed interactive installer and the dropped `talosctl install` do not
apply — installation here is `talosctl upgrade --image` and Image Factory
media.

Schematic is unchanged; the factory image was verified to exist for the new
tag before committing. The cold-rebuild ISO URL moves with it.

Not applied to any node. Rolling it out is drain -> upgrade -> wait for Ceph
to return to 217 PGs active+clean, one node at a time, as in the 1.12.11 run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 08:56:20 +02:00
k.renner cdebaba2d3 Merge pull request 'chore(rook-ceph): return mon_data_avail_warn to the Ceph default' (#655) from ceph-mon-disk-warn-default into master
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2026-08-27 06:40:38 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 dd311f4b01 chore(rook-ceph): return mon_data_avail_warn to the Ceph default
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The override existed because the mons share the node's /var with containerd,
and on the VMs that was ~60 GB — 30% free measured image and snapshot churn
rather than anything about Ceph, so k8s-2 tripped MON_DISK_LOW whenever the
image cache filled and GC could not reclaim it (#434).

Bare metal removed the premise. /var is now ~931 GB per node at 7-8% used, so
30% free is a real reserve again and the ~106 MB mon database is irrelevant
against it. Reaching 70% would be a genuine signal about the node rather than
noise about the image cache. The comment still described the 60 GB VM /var and
ended with "BARE-METAL MIGRATION: revisit this", which is now done.

Set to 30 rather than deleted, deliberately. `ceph config` keeps a value that
only disappears from this file: `ceph config dump` currently shows
`mon advanced mon_data_avail_warn 20`, and removing the line would leave it
there indefinitely. That is the trap the bluestore settings below already
document, and the one that crash-looped an OSD during the network provider
change when public_network survived being deleted here.

mon_data_avail_crit stays at the 5% default, and CephMonDiskLow in
monitoring-rules still watches /var directly for the real risk, which is the
node filling rather than the mon growing.

kubectl diff against the live cluster shows the value and the generation bump,
nothing else. Verify after it applies with
`ceph config get mon mon_data_avail_warn` — 30 there is the proof the database
entry was overwritten and not merely edited in git.

Supersedes the remaining half of #503, which was closed as overtaken by the
bare-metal migration.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 08:37:46 +02:00
k.renner 36e683aee1 Merge pull request 'fix: [alert] TargetDown (default) (#635)' (#644) from alert-fix/issue-635 into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#644
2026-08-27 06:35:54 +00:00
k.renner c34b423d38 Merge pull request 'chore(rook-ceph): give the SAN pool the whole /29 now the nodes are off it' (#654) from ceph-san-pool-widen into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#654
2026-08-27 06:35:12 +00:00
k.renner 5fd0691ed2 Merge pull request 'fix(talos): stop the VLAN parents autoconfiguring on the fallback network' (#653) from no-ipv6-on-vlan-parents into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#653
2026-08-27 06:34:51 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 f0f0b0af9d chore(rook-ceph): give the SAN pool the whole /29 now the nodes are off it
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The pool was .4-.6 because the nodes held .1-.3 for as long as Ceph needed
host networking to reach VLAN 49 — three addresses for three OSDs, with no
spare, during the one phase where things were actually moving.

The nodes have since given those addresses up: the link is only a macvlan
parent now and does not need one of its own. The reservation has nothing left
to avoid, so the pool takes .1 through .6.

Six for three is the headroom the migration could not afford. It leaves room
for a leaked allocation to sit until the whereabouts reconciler collects it —
the case where a node is lost hard enough that the CNI DEL never runs — and
room to add a second OSD per node without touching this file.

Keeping the pool inside the /29 rather than moving it somewhere roomier on the
segment stays deliberate. There is no router here, so an address outside the
/29 is unreachable from anything using one inside it, which is what would
break a future rolling change where migrated and un-migrated OSDs still have
to talk to each other. That was nearly the shape of this attachment and it
would have taken every pool down at the first OSD.

Inert for the running cluster: a NetworkAttachmentDefinition is read when a
pod is created, so the three existing OSDs keep .4, .5 and .6 until they next
restart for some other reason.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 08:03:46 +02:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 4c6c23377d fix(talos): stop the VLAN parents autoconfiguring on the fallback network
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The cluster had no IPv6 egress. Pods could not reach the IPv6 internet at all
while IPv4 from the same pod worked normally.

enp2s0f0np0 is nothing but the trunk parent for mgmt0 and ens19, and enp87s0
is unused. Both sit on the untagged fallback network, where by design nothing
is supposed to run — and both were autoconfiguring from its router
advertisements: an fd00::/64 ULA each, plus an IPv6 default route each.

That left four IPv6 default routes per node at identical priority 1024 —
mgmt0, enp2s0f0np0, enp87s0 and lo — of which only mgmt0 has a globally
routable source address. With nothing to break the tie, outbound IPv6 mostly
left through an interface whose only usable source was a ULA.

This is the same argument the file already makes for ens19, where host
addresses on a link that exists only as a macvlan parent are called "never
needed and actively harmful". It was simply never extended to the physical
ports.

How it surfaced: NetbirdRelayMemberDown and NetbirdPublicEdgeMemberDown had
been firing for 30 hours, reading as though the proxies were down. They were
not — every failing target is an IPv6 literal and the blackbox exporter is a
pod, so the probes were failing on cluster egress. The proxies answered IPv6
in 13 ms from a workstation on another VLAN throughout.

Applied to k8s-1 first and verified before rolling to the other two, because
the existing precedent disables v6 on a VLAN *child* while this targets VLAN
*parents*, and mgmt0 carries the address Ceph and Cilium use:

  mgmt0 kept 2003:d6:9718:3b02:… and fd40::…    unchanged
  fd00:: addresses                              2 -> 0
  IPv6 default routes                           4 -> 2 (mgmt0, lo)
  failing blackbox probes                       5 -> 0
  Ceph                                          217 PGs active+clean, no OSD restart

All three nodes are already patched live; this puts it in git so the next
apply-config does not undo it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 07:51:51 +02:00
k.renner f7f04281c0 Merge pull request 'fix: [alert] AlertmanagerClusterFailedToSendAlerts (monitoring) (#649)' (#650) from alert-fix/issue-649 into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#650
2026-08-27 04:54:09 +00:00
k.renner c4a6d72cd6 Merge pull request 'fix: [alert] KubeStatefulSetReplicasMismatch (openbao) (#645)' (#648) from alert-fix/issue-645 into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#648
2026-08-27 04:53:56 +00:00
k.renner 8c019e50d2 Merge pull request 'feat(monitoring): alert on OpenBao replicas being unavailable' (#647) from openbao-alerting into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#647
2026-08-27 04:53:34 +00:00
security-bot c9e9830092 chore(image-automation): bump ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.10.0
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Updates managed by image-automation-controller.
2026-08-27 01:17:36 +00:00
issue-fix-bot 7e825aff0f fix: [alert] AlertmanagerClusterFailedToSendAlerts (monitoring) (#649)
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2026-08-26 23:45:38 +00:00
issue-fix-bot 781b849adb fix: [alert] KubeStatefulSetReplicasMismatch (openbao) (#645)
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2026-08-26 22:45:57 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 af81045277 feat(monitoring): alert on OpenBao replicas being unavailable
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There was no OpenBao alerting of any kind — no rule, no ServiceMonitor. That
is why today's seal went unnoticed for two hours: the k8s-1 Talos upgrade
sealed the single replica, the ClusterSecretStore went InvalidProviderConfig,
and nothing said so.

Three replicas make this more important rather than less. Before, a seal was a
visible outage that announced itself. Now the service survives one, so a
sealed replica is a quiet loss of redundancy that nothing surfaces until the
next drain takes quorum with it.

Watches pod readiness rather than a seal metric, because there is no seal
metric to watch. OpenBao is not scraped: no ServiceMonitor exists, and its
metrics endpoint needs a token or an explicit unauthenticated_metrics_access
telemetry setting, neither configured. Verified against the running
Prometheus — no bao_* or vault_* series at all. External Secrets exports
nothing usable either, so the ClusterSecretStore going NotReady is invisible.

Readiness carries the signal for a structural reason, not by luck: a sealed
server fails its readiness probe because it can neither serve requests nor act
as a raft standby. Sealed is therefore always not-Ready. The converse does not
hold — a crash or stuck scheduling fires the same alert — but those want a
human too.

Three rules:

  OpenBaoReplicaNotReady   < 3 ready for 10m, warning. The duration only
                           ignores ordinary rescheduling; a sealed replica
                           never recovers on its own.
  OpenBaoQuorumLost        < 2 ready for 5m, critical. Raft quorum of three
                           is two, so below that the store is down.
  OpenBaoMetricsMissing    absent() for 15m, warning. Both rules above are
                           threshold comparisons, so if the series disappears
                           they stop evaluating and the silence is
                           indistinguishable from health.

Verified against the running Prometheus rather than assumed: the selector
matches (the same query with `< 4` returns the series at 3), and the alerting
thresholds correctly return nothing at 3/3 ready. Testing only that it returns
nothing would not have caught a typo in the selector.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 23:00:10 +02:00
k.renner 71d6bd3724 Merge pull request 'feat(openbao): run three raft replicas so a node drain is not an outage' (#646) from openbao-ha-3-replicas into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#646
2026-08-26 20:51:03 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 0809823511 feat(openbao): run three raft replicas so a node drain is not an outage
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OpenBao ran a single replica. Every node drain took the whole secret store
down with it: today the k8s-1 Talos upgrade sealed it, the ClusterSecretStore
went InvalidProviderConfig, and it stayed that way for two hours because
nothing was watching.

Three, not two. Raft needs a quorum and the quorum of two is two, so a
two-replica cluster tolerates no failures — it would stop the moment one pod
is sealed or rescheduled, which is worse than the single replica it replaced.
Three tolerates one.

What this buys: a drain seals the replica on that node, and raft elects a new
leader from the remaining standbys within seconds. The service does not go
down.

What it does not buy, stated plainly because it is easy to assume otherwise: a
sealed server can neither serve requests nor act as a standby, so that replica
stays out of the cluster until someone unseals it. Scaling removes the outage,
not the manual unseal. For rolling node maintenance the consequence matters —
a Talos upgrade drains all three nodes in turn, so unseal each replica as it
comes back, or the third drain takes the last unsealed one and quorum is lost
anyway.

retry_join is what makes a scaled replica join the existing cluster rather
than come up isolated and uninitialized; without it each new pod would need a
manual `bao operator raft join`. All three peers are listed on every node —
the stanza is a list of possible leaders, a node ignores its own entry, and
listing all three keeps the config identical across replicas regardless of
which pod currently leads. Addressed through the headless service so each
entry resolves to one specific pod.

The snapshot job moves from the plain service to openbao-active. With one
replica the plain service could only ever hit the one pod; with three it
selects any of them, and a raft snapshot has to be taken against the leader.

No affinity was added: the chart already applies a required podAntiAffinity on
kubernetes.io/hostname, so the replicas spread across the three nodes on their
own — verified against the running StatefulSet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 22:49:41 +02:00
issue-fix-bot 5155581fba fix: [alert] TargetDown (default) (#635)
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2026-08-26 20:45:37 +00:00
k.renner 96acff3456 Merge pull request 'chore(talos): drop the node addresses on the Ceph SAN' (#643) from ceph-san-cleanup into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#643
2026-08-26 20:18:18 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 b5a1818896 chore(talos): drop the node addresses on the Ceph SAN
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The nodes held 10.99.0.1-.3/29 on enp2s0f1np1 only because reaching that link
required CephCluster.spec.network.provider: host, which is not per-daemon and
put every Ceph daemon on host networking. Rook now attaches the link to the
OSD pods through a Multus macvlan, and a macvlan parent only needs to be up —
it does not need an address of its own for its children to work.

By the rule this segment is built on — Ceph-internal traffic and nothing else,
no router, no other participants — the node has no business holding an address
there either. This is stricter than before, not looser.

The link keeps up: true and mtu: 9000. Both still matter: the parent must be
up for the macvlan children to exist, and the MTU is what the children
inherit.

Not in this commit, deliberately: widening the attachment's whereabouts pool
from .4-.6 to the full /29. That must not land before these addresses are
actually gone from the running nodes, or whereabouts could hand .1 to an OSD
while a node still holds it. Follow-up once these configs are applied and
verified.

Also records the one-time step that the manifests cannot express. Removing
addressRanges did not clear public_network and cluster_network from Ceph's
config database — the same trap the bluestore comment in the same file
describes. The first OSD of the phase A rollout came up on the pod network,
still had public_network 10.2.40.0/24 in the config database, found no
interface in it and crash-looped on "Failed to pick public address". Both keys
were removed by hand. A rebuild from scratch will not hit this because the
config database starts empty; another provider change on a live cluster will.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 22:17:15 +02:00
k.renner 1a94adb4c4 Merge pull request 'feat(rook-ceph): attach the cluster network via Multus (phase B of two)' (#642) from ceph-provider-phase-b into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#642
2026-08-26 20:08:31 +00:00
k.renner e9f3175b5b Merge pull request 'refactor(rook-ceph): drop the host network provider (phase A of two)' (#640) from ceph-provider-phase-a into master
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Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#640
2026-08-26 19:54:07 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 a775b675d4 feat(rook-ceph): attach the cluster network via Multus (phase B of two)
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Puts the OSDs back on the VLAN 49 link that phase A gave up, without putting
every Ceph daemon on host networking to get there.

The cluster network is an OSD concern. Per the Ceph documentation it carries
OSD heartbeat, replication and recovery, and "Ceph Monitors always operate on
the public network". Reaching it through addressRanges required
provider: host, which is not per-daemon — the mons went onto host networking
as a side effect, making a mon's address the node's DHCP lease.

That failure is documented rather than hypothetical. When a lease moved, the
mon could not bind ("Cannot assign requested address") and crash-looped. Rook
detected it and began a failover, but with three mons on three nodes each
holding the mon host ports the replacement could not be scheduled anywhere —
the canary sat Pending on "didn't have free ports". Two of three nodes hit it
during the Talos v1.12.11 upgrade; both needed hand intervention.

Selecting only `cluster` leaves `public` on the pod network, so mons, MDS,
MGR and the CSI pods keep Rook-managed identities and hold no host ports.
That removes the failure mode rather than working around it.

Isolation is not weakened. Rook's Multus prerequisites about hosts routing to
the Multus network apply to a Multus *public* network; selecting only
`cluster` means they do not apply here. VLAN 49 stays Ceph-internal traffic
and nothing else, with no router and no other participants.

MUST NOT be applied before phase A. Verified rather than assumed — kubectl
diff against the current cluster refuses it:

  spec.network.provider: Invalid value: "multus": network provider must be
  disabled (reverted to empty string) before a new provider is enabled

Second of the two rolling OSD restarts, bounded by the same two settings: one
OSD at a time, only once PGs are clean.

Follow-up, not in this commit: once this settles, the node addresses on VLAN
49 (10.99.0.1-.3) have no remaining purpose and should come out of the Talos
configs, after which the attachment's pool can take the whole /29 instead of
the three addresses it reserves today.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 21:52:38 +02:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 a6dd1f4be2 refactor(rook-ceph): drop the host network provider (phase A of two)
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Intermediate state, not a destination. san-network-attachment.yaml is already
in the cluster and stays unused until phase B sets provider: multus.

The detour is forced by Rook's own CRD validation, not chosen:

  rule:    self == '' || oldSelf == '' || self == oldSelf
  message: network provider must be disabled (reverted to empty string)
           before a new provider is enabled

host -> multus is rejected outright. It has to pass through empty, and an
empty provider means the default CNI — so addressRanges, which only takes
effect under provider: host, goes with it.

What this costs while it is in place: there is no cluster network. OSD
heartbeat, replication and recovery move onto the pod network and share it
with everything else instead of the dedicated X710 SFP+ link. Slower, and
every OSD restart pays that price in backfill. Not a correctness problem —
the OSDs can still reach one another throughout, which is the property that
matters, and the one a separate subnet would have broken.

The mons do not move here. Rook leaves existing mons on the network they were
created with; they change only on failover, which is deliberate and separate.

Bounded by the two settings that landed ahead of this: one OSD restarts at a
time, and only once PGs are clean again. Expect three sequential OSD restarts
with full recovery between them, and the same again in phase B.

kubectl diff against the live cluster shows provider host -> "" and the
generation bump. The removal of addressRanges does not appear there, because
this resource carries no managedFields and client-side diff cannot see a
field deletion. It is inert either way — Rook does not read addressRanges
without provider: host — but worth confirming after the apply rather than
assuming.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 21:51:08 +02:00
k.renner 5d923c84e0 Merge pull request 'fix(rook-ceph): bound OSD restarts to one at a time, gated on healthy PGs' (#639) from ceph-osd-update-safety into master
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2026-08-26 19:44:29 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 c88ee0e9a0 fix(rook-ceph): bound OSD restarts to one at a time, gated on healthy PGs
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Rook's defaults are wrong for a cluster this size, and nothing here had
overridden them:

  storage.osdMaxUpdatesInParallel   default 20
  upgradeOSDRequiresHealthyPGs      default false

Twenty parallel OSD restarts is a small fraction of a large cluster. Here it
is all three, at once, with no gate on PG recovery in between. Every PG goes
inactive and every pool — RBD volumes and both CephFS mounts — becomes
unreachable for the duration. Not a degraded cluster, a stopped one.

With three OSDs at size 3 there is no spare copy to absorb the second
restart, so the health gate between one OSD returning and the next going down
is the only thing separating a rolling change from an outage.

This binds any change that rewrites the OSD deployment spec, not only Ceph
version upgrades. The immediate reason is the pending network provider
switch, which is exactly such a change — but the exposure predates it and
would have applied to any of them.

Lands inert: `kubectl diff` against the live cluster shows the two added
fields and the generation bump, nothing else. No OSD deployment spec changes,
so nothing restarts.

Deliberately separate from the provider switch rather than bundled with it,
so the bound is in place and observed before the operation it exists to
bound.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 21:43:19 +02:00
k.renner b0a473d038 Merge pull request 'feat(rook-ceph): add the VLAN 49 attachment for Ceph's cluster network' (#638) from ceph-san-nad into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#638
2026-08-26 19:41:39 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 585ea36c9f fix(rook-ceph): keep the SAN pool on-link with the node addresses
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The pool was 10.99.1.0/24, a separate subnet on the same segment, chosen to
avoid carving up a /29 with only three addresses left. That choice would have
broken the migration it exists for.

OSDs move one at a time, so the cluster runs mixed: an OSD already on the
attachment has to reach an OSD still using its node's host address on
10.99.0.x. There is no router on this segment — by design, it carries
Ceph-internal traffic and nothing else — so a pool outside the /29 is
unreachable from the un-migrated side. The two OSDs would mark each other
down, during precisely the window that is supposed to be the safe one.

Moves the pool into 10.99.0.0/29 with range_start/range_end reserving .4-.6,
leaving .1-.3 to the nodes. That is one address per OSD with nothing spare,
which is sufficient rather than merely tolerable: osdMaxUpdatesInParallel
bounds the migration to one OSD at a time, so allocations grow 1, 2, 3 and
never overlap. Headroom returns after the switch is confirmed and the node
addresses come out of the Talos configs — then the pool takes the whole /29.

Verified: the embedded CNI JSON parses with the intended range and bounds;
the NAD passes a server-side dry run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 21:37:41 +02:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 296f79469e feat(rook-ceph): add the VLAN 49 attachment for Ceph's cluster network
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Step 2 of moving Ceph's cluster network off host networking. Inert on its
own: a NetworkAttachmentDefinition does nothing until a pod references it,
and nothing will until cephcluster.yaml names it under
network.selectors.cluster.

Why this exists at all: `addressRanges` only takes effect under
`provider: host`, so carrying replication over the dedicated 10G link meant
setting a provider that is not per-daemon. It puts mons on host networking
too, which makes a mon's address the node's DHCP lease — and when that lease
moves the mon cannot bind. Three mons on three nodes then each hold the mon
host ports, so Rook cannot schedule the replacement it just decided to create
and the failover stalls. Both happened during the v1.12.11 upgrade, on two of
three nodes.

None of that serves the goal. Per the Ceph documentation the cluster network
carries OSD heartbeat, replication and recovery only — "Ceph Monitors always
operate on the public network". Attaching it here gives the OSDs the link and
leaves every other daemon on the pod network.

Its own subnet rather than the existing /29. The nodes hold 10.99.0.1-.3 for
as long as Ceph still uses host networking, which leaves exactly three
addresses for three OSDs — no headroom during the one phase where things
actually move, and a leaked allocation from a hard node loss would mean an
OSD without an address. OSDs never need to reach the node addresses, since
the cluster network is OSD-to-OSD, so the pool sits in its own range on the
same segment instead. A /24 for three addresses costs nothing: nothing else
can ever live on this segment, and it takes address count off the table when
OSDs are added.

After the provider switch is confirmed, the node addresses on VLAN 49 have no
remaining purpose and can come out of the Talos configs.

No gateway and no routes, because there is no router on this segment and
there must not be one. That also means no `sbr` chaining, unlike the v30iot
attachments — there is no DHCP-supplied default route to confine here.

whereabouts for IPAM: dhcp needs a server that must not exist on the SAN, and
host-local keeps state per node with no cluster-wide coordination, so two
nodes would hand out the same address on shared L2.

MTU 9000 matches the link. macvlan inherits it, but stating it means a change
to the parent cannot silently halve replication throughput with nothing in
the tree recording the expectation.

Verified: whereabouts from step 1 is running on all three nodes with its
binary installed next to macvlan; the NAD passes a server-side dry run; the
embedded CNI JSON parses and carries the intended master, mtu, ipam type and
range.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 21:33:02 +02:00
k.renner f1f2c6ac6b Merge pull request 'feat(multus): add whereabouts IPAM for segments without a DHCP server' (#637) from whereabouts-ipam into master
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2026-08-26 19:28:54 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 ebd9625926 feat(multus): add whereabouts IPAM for segments without a DHCP server
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Groundwork for moving Ceph's cluster network off host networking. Nothing
references whereabouts yet, so this lands inert: no existing attachment
changes, and the DaemonSet only installs a CNI binary that nothing invokes
until a NetworkAttachmentDefinition names it.

The Ceph SAN on VLAN 49 carries Ceph-internal traffic and nothing else, by
design. Neither IPAM already available covers it:

  dhcp        cni-dhcp-daemon works where a DHCP server is on the wire.
              There is none on the SAN and there must not be one.
  host-local  installed by cni-plugins-installer, but it keeps allocation
              state per node with no cluster-wide coordination. On a shared
              L2 segment two nodes hand out the same address.

Whereabouts coordinates through the Kubernetes API — allocations live in the
ippools and overlappingrangeipreservations CRDs. Nothing about assigning an
address touches the segment being addressed, which is the property that makes
it usable on an isolated SAN.

The DaemonSet runs hostNetwork and privileged. That is upstream's shape, and
it matches what multus-daemonset.yaml, cni-dhcp-daemon.yaml and
cni-plugins-installer.yaml already do: the pod writes a CNI binary and its
config into /opt/cni/bin and /etc/cni/net.d, which is node plumbing, and it
has to work before the attachment it serves exists. It is the fourth instance
of an existing exception, not a new one.

The reconciler is split out deliberately. It needs no host access — only the
API, where the allocations are — so it runs as an ordinary pod-network
Deployment. It matters more than it looks: the normal release path is the CNI
DEL when a pod goes away, which does not run when a node is lost hard, and on
a /29 a handful of leaked addresses is the difference between an OSD getting
one and not.

Vendored from upstream v0.9.4 with the image tag pinned — upstream ships
`:latest`. Tag rather than digest, matching the other images in this
directory. The three CRDs are vendored unmodified so a future upstream diff
stays readable. nodeslicepools is included because the ClusterRole references
it, though the node-slice controller itself is not deployed.

Verified: kustomize builds; all nine resources pass a server-side dry run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 21:24:52 +02:00
k.renner 6716f7dc50 Merge pull request 'chore(talos): move to v1.12.11 and add i915 to the schematic' (#634) from talos-1-12-11 into master
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2026-08-26 16:44:36 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 d505503616 chore(talos): move to v1.12.11 and add i915 to the schematic
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The nodes run v1.12.6; v1.12.11 is the last patch of the 1.12 series. Upstream
tests migration only between adjacent minors and recommends going to the latest
patch of each intermediate minor, so 1.12.11 is the required stop before 1.13,
not an optional one.

Adds siderolabs/i915 while the image is being rebuilt anyway. Nothing requests
/dev/dri today — every manifest was checked, the only devices any workload asks
for are Ceph RBD and the NVMe disks by-id. It is included for the reason
thunderbolt already is: the extension set is fixed at install and upgrade time,
so adding it later would mean another rolling upgrade of all three nodes rather
than a config change. The MS-01's Alder Lake-P Iris Xe is present in hardware
either way.

New schematic 0f6fb8bd…, identical to a21cec8f… plus i915. Registered with the
Image Factory and the resulting installer image verified to exist for v1.12.11.

The absences are deliberate and now written down, so they are not re-derived as
gaps later: the X710 (i40e) and I226 (igc) NICs need no firmware extension —
intel-ice-firmware covers E810/ice only; mei is a prerequisite for Intel Arc
discrete GPUs and there are none; iscsi-tools, nvme-cli and util-linux-tools
have no consumer, since storage is Ceph RBD and device health comes from Ceph
rather than a node-level exporter.

Both runbooks move to the new schematic and version.

Note for whoever applies this: talosctl upgrade --image does NOT write
.machine.install.image, so this config has to be applied separately or the node
keeps pointing at whatever it was installed with. That is how the running nodes
ended up on ghcr.io/siderolabs/installer:v1.12.6 despite this file naming a
Factory image — which is also why talosctl get extensions is empty on all
three.

Kubernetes is untouched; talosctl upgrade does not move it. It stays on v1.35.2
and is a separate upgrade-k8s step.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 18:33:37 +02:00
k.renner 2ba950497d Merge pull request 'feat(home-assistant): relay IoT-VLAN mDNS into HA's zeroconf as unicast' (#633) from mdns-relay into master
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2026-08-26 15:46:41 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 664bc72eb4 fix(home-assistant): confine the mDNS relay's receive sockets to net1
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Both sockets bound the wildcard, so they accepted datagrams on eth0 as well as
net1. The namespace CNP grants every pod in home-assistant unrestricted access
to every other pod on every port, so any sibling pod could reach :5353 over the
cluster network and have records forwarded into HA's zeroconf cache. The
header comment described only the IoT-VLAN side of that.

so-bindtodevice=net1 confines delivery to datagrams that actually arrived on
the IoT VLAN interface. Binding to net1's address is still not possible — it is
DHCP-leased and unknown at exec time — but binding to the device gets the same
confinement without needing the address, and needs no capability: verified that
SO_BINDTODEVICE succeeds as uid 65534 with all capabilities dropped. Also
verified it costs no reception: 6 packets in 12s with the option, 6 in 12s
without.

Scope of what this fixes, stated exactly: the relay is not what makes HA's
zeroconf reachable from inside the cluster. HA binds :5353 on its pod address
(v4) and the wildcard (v6) — confirmed in /proc/net/udp and /proc/net/udp6 —
and the namespace CNP already permits any sibling pod to reach it directly.
This removes a second route to that listener, not the first.

Adds ipv6-v6only=1 on the v6 socket. The two containers share the pod's network
namespace, so a dual-stack v6 socket overlaps the v4 container's port. Measured
behaviour without it was no contention — both bound cleanly and the v4 receiver
kept taking packets throughout the v6 container's lifetime — so this is not a
latent bug being fixed, but the outcome depended on the kernel's bindv6only
default rather than on anything the manifest said. The roles are now explicit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 17:11:33 +02:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 14e45a540c fix(home-assistant): relay mDNS over IPv6 as well, not just IPv4
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The relay joined 224.0.0.251 only. mDNS is two protocols, and a socket joined
to one group hears nothing of the other, so every IPv6 announcement was
dropped — and a device that announces only over v6 would have stayed exactly
as invisible as before the relay existed.

Not hypothetical for this cluster: HA's zeroconf holds ff02::fb on eth0
alongside the v4 group, verified in /proc/net/igmp6. The listener was already
waiting for traffic the relay was never going to send it.

Adds a second socat container for the v6 group. Two processes rather than one
because socat carries a single address pair per invocation and the families
need different receive and send addresses. They fail independently and the
kubelet restarts each on its own.

Joining ff02::fb needs no address configuration on net1. The group is
link-local, so the kernel's automatic link-local address on the macvlan is
enough to receive on it; whether v30iot hands out global v6 addresses does not
affect reception.

The delivery Service becomes dual-stack (PreferDualStack with both families
listed, matching mosquitto-iot in this namespace), so each family is forwarded
over its own transport instead of folding v6 announcements into a v4 hop.
UDP4-SENDTO takes the A record and UDP6-SENDTO the AAAA from the same name.

Verified: the v6 socat address syntax parses and joins; a server-side dry run
allocates both families to the Service; all three manifests still apply.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 16:54:43 +02:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 4965f53990 feat(home-assistant): relay IoT-VLAN mDNS into HA's zeroconf as unicast
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HA's zeroconf listener joins 224.0.0.251 on eth0 and hears nothing. The HA
pod has received 0 multicast frames against 1.9M packets total. Two
independent reasons: multicast is link-local, so IoT-VLAN announcements never
reach the pod CIDR; and Cilium runs tunnel mode (VXLAN) with no
`enable-multicast`, so it does not replicate multicast between pods either.

The visible cost is that the ESPHome integration dials each device at the
address cached in its config entry and has no way to learn when that address
changes. A rotated lease produces `[Errno 113] Connect call failed` until
someone repoints the entry by hand. All eight ESPHome config entries were
created by `source=zeroconf` and now carry `discovery_keys: dhcp` — both
paths are inert today, so the addresses are frozen at whatever they were when
last discovered.

An avahi-style reflector cannot fix this. It receives on one interface and
re-emits as multicast on the other, and the second half is exactly what the
CNI drops. The published recipes for this all put avahi on the node, which
Talos does not permit.

So the relay bridges the last hop as unicast, which is the one direction the
CNI carries. It holds the multicast membership on v30iot through its own
macvlan and forwards each datagram to HA's :5353.

This works because python-zeroconf does not filter on how a packet arrived —
verified against _listener.py: datagram_received checks size, deduplicates,
and parses, with no test on destination address, source address, or source
port. Unicast mDNS is RFC 6762's QU mechanism, so this stays inside the
protocol.

Scope of the fix, stated plainly: passive reception only. RFC 6762 requires a
responder to re-announce when its address changes, which is the failure this
addresses, and new devices announcing themselves are seen too. Queries HA
sends still leave on eth0 and die there, so nothing that depends on
soliciting a response is restored.

No macvlan on the HA pod itself — that stays off-table, and the outcome since
it was removed supports keeping it that way. A separate relay was already the
recorded intent; this is that relay.

Shape follows shelly-manager-iot, which is the working precedent for L2
presence on v30iot: macvlan with DHCP IPAM, chained with sbr so the leased
default gateway cannot displace eth0's route. The forward path runs over eth0,
so that route has to survive.

Delivery target is a dedicated ClusterIP rather than the pod. socat resolves
its target once at start and cannot chase pod IPs; a ClusterIP is stable and
Cilium re-DNATs to the current backend. Kept separate from the
`home-assistant` Service, which fronts the nginx sidecar and is the XFF trust
anchor.

Exposure, since it is not zero: socat binds :5353 on all interfaces including
net1, because net1's address is DHCP-leased and unknown at exec time. Any host
on the IoT VLAN can send it a datagram that reaches HA's zeroconf cache — the
same trust already extended to real mDNS from that segment, which any device
there can equally forge. macvlan traffic bypasses Cilium policy, so the
namespace CNP does not constrain that interface. The container runs socat and
nothing else.

No CNP change needed: home-assistant-ns.yaml already allows intra-namespace
traffic on all ports.

Verified before committing: the socat address syntax joins the group and reads
in a loop without forking per datagram (UDP4-RECV, not UDP4-RECVFROM); it runs
as uid 65534 with no privileged operation; the image digest is pinned from the
registry; kustomize builds; all three manifests pass a server-side dry run.

Not yet verified, and only observable once deployed: that HA acts on the
forwarded records. The check is `discovery_keys` flipping back to zeroconf, or
a device surviving a lease change without hand-editing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 14:02:15 +02:00
k.renner e7c70ea368 Merge pull request 'fix(ansible): stop rotating netbird_proxy_token — Ansible does not own both ends' (#632) from netbird-rotate-migration into master
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2026-08-26 11:04:55 +00:00
k.renner 4187aa91cb Merge pull request 'docs(runbook): record the half-open socket failure after a node move' (#630) from runbook-stale-sockets into master
Reviewed-on: k.renner/homelab#630
2026-08-26 11:04:38 +00:00
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 c8b0d1cd4b docs(runbook): record the half-open socket failure after a node move
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Anything holding a long-lived TCP session to a device outside the cluster keeps
a half-open socket when the node under it moves. The peer drops its side; the
pod never learns, because no RST arrives and no keepalive fires.

This cost real time after the conversion. Home Assistant held seven ESTABLISHED
sockets to ESPHome devices that were themselves reporting "not connected". It
logged nothing and retried nothing, because as far as it knew the connections
were fine — so the search went through logs that were empty by construction.
The one device Home Assistant did log was the only one genuinely offline.

Records the check that settles it in one command, reading /proc/net/tcp in the
pod, and notes that reloading the integration is the lighter fix than
restarting the pod.

Placed in "Verify and restore" rather than the known-stale list: it is something
to check before calling a conversion finished, not a trap in the tooling.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 12:13:21 +02:00
27 changed files with 1453 additions and 101 deletions
+5 -1
View File
@@ -51,7 +51,11 @@ kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-0 -- bao operator unseal # paste key
```
**Manual unseal is required after every pod restart** (node drain, upgrade,
crash): `kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-0 -- bao operator unseal`.
crash), **per replica** — the server runs three raft peers (see
`infrastructure/openbao/helmrelease.yaml`), and a sealed one is neither a
voter nor a standby, so it stays out of the cluster until unsealed:
`kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-<N> -- bao operator unseal`, same key for
all three. Three peers mean one sealed replica is survivable; two are not.
Accepted for now; auto-unseal needs a second trust root (transit/KMS) and is
explicitly out of scope. Symptom of sealed: ESO stores go NotReady, synced
Secrets keep their last value (they are real k8s Secrets — pods keep running).
+30 -2
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@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ all in state that outlived the VM.
two hosts every PG is undersized with min_size 2, so one further OSD loss
blocks IO on every CephFS mount cluster-wide.
- [ ] Talos metal ISO on a USB stick. Schematic
`a21cec8f35ae32ab5e9a452e7b13500ca8776053930b8e182b9cb23eed186b64`
(`net.ifnames=1`, intel-ucode, thunderbolt; no qemu-guest-agent).
`0f6fb8bd8bb53013e9743b7c7b099d96fb9c32fd2464ced32693c2dc0ea5feb9`
(`net.ifnames=1`, intel-ucode, thunderbolt, i915; no qemu-guest-agent).
Verify by comparing partition offsets and sizes against the ISO with
`fdisk -l` — blkid labels lie after a rewrite.
- [ ] Physical access. Secure Boot must be turned off (see below), and that is
@@ -383,6 +383,34 @@ raised to `high_recovery_ops` to speed the evacuation.
The retired Crucial leaves a stale entry in `ceph device ls`. Remove it with
`ceph config-key rm device/<devid>`; the mgr's devicehealth view may lag.
### Long-lived TCP sessions to devices outside the cluster die silently
Check this before declaring the conversion done. Anything holding a persistent
connection to a device on another VLAN — the ESPHome integration is the case
that bit us — keeps a half-open socket when the node underneath it moves. The
peer drops its side; the pod's side never learns, because no RST arrives and no
keepalive fires.
The symptom is that there is no symptom. Home Assistant logged nothing, retried
nothing, and reported the devices as connected. The devices themselves showed
"not connected". Hours went into reading logs that were empty by construction.
`/proc/net/tcp` in the pod settles it in one command — `01` is ESTABLISHED,
`02` is SYN_SENT, and the port is hex:
```sh
kubectl -n home-assistant exec <ha-pod> -c home-assistant -- \
sh -c 'grep ":17A5" /proc/net/tcp' # 17A5 = 6053, the ESPHome API
```
Seven `01` entries to devices insisting they were disconnected is the tell. A
`02` alongside them is a genuinely dead device, not a stale socket — that one
Home Assistant *was* retrying and *did* log.
Restarting the consuming pod clears it. Reloading just the integration from the
UI does the same with less disruption. Neither is discoverable from logs, which
is why it belongs here.
## Known-stale things that will bite
- `bootstrap.sh` cannot generate a config at all right now (issue #581), so a
+162 -38
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,25 @@
# Cold-rebuild runbook — homelab cluster from scratch
Rebuild the entire cluster from **this repo + backups only**, assuming nothing
in the cluster survives (all VMs gone, Ceph gone, in-cluster Gitea gone).
in the cluster survives (all three nodes wiped, Ceph gone, in-cluster Gitea
gone).
Order: **tofu → talos → flux → openbao → apps.**
All three nodes are bare-metal MS-01 machines. Nothing provisions them: there
are no VMs to recreate, and OpenTofu owns only DNS, object storage and UniFi.
Step 1 is therefore two unrelated halves — a `tofu apply` for the platform
resources, and physically booting three machines from install media.
**Someone has to be at the machines to boot them from USB** — MS-01 has no IPMI
and nothing here does PXE. Everything after that is remote.
A node in maintenance mode configures no VLANs and DHCPs untagged, so it comes
up on whatever untagged network its ports carry — not on management, which is
a tagged VLAN on the X710 trunk. It is reachable there: that is the address
`apply-config --insecure` talks to in Step 2, and it is how all three
bare-metal conversions were driven. Find the leases on the UDM.
## The circular-bootstrap problem this runbook exists to break
In steady state Flux's `GitRepository flux-system` pulls manifests from the
@@ -61,12 +76,21 @@ These must exist outside the cluster or the rebuild cannot complete:
`openbao-daily` offsite copy. In a total-loss rebuild the offsite Velero
copy is the one that survives.
- [ ] **Tooling:** `talosctl`, `kubectl`, `flux`, `tofu`, `bao`, plus the
OpenTofu backend + Proxmox/UniFi credentials the `opentofu/` stack needs.
OpenTofu backend + UniFi credentials the `opentofu/` stack needs. No
Proxmox credentials — there is no Proxmox any more.
- [ ] **Install media** written and to hand: the Image Factory ISO named in
Step 1, on a USB stick, for all three machines.
- [ ] **Someone at the machines to boot them from USB.** No IPMI, no PXE. A
monitor is useful for reading boot errors but is not required to find the
node afterwards — it DHCPs into management on its own (see the note at
the top). Everything past the boot is remote.
## Step 1 — tofu: provision the VMs + supporting infra
## Step 1a — tofu: DNS, object storage, UniFi
Recreate the Talos VMs and the platform resources OpenTofu owns (Proxmox VMs,
UniFi DNS records incl. `k8s.renner.uno` / node A records, etc.).
OpenTofu no longer provisions any node. The `proxmox_vm` module still exists in
the tree but nothing instantiates it, so `tofu apply` here creates only the
platform resources: UniFi DNS records including `k8s.renner.uno` and the node A
records, the Hetzner object storage, and the NAT hairpin rules.
```sh
cd opentofu
@@ -74,44 +98,119 @@ tofu init -upgrade -backend-config="access_key=..." -backend-config="secret_key=
tofu apply
```
In CI this is `.woodpecker/deploy-infrastructure.yml` (manual, `TOFU_APPLY=true`),
which also pre-seeds the Talos image onto every Proxmox node. Wait until the
node FQDNs (`k8s-{1,2,3}.srv.renner.uno`) resolve and the VMs are up before
Step 2 — `bootstrap.sh` polls DNS but will not create the records.
Run this first regardless, because Step 2 needs `k8s.renner.uno` and the node
FQDNs to resolve — the control-plane endpoint is baked into every generated
config, and the nodes are addressed by name.
**k8s-1 is not a VM and OpenTofu does not create it.** jupiter runs Talos on
bare metal, so this step only provisions k8s-2 (saturn) and k8s-3 (neptune).
Before Step 2, boot jupiter from the bare-metal image below so it comes up in
maintenance mode and answers on `k8s-1.srv.renner.uno` — `bootstrap.sh` treats
all three nodes identically from there, since `apply-config --insecure` does
not care whether the target is a VM or bare metal.
## Step 1b — boot all three machines from install media
```
https://factory.talos.dev/image/a21cec8f35ae32ab5e9a452e7b13500ca8776053930b8e182b9cb23eed186b64/v1.12.6/metal-amd64.iso
https://factory.talos.dev/image/0f6fb8bd8bb53013e9743b7c7b099d96fb9c32fd2464ced32693c2dc0ea5feb9/v1.13.9/metal-amd64.iso
```
That schematic is deliberately not the one `.woodpecker/deploy-infrastructure.yml`
seeds onto the Proxmox nodes. It keeps the same `net.ifnames=1` kernel argument
— without it the predictable interface names that `talos/patches/k8s-1.yaml`
matches its VLAN parents against do not exist — and differs in three ways:
Write it to a USB stick and boot each MS-01 from it. Each comes up in
maintenance mode with a DHCP address on an untagged network — not on
management, which is tagged. Read the leases off the UDM; those addresses are
what Step 2 applies the first config to.
- drops `siderolabs/qemu-guest-agent`, which has nothing to talk to on bare metal
- adds `siderolabs/intel-ucode`, since no hypervisor is supplying microcode now
- adds `siderolabs/thunderbolt`, unused so far and inert until
`machine.kernel.modules` requests `thunderbolt`/`thunderbolt_net`. It is
present only so enabling the MS-01 Thunderbolt mesh later does not require a
new image and a reinstall. Note its udev rule auto-authorises any Thunderbolt
device attached to the machine once those modules are loaded.
The schematic `0f6fb8bd…` carries `net.ifnames=1` — without it the predictable
interface names that `talos/patches/k8s-{1,2,3}.yaml` match their VLAN parents
against do not exist, and the node ends up with no address on any interface.
Beyond that it carries:
- `siderolabs/intel-ucode` — no hypervisor supplies microcode here
- `siderolabs/i915` — the Alder Lake-P Iris Xe. Nothing requests `/dev/dri`
today; present so wanting hardware transcoding later is a config change
rather than another rolling reinstall
- `siderolabs/thunderbolt` — inert until `machine.kernel.modules` requests
`thunderbolt`/`thunderbolt_net`, present for the same reason. Note its udev
rule auto-authorises any Thunderbolt device attached once those modules load
- no `qemu-guest-agent`, which has nothing to talk to on bare metal
Verify the disks before going further. Talos enumerates NVMe in an order that
is not stable across boots, and the per-node configs select by serial for
exactly that reason — the failure mode is the installer taking the Ceph OSD
drive. `talosctl -n <maintenance-ip> --insecure get disks` should show three
NVMe devices whose serials match the `diskSelector` and `VolumeConfig` entries
in `talos/patches/k8s-N.yaml`.
## Step 2 — talos: form the cluster + get kubeconfig
**Do not use `kubernetes/bootstrap.sh talos`.** That phase cannot generate a
config: it passes `talos/patches/cilium-cni.yaml` whole, and that file's
`$patch: delete` document fails against a base with no `inlineManifests`
(#581). Its other phases — `flux`, `wait-apps` — are still used, in Steps 3, 5
and 6; only config generation is broken.
The procedure below is what actually works, and is the same one
`RUNBOOK-baremetal-conversion.md` uses.
### Generate the configs
This is a genuinely new cluster — nothing survives to copy secrets from, so
generate them fresh. (In a *partial* rebuild, where one node still runs, pull
secrets off it instead with `talosctl get mc v1alpha1` + `gen secrets
--from-controlplane-config`, or the new node forms its own cluster rather than
joining.)
```sh
kubernetes/bootstrap.sh talos
talosctl gen secrets -o secrets.yaml
for N in 1 2 3; do
talosctl gen config homelab https://k8s.renner.uno:6443 \
--with-secrets secrets.yaml --output-types controlplane \
--config-patch @talos/patches/cluster.yaml \
--config-patch @<cilium additive half> \
--config-patch @talos/patches/registry-mirror.yaml \
--config-patch @talos/patches/k8s-$N.yaml -o install-k8s-$N.yaml
done
```
Generates + applies Talos configs to `k8s-{1,2,3}`, bootstraps etcd/Kubernetes,
writes `~/.talos/config` + `~/.kube/config`, and stages both into
`kubernetes/access-staging/` for later phases. Ends when all 3 nodes are `Ready`.
Two things the generator gets wrong for this repo, both of which will bite
silently:
- **`cilium-cni.yaml` cannot be passed whole** — extract only its additive
second document. See issue #581.
- **Strip the generated `HostnameConfig`** — it collides with
`machine.network.hostname` from the per-node patch.
Validate each before applying:
```sh
talosctl validate --config install-k8s-$N.yaml --mode metal
```
### Apply in two stages
Do **not** apply the full per-node config in maintenance mode. A document that
references an interface which does not exist yet hangs the install: the node
sits at `STAGE: Installing` indefinitely with `KUBELET n/a` and `APISERVER n/a`,
and nothing times out. Concretely, the `ens19` VLAN document must be removed
from the first-stage config — its parent exists, but the install stalls anyway.
```sh
# Stage 1: minimal config, from the maintenance-mode address off the console
talosctl apply-config --insecure -n <maintenance-ip> --file install-k8s-$N-stage1.yaml
# Stage 2: once the node is up on management, apply the complete config
talosctl -n k8s-$N.srv.renner.uno apply-config --mode=try --timeout=5m --file install-k8s-$N.yaml
```
`--mode=try` rolls back on its own if the node becomes unreachable, which is the
only safety net there is for a network change that can strand a machine with no
IPMI. Use it for every network-affecting apply, then make it permanent once
proven.
### Bootstrap etcd, then collect access
Bootstrap **exactly one** node:
```sh
talosctl -n k8s-1.srv.renner.uno bootstrap
talosctl -n k8s-1.srv.renner.uno kubeconfig .
```
Ends when all three nodes are `Ready`. `scripts/import-cluster-access.sh` is the
supported way to get the kubeconfig into place afterwards.
## Step 3 — flux: bootstrap GitOps **from the GitHub mirror** (break-glass)
@@ -149,8 +248,8 @@ Secrets, and every secret-consuming app stays Pending. This step is **manual**
(the unseal key lives in `pass`, off-cluster by design).
```sh
# 1. Wait for the OpenBao pod to exist (sealed, 0/1 Ready is expected).
kubectl -n openbao get pod openbao-0
# 1. Wait for the OpenBao pods to exist (all three sealed, 0/1 Ready is expected).
kubectl -n openbao get pods
# 2. Restore the most recent raft snapshot. Source it from the snapshot PVC
# (infrastructure/openbao/snapshot-cronjob.yaml) or, in a total-loss rebuild,
@@ -158,8 +257,12 @@ kubectl -n openbao get pod openbao-0
kubectl -n openbao cp <snapshot>.snap openbao-0:/tmp/restore.snap
kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-0 -- bao operator raft snapshot restore /tmp/restore.snap
# 3. Unseal with the key from pass (threshold 1).
# 3. Unseal with the key from pass (threshold 1) — EVERY replica, same key.
# A sealed server is neither a raft voter nor a standby, so unsealing only
# openbao-0 leaves the three-peer cluster one node short of quorum.
kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-0 -- bao operator unseal # paste homelab/openbao/unseal-key
kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-1 -- bao operator unseal # same key
kubectl -n openbao exec -it openbao-2 -- bao operator unseal # same key
```
Verify the store recovers before moving on:
@@ -170,7 +273,9 @@ kubectl -n <ns> get externalsecret # want: SecretSynced
```
> **Manual unseal is required after every OpenBao pod restart**, not just
> during rebuilds. Details + rationale: `MIGRATION-sops-openbao.md`.
> during rebuilds, and for *each* replica that restarts — a rolling node
> drain seals all three in turn. Details + rationale:
> `MIGRATION-sops-openbao.md`.
## Step 5 — apps: let the rest reconcile
@@ -225,9 +330,28 @@ it: repo → **Settings → Repository → Mirror Settings** in Gitea, or
in-cluster commits made **after** Flux/Gitea broke are not on the mirror
(Gitea couldn't push them if Gitea itself was down). This is the intended
recovery point, but be aware of it when reconciling drift.
- `bootstrap.sh` has no `openbao` phase — Step 4 is manual because the unseal
key must not live in CI. See issue #187 for the open question of whether to
wire a semi-automated OpenBao restore.
- **Booting is physical; the rest is not.** MS-01 has no IPMI and nothing here
does PXE, so someone has to put a USB stick in three machines. From there it
is remote — a maintenance-mode node DHCPs untagged and is reachable at that
address, which is how all three bare-metal conversions were driven.
#576 claims a freshly booted node "comes up unreachable and must be installed
from a console". That is not what happens and has never been observed here.
- **`bootstrap.sh talos` is dead** — it cannot generate a config (#581), and
Step 2 no longer uses it. Its `flux` and `wait-apps` phases are still used in
Steps 3, 5 and 6 and work; do not read this as the whole script being gone.
It has also never had an `openbao` phase — Step 4 is manual because the
unseal key must not live in CI; see issue #187 on whether to wire a
semi-automated OpenBao restore.
- **OpenBao seals on every restart and each replica must be unsealed
individually.** Three raft replicas mean the service survives losing one, but
a sealed server is neither a voter nor a standby — unsealing only one leaves
the cluster short of quorum. Step 4 covers this; it is repeated here because
it is the step most likely to be half-done under pressure.
- Ceph's cluster network is a Multus attachment on VLAN 49 with whereabouts
IPAM, not host networking. Nothing in the rebuild needs special handling for
it — the nodes hold no address on that segment — but a rebuilt cluster will
not have the whereabouts allocations from before, which is harmless since
they are assigned fresh.
- warn-and-continue waits in the `flux` phase can mask a genuinely broken
Ceph/infra bring-up; always read the phase output rather than trusting the
exit code.
@@ -37,6 +37,13 @@ resources:
- esphome-service.yaml
- esphome-gate-service.yaml
- esphome-ingress.yaml
# mDNS relay — carries IoT-VLAN announcements into HA's zeroconf listener as
# unicast, which is the only direction the CNI will move them. Without it HA
# never learns that a device's DHCP lease moved. See the header comment in
# mdns-relay-deployment.yaml.
- mdns-relay-network-attachment.yaml
- mdns-relay-service.yaml
- mdns-relay-deployment.yaml
# Zigbee2MQTT — ZHA replacement bridge. Ships scaled to 0; the cutover
# runbook (zigbee2mqtt-migration-runbook.md) scales it up. The MQTT
# `zigbee2mqtt` broker user is provisioned by mosquitto-bootstrap.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
---
# mDNS relay: gives Home Assistant sight of the IoT VLAN's mDNS announcements
# without putting a macvlan on the HA pod itself.
#
# THE PROBLEM
#
# HA's zeroconf listener joins both mDNS groups on eth0 — 224.0.0.251 and
# ff02::fb — and never hears anything on either.
# Multicast is link-local, so IoT-VLAN announcements do not reach the pod
# CIDR; and Cilium runs in tunnel mode (VXLAN) without `enable-multicast`, so
# it does not replicate multicast between pods either. Both halves of the path
# are dead, which is why an avahi-style reflector — receive on one interface,
# re-emit as multicast on the other — cannot work here: the re-emitted packets
# would be dropped by the CNI.
#
# Consequence for HA: the ESPHome integration dials devices at the address
# cached in its config entry. When a lease rotates, every attempt fails with
# `[Errno 113] Connect call failed` and the device stays unreachable, because
# the mDNS announcement that would carry the new address never arrives. New
# devices are never discovered at all.
#
# THE MECHANISM
#
# This relay holds the multicast membership on the IoT VLAN through its own
# macvlan (mdns-relay-network-attachment.yaml) and forwards each datagram it
# receives to HA as ordinary UNICAST UDP. That is the one direction of travel
# the CNI will carry.
#
# It works because python-zeroconf does not filter on how a packet arrived:
# its datagram handler validates size, deduplicates, and parses, but performs
# no check on destination address, source address, or source port. A unicast
# datagram delivered to :5353 is processed exactly like a multicast one. (mDNS
# unicast responses are part of RFC 6762 — the QU bit — so this is within the
# protocol, not a trick.)
#
# WHAT THIS DOES AND DOES NOT RESTORE
#
# Restored: passive reception. RFC 6762 requires a responder to re-announce
# when its address changes, so a device that moves to a new lease announces
# the move, HA sees it, and the ESPHome integration updates the config entry.
# That is the failure this exists to fix. New devices announcing themselves
# are likewise seen.
#
# NOT restored: HA-initiated browsing. Queries HA sends leave on eth0 as
# multicast and die there, so HA cannot actively solicit a response. Anything
# depending on a query rather than an announcement stays broken. Making that
# work needs a querier on the VLAN side, which this relay deliberately is not.
#
# EXPOSURE
#
# The receive sockets carry so-bindtodevice=net1, so only datagrams that
# actually arrived on the IoT VLAN interface are delivered. Binding to net1's
# address instead is not possible — it is DHCP-leased and unknown at exec time
# — but binding to the device achieves the same confinement without needing to
# know the address, and needs no capability: SO_BINDTODEVICE succeeds as an
# unprivileged uid here.
#
# Without it socat would bind the wildcard, and since the namespace CNP grants
# every pod in home-assistant unrestricted access to every other pod on every
# port, any sibling pod could reach :5353 over the cluster network and have
# records forwarded into HA's zeroconf cache.
#
# What remains, and cannot be closed here: any host on the IoT VLAN can send
# this port a datagram. That is the same trust already extended to genuine
# mDNS from that segment, which any device there can equally forge — the relay
# widens who can reach HA's listener, not what can be claimed. macvlan traffic
# bypasses Cilium policy entirely, so the namespace CNP does not constrain
# this interface either way.
#
# Note that the relay is not what makes HA's zeroconf reachable from inside
# the cluster: HA binds :5353 on the pod address (v4) and the wildcard (v6),
# and the namespace CNP already permits any sibling pod to reach it directly.
# Confining the relay removes a second route to that listener; it does not
# remove the first.
#
# Nothing else is exposed: the containers run socat and only socat, with no
# second listener to reach.
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: mdns-relay
namespace: home-assistant
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: mdns-relay
spec:
# One replica. Extra replicas would deliver a duplicate of every announcement
# — harmless, since zeroconf deduplicates, but they buy nothing: this is a
# cache-refresh path, and a missed window is corrected by the next
# announcement.
replicas: 1
# Recreate, not RollingUpdate: two relays would briefly hold two DHCP leases
# on v30iot for one workload.
strategy:
type: Recreate
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: mdns-relay
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: mdns-relay
annotations:
k8s.v1.cni.cncf.io/networks: mdns-relay-iot
spec:
enableServiceLinks: false
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 65534
runAsGroup: 65534
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
# One container per address family. mDNS is two protocols — 224.0.0.251
# and ff02::fb — and a socket joined to one hears nothing of the other.
# HA listens on both (its zeroconf holds both groups on eth0), so a
# v4-only relay would silently drop every IPv6 announcement, and devices
# that announce only over v6 would stay invisible exactly as before.
#
# Two processes rather than one: socat carries a single address pair per
# invocation, and the families need different receive and send addresses.
# They are independent — one crashing does not blind the other — and each
# is restarted by the kubelet on its own.
containers:
# -u is load-bearing on both: unidirectional, left to right. Without it
# socat would also carry HA's replies back out, and this must stay a
# one-way tap.
#
# UDP{4,6}-RECV (not -RECVFROM) keeps reading from one socket instead of
# forking per datagram — the IoT VLAN's mDNS chatter is continuous, and
# a fork per packet would be a process storm.
#
# The group is joined on net1 specifically, so the relay subscribes on
# the IoT VLAN rather than on the pod network.
#
# Both send targets are the same ClusterIP name, resolved once at start;
# UDP4-SENDTO takes its A record and UDP6-SENDTO its AAAA. See
# mdns-relay-service.yaml for why that indirection is required and why
# the Service is dual-stack.
- name: socat-ipv4
image: alpine/socat:1.8.0.3@sha256:beb4a68d9e4fe6b0f21ea774a0fde6c31f580dde6368939ed70100c5385b015e
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
args:
- -u
- "UDP4-RECV:5353,ip-add-membership=224.0.0.251:net1,so-bindtodevice=net1,reuseaddr"
- "UDP4-SENDTO:home-assistant-mdns.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local:5353"
# No probes. socat is a single process with no health surface: if it
# exits, the container exits and the kubelet restarts it, which is the
# entire liveness story. A probe here could only re-assert that PID 1
# is running.
resources:
requests:
cpu: 10m
memory: 16Mi
limits:
memory: 64Mi
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
# Joining ff02::fb needs no address configuration on net1: the group is
# link-local and the kernel's automatic link-local address on the
# macvlan is sufficient to receive on it. Whether v30iot hands out
# global v6 addresses does not affect reception here.
#
# ipv6-v6only=1 keeps this socket to v6 only. Both containers share the
# pod's network namespace, and a dual-stack v6 socket would overlap the
# v4 container's port. Measured behaviour without it was no contention —
# the v4 receiver kept taking packets while the v6 one ran — but that
# depends on the kernel's bindv6only default rather than on anything
# stated here, so the roles are made explicit instead of inherited.
- name: socat-ipv6
image: alpine/socat:1.8.0.3@sha256:beb4a68d9e4fe6b0f21ea774a0fde6c31f580dde6368939ed70100c5385b015e
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
args:
- -u
- "UDP6-RECV:5353,ipv6-join-group=[ff02::fb]:net1,so-bindtodevice=net1,ipv6-v6only=1,reuseaddr"
- "UDP6-SENDTO:home-assistant-mdns.home-assistant.svc.cluster.local:5353"
resources:
requests:
cpu: 10m
memory: 16Mi
limits:
memory: 64Mi
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
---
# mdns-relay's second NIC: macvlan onto v30iot, so the relay has real L2
# presence on the IoT VLAN and can join both mDNS multicast groups
# (224.0.0.251 and ff02::fb, port 5353). The v6 group needs no address
# configuration of its own: it is link-local, and the kernel's automatic
# link-local address on the macvlan is enough to receive on it, independently
# of whether v30iot hands out global v6 addresses.
# Multicast is link-local — it does not cross the L3
# boundary between the cluster pod CIDR and v30iot — so that membership has to
# be held by a pod sitting physically on that segment.
#
# The address is leased from the UniFi DHCP server on v30iot. Nothing
# references it: the relay only receives on this interface and sends onward
# over eth0. See mdns-relay-deployment.yaml for what the relay does with it.
#
# Multus's `master` is an interface name. On the k8s-{1,2,3} nodes the v30iot
# NIC is `ens19` — a stable, busPath-derived predictable name (net.ifnames=1,
# via the Image Factory schematic), identical across nodes and independent of
# driver probe order. This is the same master shelly-manager-iot uses.
apiVersion: k8s.cni.cncf.io/v1
kind: NetworkAttachmentDefinition
metadata:
name: mdns-relay-iot
namespace: home-assistant
spec:
# Chained CNI, identical in shape to shelly-manager-iot: macvlan leases the
# v30iot address by DHCP, then `sbr` confines net1's routes to a
# source-based routing table. Without sbr the DHCP-supplied default gateway
# (10.2.30.1, option 3) installs a second default route at the same metric
# as eth0's, and cluster-internal traffic egresses the IoT VLAN and is
# dropped. The relay's forward path to Home Assistant runs over eth0, so
# that route has to stay intact.
#
# Requires the cni-dhcp-daemon DaemonSet in infrastructure/multus.
config: |
{
"cniVersion": "0.3.1",
"name": "mdns-relay-iot",
"plugins": [
{
"type": "macvlan",
"master": "ens19",
"mode": "bridge",
"ipam": {
"type": "dhcp"
}
},
{
"type": "sbr"
}
]
}
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
---
# Stable delivery target for the relay's forwarded mDNS traffic.
#
# The relay resolves its send target once, at process start (socat has no
# re-resolution loop), so it cannot chase the HA pod IP across restarts. A
# ClusterIP is the fix: the IP is stable for the lifetime of the Service, and
# Cilium re-DNATs to whatever pod currently backs it.
#
# Deliberately a separate Service from `home-assistant`, which targets the
# nginx proxy sidecar on 8124 and is the XFF trust anchor for the public UI.
# This one bypasses the sidecar and addresses the home-assistant container's
# own port directly — containers in a pod share a network namespace, so
# targetPort 5353 lands on python-zeroconf's listener regardless of which
# container opened it. Keeping the two apart means the UI path and the
# discovery path cannot be changed by accident through one another.
#
# No CiliumNetworkPolicy change is needed: home-assistant-ns.yaml already
# permits intra-namespace traffic on all ports, and the relay is in this
# namespace.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: home-assistant-mdns
namespace: home-assistant
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: home-assistant
spec:
# Dual-stack, because mDNS is two protocols and HA listens on both: its
# zeroconf socket holds 224.0.0.251 on eth0 and ff02::fb alongside it. The
# relay forwards each family over its own transport rather than folding v6
# announcements into a v4 hop, so the Service has to answer on both.
ipFamilyPolicy: PreferDualStack
ipFamilies:
- IPv4
- IPv6
selector:
app.kubernetes.io/name: home-assistant
ports:
- name: mdns
port: 5353
protocol: UDP
targetPort: 5353
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ resources:
- prometheusrule-netbird-availability.yaml
- prometheusrule-netbird-backup.yaml
- prometheusrule-netbird-ingress.yaml
- prometheusrule-openbao.yaml
- prometheusrule-velero.yaml
- prometheusrule-woodpecker-rotation.yaml
# CNPG backup health. Seven Postgres clusters ship to Hetzner and nothing
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
kind: PrometheusRule
metadata:
name: openbao
namespace: monitoring
labels:
# kube-prometheus-stack's Prometheus resource selects on this label;
# without it the rule is created but never loaded into Prometheus.
release: kube-prometheus-stack
spec:
groups:
- name: openbao.rules
rules:
# WHY THIS WATCHES POD READINESS RATHER THAN A SEAL METRIC
#
# OpenBao is not scraped: there is no ServiceMonitor for it, and its
# metrics endpoint needs either a token or an explicit
# `unauthenticated_metrics_access` telemetry setting, neither of which
# is configured. Confirmed against Prometheus — no bao_* or vault_*
# series exist. External Secrets exports nothing usable either, so the
# ClusterSecretStore going NotReady is invisible as a metric.
#
# kube-state-metrics readiness carries the signal anyway, and does so
# for a structural reason rather than by luck: a sealed OpenBao fails
# its readiness probe, because a sealed server can neither serve
# requests nor act as a raft standby. Sealed is therefore always
# not-Ready. The converse does not hold — a crash or a stuck
# scheduling would also fire this — but both want a human too, so the
# imprecision costs nothing.
- alert: OpenBaoReplicaNotReady
# A replica that is sealed never recovers on its own, so the
# duration is only there to ignore ordinary rescheduling: a healthy
# pod moving between nodes is Ready again in well under a minute.
expr: kube_statefulset_status_replicas_ready{namespace="openbao", statefulset="openbao"} < 3
for: 10m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "OpenBao has {{ $value }} of 3 replicas ready"
description: >-
An OpenBao replica has been unavailable for 10 minutes. The usual
cause is a sealed replica after a node drain — every restart
seals it, and it stays out of the raft cluster until unsealed by
hand. The service is still up on the remaining replicas, so
nothing is broken yet, but redundancy is reduced and a second
drain would cost quorum. Check `kubectl -n openbao get pods` and
`bao status` in the not-ready pod; unseal with the key from
`pass` (homelab/openbao/unseal-key).
- alert: OpenBaoQuorumLost
# Raft quorum of a three-node cluster is two. At one ready replica
# the cluster cannot elect a leader and the secret store is down:
# the ClusterSecretStore goes InvalidProviderConfig and no
# ExternalSecret can refresh.
#
# Shorter window than the warning above because this is an outage,
# not a degradation — but not zero, so a rolling restart that
# briefly dips does not page.
expr: kube_statefulset_status_replicas_ready{namespace="openbao", statefulset="openbao"} < 2
for: 5m
labels:
severity: critical
annotations:
summary: "OpenBao below raft quorum — {{ $value }} of 3 replicas ready"
description: >-
Fewer than two OpenBao replicas are ready, so raft cannot hold
quorum and the secret store is unavailable. ExternalSecrets stop
refreshing; existing Secrets keep their last values, so failures
surface only when something rotates or a new secret is needed.
Unseal the sealed replicas (key in `pass`,
homelab/openbao/unseal-key) — each one individually, since a
sealed server cannot be a standby.
- alert: OpenBaoMetricsMissing
# Guards the two alerts above. Both are threshold comparisons, so if
# kube-state-metrics stops exporting this series — the StatefulSet
# deleted, the namespace gone, kube-state-metrics itself broken —
# they silently stop evaluating and the silence looks identical to
# health. This makes that state say something.
expr: absent(kube_statefulset_status_replicas_ready{namespace="openbao", statefulset="openbao"})
for: 15m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "No readiness metric for the OpenBao StatefulSet"
description: >-
kube-state-metrics has not reported
kube_statefulset_status_replicas_ready for the openbao
StatefulSet in 15 minutes. Either the StatefulSet is gone or
kube-state-metrics is not scraping — and while this is absent,
OpenBaoReplicaNotReady and OpenBaoQuorumLost cannot fire at all.
@@ -40,17 +40,31 @@ spec:
description: "A Velero backup run for {{ $labels.schedule }} completed with Failed or PartiallyFailed status in the last hour. Inspect with `kubectl -n velero get backup.velero.io -l velero.io/schedule-name={{ $labels.schedule }}` and the velero pod logs."
- alert: VeleroBackupStale
# Daily schedule with no successful backup in over 30h: covers
# the case where multiple consecutive runs failed (Garage flapping
# over the backup window) without the per-event alerts being
# acted on.
# Daily schedule with no successful backup in over 60h: covers the
# case where consecutive runs failed without the per-event alerts
# being acted on.
#
# 60h, not 30h. At 30h a single missed cycle pages, and a single
# missed cycle is the normal cost of touching the nodes: Velero moves
# data through pods, so draining a node kills whatever upload is in
# flight and the schedule is simply lost for that day — it is not
# retried. Rolling node work between 03:15 and 08:45 UTC therefore
# produced a guaranteed critical alert for every schedule it
# overlapped, which is noise about planned work rather than a signal
# about backups.
#
# 60h still catches what this is for. Two consecutive failures is no
# longer explicable by one maintenance window, and the per-event
# VeleroBackupFailed alert fires on the first failure regardless — so
# nothing is hidden, only the escalation to critical is deferred
# until a second cycle confirms it.
expr: |
time() - velero_backup_last_successful_timestamp{schedule!=""} > 30 * 3600
time() - velero_backup_last_successful_timestamp{schedule!=""} > 60 * 3600
and
velero_backup_last_successful_timestamp{schedule!=""} > 0
for: 10m
labels:
severity: critical
annotations:
summary: "Velero {{ $labels.schedule }} has no successful backup in 30h+"
description: "Last successful backup for {{ $labels.schedule }} was over 30 hours ago. With a daily schedule that means at least one full cycle missed. RPO is degrading."
summary: "Velero {{ $labels.schedule }} has no successful backup in 60h+"
description: "Last successful backup for {{ $labels.schedule }} was over 60 hours ago. With a daily schedule that is at least two consecutive cycles missed, which one maintenance window does not explain. RPO is degrading."
@@ -275,8 +275,11 @@ spec:
- alertmanager-smtp
# SMTP via Proton submission (smtp.protonmail.ch:587 STARTTLS).
# The Proton SMTP token is a per-account credential generated in
# the Proton webapp (Settings -> IMAP/SMTP) and lives in the
# alertmanager-smtp SOPS-encrypted Secret. Outbound 587 from the
# the Proton webapp (Settings -> IMAP/SMTP). It is stored in
# OpenBao at apps/monitoring/alertmanager-smtp and projected into
# the alertmanager-smtp Secret by
# ./alertmanager-smtp-externalsecret.yaml — rotating the token
# means updating OpenBao, not this repo. Outbound 587 from the
# monitoring ns is not blocked by any CNP today.
config:
global:
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ spec:
# stdlib only; Flux keeps the tag in lockstep via the shared image
# policy) — no extra dependency.
- name: reconcile-publish-ip
image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.9.13 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.10.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
command: ["/app/venv/bin/python", "/scripts/reconcile.py"]
volumeMounts:
- name: data
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ spec:
readOnly: true
containers:
- name: music-assistant
image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.9.13 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
image: ghcr.io/music-assistant/server:2.10.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:music-assistant"}
env:
- name: LOG_LEVEL
value: info
@@ -4,3 +4,12 @@ resources:
- cni-plugins-installer.yaml
- cni-dhcp-daemon.yaml
- multus-daemonset.yaml
# Whereabouts — cluster-coordinated IPAM, for attachments on segments with
# no DHCP server. CRDs first: the DaemonSet's control loop reads them at
# startup. See the header in whereabouts-daemonset.yaml for why neither
# dhcp nor host-local covers the Ceph SAN.
- whereabouts-crd-ippools.yaml
- whereabouts-crd-overlappingrangeipreservations.yaml
- whereabouts-crd-nodeslicepools.yaml
- whereabouts-daemonset.yaml
- whereabouts-reconciler.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
---
apiVersion: apiextensions.k8s.io/v1
kind: CustomResourceDefinition
metadata:
annotations:
controller-gen.kubebuilder.io/version: v0.14.0
name: ippools.whereabouts.cni.cncf.io
spec:
group: whereabouts.cni.cncf.io
names:
kind: IPPool
listKind: IPPoolList
plural: ippools
singular: ippool
scope: Namespaced
versions:
- name: v1alpha1
schema:
openAPIV3Schema:
description: IPPool is the Schema for the ippools API
properties:
apiVersion:
description: |-
APIVersion defines the versioned schema of this representation of an object.
Servers should convert recognized schemas to the latest internal value, and
may reject unrecognized values.
More info: https://git.k8s.io/community/contributors/devel/sig-architecture/api-conventions.md#resources
type: string
kind:
description: |-
Kind is a string value representing the REST resource this object represents.
Servers may infer this from the endpoint the client submits requests to.
Cannot be updated.
In CamelCase.
More info: https://git.k8s.io/community/contributors/devel/sig-architecture/api-conventions.md#types-kinds
type: string
metadata:
type: object
spec:
description: IPPoolSpec defines the desired state of IPPool
properties:
allocations:
additionalProperties:
description: IPAllocation represents metadata about the pod/container
owner of a specific IP
properties:
id:
type: string
ifname:
type: string
podref:
type: string
required:
- id
- podref
type: object
description: |-
Allocations is the set of allocated IPs for the given range. Its` indices are a direct mapping to the
IP with the same index/offset for the pool's range.
type: object
range:
description: Range is a RFC 4632/4291-style string that represents
an IP address and prefix length in CIDR notation
type: string
required:
- allocations
- range
type: object
type: object
served: true
storage: true
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
---
apiVersion: apiextensions.k8s.io/v1
kind: CustomResourceDefinition
metadata:
annotations:
controller-gen.kubebuilder.io/version: v0.14.0
name: nodeslicepools.whereabouts.cni.cncf.io
spec:
group: whereabouts.cni.cncf.io
names:
kind: NodeSlicePool
listKind: NodeSlicePoolList
plural: nodeslicepools
singular: nodeslicepool
scope: Namespaced
versions:
- name: v1alpha1
schema:
openAPIV3Schema:
description: NodeSlicePool is the Schema for the nodesliceippools API
properties:
apiVersion:
description: |-
APIVersion defines the versioned schema of this representation of an object.
Servers should convert recognized schemas to the latest internal value, and
may reject unrecognized values.
More info: https://git.k8s.io/community/contributors/devel/sig-architecture/api-conventions.md#resources
type: string
kind:
description: |-
Kind is a string value representing the REST resource this object represents.
Servers may infer this from the endpoint the client submits requests to.
Cannot be updated.
In CamelCase.
More info: https://git.k8s.io/community/contributors/devel/sig-architecture/api-conventions.md#types-kinds
type: string
metadata:
type: object
spec:
description: NodeSlicePoolSpec defines the desired state of NodeSlicePool
properties:
range:
description: |-
Range is a RFC 4632/4291-style string that represents an IP address and prefix length in CIDR notation
this refers to the entire range where the node is allocated a subset
type: string
sliceSize:
description: SliceSize is the size of subnets or slices of the range
that each node will be assigned
type: string
required:
- range
- sliceSize
type: object
status:
description: NodeSlicePoolStatus defines the desired state of NodeSlicePool
properties:
allocations:
description: Allocations holds the allocations of nodes to slices
items:
properties:
nodeName:
description: NodeName is the name of the node assigned to this
slice, empty node name is an available slice for assignment
type: string
sliceRange:
description: SliceRange is the subnet of this slice
type: string
required:
- nodeName
- sliceRange
type: object
type: array
required:
- allocations
type: object
type: object
served: true
storage: true
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
---
apiVersion: apiextensions.k8s.io/v1
kind: CustomResourceDefinition
metadata:
annotations:
controller-gen.kubebuilder.io/version: v0.14.0
name: overlappingrangeipreservations.whereabouts.cni.cncf.io
spec:
group: whereabouts.cni.cncf.io
names:
kind: OverlappingRangeIPReservation
listKind: OverlappingRangeIPReservationList
plural: overlappingrangeipreservations
singular: overlappingrangeipreservation
scope: Namespaced
versions:
- name: v1alpha1
schema:
openAPIV3Schema:
description: OverlappingRangeIPReservation is the Schema for the OverlappingRangeIPReservations
API
properties:
apiVersion:
description: |-
APIVersion defines the versioned schema of this representation of an object.
Servers should convert recognized schemas to the latest internal value, and
may reject unrecognized values.
More info: https://git.k8s.io/community/contributors/devel/sig-architecture/api-conventions.md#resources
type: string
kind:
description: |-
Kind is a string value representing the REST resource this object represents.
Servers may infer this from the endpoint the client submits requests to.
Cannot be updated.
In CamelCase.
More info: https://git.k8s.io/community/contributors/devel/sig-architecture/api-conventions.md#types-kinds
type: string
metadata:
type: object
spec:
description: OverlappingRangeIPReservationSpec defines the desired state
of OverlappingRangeIPReservation
properties:
containerid:
type: string
ifname:
type: string
podref:
type: string
required:
- podref
type: object
required:
- spec
type: object
served: true
storage: true
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
---
# Whereabouts: cluster-wide IPAM for Multus attachments.
#
# WHY THIS EXISTS
#
# The attachments in this cluster lease their addresses by DHCP
# (cni-dhcp-daemon.yaml). That works where a DHCP server is on the wire —
# v30iot has one. It does not work on the Ceph SAN (VLAN 49), which carries
# Ceph-internal traffic and nothing else, by design: there is no DHCP server
# there and there must not be one.
#
# `host-local`, already installed by cni-plugins-installer.yaml, cannot stand
# in. It keeps its allocation state per node with no cluster-wide
# coordination, so on a shared L2 segment two nodes hand out the same address.
# Whereabouts coordinates through the Kubernetes API instead — allocations
# live in the ippools/overlappingrangeipreservations CRDs, so nothing about
# the address assignment touches the segment being addressed. That property is
# what makes it usable on an isolated SAN.
#
# HOST ACCESS
#
# The DaemonSet runs with hostNetwork and privileged. That is how upstream
# ships it, and it is what the three CNI components already here do —
# multus-daemonset.yaml, cni-dhcp-daemon.yaml and cni-plugins-installer.yaml
# all carry both. The reason is the same in each case: the pod writes a CNI
# binary and its config into /opt/cni/bin and /etc/cni/net.d on the node,
# which is node plumbing rather than a workload, and it must work before the
# attachment it provides addresses for exists.
#
# The reconciler is deliberately NOT in here. It needs neither, and runs as an
# ordinary pod-network Deployment — see whereabouts-reconciler.yaml.
#
# Vendored from upstream v0.9.4 (doc/crds/daemonset-install.yaml), with the
# image tag pinned; upstream ships `:latest`. The CRDs it needs are the three
# whereabouts-crd-*.yaml files alongside this one, vendored unmodified so an
# upstream diff stays readable.
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: whereabouts
namespace: kube-system
---
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
metadata:
name: whereabouts
roleRef:
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: ClusterRole
name: whereabouts-cni
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: whereabouts
namespace: kube-system
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRole
metadata:
name: whereabouts-cni
rules:
- apiGroups:
- whereabouts.cni.cncf.io
resources:
- ippools
- overlappingrangeipreservations
- nodeslicepools
verbs:
- get
- list
- watch
- create
- update
- patch
- delete
- apiGroups:
- coordination.k8s.io
resources:
- leases
verbs:
- '*'
- apiGroups: [""]
resources:
- pods
verbs:
- list
- watch
- get
- apiGroups: [""]
resources:
- nodes
verbs:
- get
- list
- watch
- apiGroups: ["k8s.cni.cncf.io"]
resources:
- network-attachment-definitions
verbs:
- get
- list
- watch
- apiGroups:
- ""
- events.k8s.io
resources:
- events
verbs:
- create
- patch
- update
- get
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: whereabouts-config
namespace: kube-system
annotations:
kubernetes.io/description: |
Configmap containing user customizable cronjob schedule
data:
# Read by the reconciler (whereabouts-reconciler.yaml), not by this
# DaemonSet. Governs how often stale allocations are swept — the case that
# matters here is a node lost hard enough that the CNI DEL never ran, which
# otherwise leaves an address held by a pod that no longer exists.
cron-expression: "30 4 * * *"
---
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: DaemonSet
metadata:
name: whereabouts
namespace: kube-system
labels:
tier: node
app: whereabouts
spec:
selector:
matchLabels:
name: whereabouts
updateStrategy:
type: RollingUpdate
template:
metadata:
labels:
tier: node
app: whereabouts
name: whereabouts
spec:
hostNetwork: true
serviceAccountName: whereabouts
# Every node here is a control plane node, so the NoSchedule toleration
# is not optional — without it this schedules nowhere.
tolerations:
- operator: Exists
effect: NoSchedule
containers:
- name: whereabouts
command: ["/bin/sh"]
args:
- -c
- |
SLEEP=false source /install-cni.sh
/token-watcher.sh &
/ip-control-loop -log-level debug
image: ghcr.io/k8snetworkplumbingwg/whereabouts:v0.9.4
env:
- name: NODENAME
valueFrom:
fieldRef:
apiVersion: v1
fieldPath: spec.nodeName
- name: WHEREABOUTS_NAMESPACE
valueFrom:
fieldRef:
fieldPath: metadata.namespace
resources:
requests:
cpu: "100m"
memory: "100Mi"
limits:
cpu: "100m"
memory: "200Mi"
securityContext:
privileged: true
volumeMounts:
- name: cnibin
mountPath: /host/opt/cni/bin
- name: cni-net-dir
mountPath: /host/etc/cni/net.d
volumes:
- name: cnibin
hostPath:
path: /opt/cni/bin
- name: cni-net-dir
hostPath:
path: /etc/cni/net.d
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
---
# Sweeps whereabouts allocations that no live pod holds any more.
#
# The normal release path is the CNI DEL when a pod goes away. It does not run
# when a node is lost hard — power cut, kernel panic, a reboot that never
# comes back — and the allocation then stays claimed by a pod that no longer
# exists. On a small range that matters: the Ceph SAN is a /29, so a handful
# of leaked addresses is the difference between an OSD getting an address and
# not.
#
# Runs as an ordinary pod-network Deployment. Unlike the DaemonSet next to it,
# this needs no host access at all — it only talks to the Kubernetes API,
# where the allocations live.
#
# replicas stays at 1: there is no leader election, so a second replica would
# reconcile the same records concurrently.
#
# Vendored from upstream v0.9.4 (doc/crds/reconciler-deployment.yaml) with the
# image tag pinned; upstream ships `:latest`. The schedule comes from the
# whereabouts-config ConfigMap in whereabouts-daemonset.yaml.
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: whereabouts-reconciler
namespace: kube-system
labels:
tier: node
app: whereabouts-reconciler
spec:
replicas: 1
selector:
matchLabels:
name: whereabouts-reconciler
template:
metadata:
labels:
tier: node
app: whereabouts-reconciler
name: whereabouts-reconciler
spec:
serviceAccountName: whereabouts
# Every node here is a control plane node.
tolerations:
- operator: Exists
effect: NoSchedule
containers:
- name: whereabouts-reconciler
command: ["/ip-reconciler"]
args:
- -log-level
- debug
image: ghcr.io/k8snetworkplumbingwg/whereabouts:v0.9.4
env:
- name: WHEREABOUTS_NAMESPACE
valueFrom:
fieldRef:
fieldPath: metadata.namespace
resources:
requests:
cpu: "100m"
memory: "50Mi"
limits:
cpu: "100m"
memory: "50Mi"
volumeMounts:
- name: cron-scheduler-configmap
mountPath: /cron-schedule
volumes:
- name: cron-scheduler-configmap
configMap:
name: whereabouts-config
defaultMode: 0744
items:
- key: "cron-expression"
path: "config"
@@ -42,12 +42,28 @@ spec:
# the agent-injector mutating webhook is unused surface.
enabled: false
server:
# Single-node raft (not standalone/file) so we get `bao operator raft
# snapshot` as a consistent backup primitive. TLS terminates at the
# Traefik ingress; in-cluster traffic is plain HTTP.
# Raft (not standalone/file) for two reasons: `bao operator raft
# snapshot` as a consistent backup primitive, and real HA across three
# nodes. TLS terminates at the Traefik ingress; in-cluster traffic is
# plain HTTP.
ha:
enabled: true
replicas: 1
# Three, not two. Raft needs a quorum, and the quorum of two is two —
# a two-replica cluster tolerates no failures at all and would stop
# the moment one pod is sealed or rescheduled, which is worse than
# the single replica it replaced. Three tolerates one.
#
# What this buys, and what it does not: a node drain seals the replica
# on it, and raft elects a new leader from the remaining standbys
# within seconds, so the service does not go down. It does NOT remove
# the manual unseal — a sealed server can neither serve requests nor
# act as standby, so that replica stays out until someone unseals it.
#
# The consequence for rolling node maintenance is worth stating: a
# Talos upgrade drains all three nodes in turn, sealing each replica
# as it goes. Unseal each one as it comes back, or the third drain
# takes the last unsealed replica with it and quorum is lost anyway.
replicas: 3
raft:
enabled: true
setNodeId: true
@@ -65,8 +81,32 @@ spec:
cluster_address = "[::]:8201"
}
# retry_join is what makes a replica join the existing raft
# cluster instead of coming up as an isolated, uninitialized
# node. Without it, scaling the StatefulSet produces pods that
# never become peers and would each need a manual
# `bao operator raft join`.
#
# All three peers are listed on every node, including the node
# itself. That is deliberate: the stanza is a list of possible
# leaders, a node ignores its own entry, and listing all three
# means the set is identical on every replica and stays correct
# regardless of which pod currently leads.
#
# Addressed through the headless service, so each entry resolves
# to one specific pod rather than load-balancing across them.
storage "raft" {
path = "/openbao/data"
retry_join {
leader_api_addr = "http://openbao-0.openbao-internal:8200"
}
retry_join {
leader_api_addr = "http://openbao-1.openbao-internal:8200"
}
retry_join {
leader_api_addr = "http://openbao-2.openbao-internal:8200"
}
}
service_registration "kubernetes" {}
@@ -53,7 +53,13 @@ spec:
command: ["/bin/sh", "-ec"]
args:
- |
export BAO_ADDR=http://openbao.openbao.svc.cluster.local:8200
# openbao-active, not openbao: with more than one replica
# the plain service selects any pod, and a raft snapshot has
# to be taken against the leader. Standbys forward ordinary
# requests, but this is not one to leave to chance — the
# active service selects the leader by label, so the
# snapshot is always taken where it is consistent.
export BAO_ADDR=http://openbao-active.openbao.svc.cluster.local:8200
BAO_TOKEN=$(bao write -field=token auth/kubernetes/login \
role=openbao-snapshot \
jwt="$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)")
@@ -8,6 +8,17 @@ spec:
image: quay.io/ceph/ceph:v19.2.6 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:ceph"}
allowUnsupported: false
dataDirHostPath: /var/lib/rook
# Do not start restarting OSDs while PGs are still recovering. The default
# is false, so Rook would proceed regardless — and paired with the old
# osdMaxUpdatesInParallel default that means it can take the next OSD down
# while the previous one's data is still being caught up.
#
# With three OSDs and size 3 there is no spare copy to fall back on: the
# gate between one OSD returning and the next going down is the only thing
# that keeps a rolling change from becoming an outage. See
# storage.osdMaxUpdatesInParallel below, which bounds the same operation
# from the other side.
upgradeOSDRequiresHealthyPGs: true
mon:
count: 3
allowMultiplePerNode: false
@@ -36,26 +47,27 @@ spec:
# (paperless + audiobookshelf + immich + ... all clone at once).
cephConfig:
mon:
# Ceph's 30% default assumes the mon has a filesystem to itself, where
# 30% free is a meaningful reserve. Here the mons live on
# dataDirHostPath /var/lib/rook — the node's /var, shared with ~29 GB
# of containerd image and snapshot storage — and the mon DB itself is
# ~106 MB. So the default measures container churn, not Ceph: k8s-2
# trips MON_DISK_LOW whenever the image cache fills, and image GC does
# not clear it (most of /var/lib/containerd is overlayfs snapshots held
# by running containers, which GC cannot reclaim — see #434).
# 20% of a 60 GB /var still leaves ~12 GB against a 106 MB database.
# mon_data_avail_crit stays at the 5% default, and CephMonDiskLow in
# monitoring-rules watches /var directly for the real risk, which is the
# node filling rather than the mon growing.
# The Ceph default, stated rather than left out. Removing the line would
# not restore it: `ceph config` keeps a value that only disappears from
# this file, so the old 20 would sit in the mon config database
# indefinitely — the same trap the bluestore settings below describe,
# and the one that crash-looped an OSD during the network provider
# change when public_network survived being deleted here.
#
# BARE-METAL MIGRATION: revisit this. Give the mons their own volume and
# the default 30% becomes meaningful again, at which point this override
# should be dropped rather than carried over. It cannot be done on the
# current cluster — every StorageClass is Ceph-backed, so a mon PVC
# would be circular, and Rook only applies mon.volumeClaimTemplate to
# newly created mons, never migrating existing ones.
mon_data_avail_warn: "20"
# It was 20 because the mons share the node's /var with containerd, and
# on the VMs that was ~60 GB: 30% free measured image and snapshot churn
# rather than anything about Ceph, so k8s-2 tripped MON_DISK_LOW whenever
# the image cache filled and GC could not reclaim it (#434).
#
# Bare metal removed the premise. /var is now ~931 GB per node at 7-8%
# used, so 30% free is a real reserve again and the ~106 MB mon database
# is irrelevant against it. Reaching 70% would be a genuine signal about
# the node rather than noise about the image cache.
#
# mon_data_avail_crit stays at the 5% default, and CephMonDiskLow in
# monitoring-rules still watches /var directly for the real risk, which
# is the node filling rather than the mon growing.
mon_data_avail_warn: "30"
# Stop compacting the whole RocksDB prefix on every paxos trim.
#
# Upstream default is true — "Compact a certain prefix (including paxos)
@@ -147,19 +159,65 @@ spec:
ssl: false
monitoring:
enabled: true
# Dedicated Ceph cluster network on VLAN 49 / 10.99.0.0/29, carried by an
# X710 SFP+ port PCI-passed-through to each Talos K8s VM (see
# talos/patches/k8s-{1,2,3}.yaml and opentofu/vm_15{0,1,2}_k8s_*.tf).
# `addressRanges` requires `provider: host` — Rook v1.18 explicitly notes
# the default (CNI) provider ignores addressRanges. Public range matches
# the existing v40srv subnet that the controlplane VMs already live on.
# Dedicated Ceph cluster network on VLAN 49, carried by the second X710
# SFP+ port (enp2s0f1np1) on each node, attached to the OSDs through Multus.
#
# WHY NOT provider: host, WHICH ALSO REACHES THAT LINK
#
# Because it reaches it for every daemon, not just the ones that need it.
# The cluster network is an OSD concern: per the Ceph documentation it
# carries OSD heartbeat, replication and recovery, and "Ceph Monitors always
# operate on the public network". `addressRanges` is only honoured under
# provider: host, so using it put the mons on host networking as a side
# effect — making a mon's address the node's DHCP lease.
#
# That is not theoretical. When a lease moved, the mon could no longer bind
# ("Cannot assign requested address") and crash-looped. Rook detected it and
# started a failover, but with three mons on three nodes each holding the
# mon host ports, the replacement could not be scheduled anywhere — the
# canary sat Pending on "didn't have free ports". Two of three nodes hit
# this during the Talos v1.12.11 upgrade and both needed hand intervention.
#
# Only `cluster` is selected here. With `public` left unset Rook puts client
# traffic on the pod network, so mons, MDS, MGR and the CSI pods keep
# Rook-managed identities and hold no host ports — which is what removes
# that failure mode rather than working around it.
#
# ISOLATION IS PRESERVED
#
# Rook's Multus prerequisites about hosts routing to the Multus network
# apply to a Multus *public* network. Selecting only `cluster` means they do
# not apply, so VLAN 49 stays what it is: Ceph-internal traffic and nothing
# else, no router, no other participants. After this settles, the node
# addresses on that segment (10.99.0.1-.3) have no remaining purpose and
# should come out of the Talos configs — at which point the attachment's
# pool can take the whole /29.
#
# Reached from provider: "" rather than directly from host, which Rook's CRD
# rejects. See the phase A commit.
#
# ONE-TIME STEP THAT THIS FILE CANNOT EXPRESS, recorded because it is not
# reproducible from the manifests alone. Removing addressRanges here does
# not clear public_network and cluster_network from Ceph's own config
# database — the same trap the bluestore comment above describes: `ceph
# config` retains a value that is only deleted from this file. During the
# phase A rollout the first OSD came up on the pod network, still had
# public_network 10.2.40.0/24 in the config database, found no interface in
# it and crash-looped on "Failed to pick public address". Both keys were
# removed with `ceph config rm global public_network` and the same for
# cluster_network; Rook then wrote cluster_network afresh from the
# attachment below. Anyone rebuilding this cluster from scratch will not hit
# it — the config database starts empty — but anyone repeating a provider
# change on a live cluster will.
#
# Bounded by upgradeOSDRequiresHealthyPGs and storage.osdMaxUpdatesInParallel
# above: one OSD restarts at a time and only once PGs are clean again.
#
# The attachment itself is san-network-attachment.yaml.
network:
provider: host
addressRanges:
public:
- "10.2.40.0/24"
cluster:
- "10.99.0.0/29"
provider: multus
selectors:
cluster: rook-ceph/ceph-san
# Nodes are listed explicitly rather than useAllNodes, so that a node can be
# taken out of the storage fleet by removing it here. Under useAllNodes the
# operator re-provisions an OSD on any node whose device still carries a
@@ -193,6 +251,15 @@ spec:
# 2326E6E8E67D Crucial — Talos EPHEMERAL (/var)
# S437NF0M501176 PM983 — this OSD
storage:
# One OSD restarted at a time. The default is 20, which on a three-OSD
# cluster means all of them at once — every PG inactive, every pool
# unreachable, for as long as the restart takes. The default suits a
# cluster large enough that 20 OSDs is a small fraction of it; here it is
# the whole thing.
#
# This binds any change that rewrites the OSD deployment spec, not just
# Ceph version upgrades — a network provider change is one such.
osdMaxUpdatesInParallel: 1
useAllNodes: false
useAllDevices: false
nodes:
@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
# Attachment for the VLAN 49 cluster network. Inert until cephcluster.yaml
# names it under network.selectors.cluster — creating it changes nothing on
# its own.
- san-network-attachment.yaml
- cephcluster.yaml
- toolbox.yaml
- storageclass.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
---
# The Ceph cluster network as a Multus attachment, so OSDs reach VLAN 49
# without every Ceph daemon being put on host networking to get there.
#
# WHAT THIS REPLACES, AND WHY
#
# `addressRanges` only takes effect under `provider: host` — Rook ignores it
# for the default CNI provider. So carrying replication over the dedicated
# 10G link meant setting provider: host, which is not per-daemon: it puts
# mons on host networking too. A mon's address is then the node's DHCP lease,
# and when that lease moves the mon cannot bind and fails. Worse, three mons
# on three nodes each hold the mon host ports, so Rook cannot schedule a
# replacement anywhere and the failover it starts cannot finish.
#
# None of that has anything to do with the goal. Per the Ceph documentation
# the cluster network carries OSD heartbeat, replication and recovery only —
# "Ceph Monitors always operate on the public network". Attaching it here
# gives the OSDs the link and leaves everything else on the pod network,
# where Rook manages identity itself.
#
# ISOLATION
#
# VLAN 49 carries Ceph-internal traffic and nothing else. Two consequences
# are deliberate:
#
# No gateway and no routes. There is no router on this segment and there
# must not be one. whereabouts adds neither unless asked, so nothing here
# can leak onto or off the SAN. This also means no `sbr` chaining is
# needed — unlike the v30iot attachments, there is no DHCP-supplied default
# route to confine, because there is no DHCP and no default route.
#
# The pool is the whole usable /29, .1 through .6. It was .4-.6 while the
# migration ran, because the nodes still held .1-.3 for as long as Ceph
# needed host networking to reach this link — three addresses for three
# OSDs, no spare. The nodes have since given those up (the link is only a
# macvlan parent now and needs no address of its own), so the reservation
# has nothing left to avoid.
#
# Keeping the pool inside the /29 rather than moving it elsewhere on the
# segment is not cosmetic. There is no router here, so an address outside
# the /29 would be unreachable from anything still using one inside it —
# which is exactly what would break a future rolling change, where migrated
# and un-migrated OSDs have to keep talking to each other.
#
# Six addresses for three OSDs is the headroom the migration could not
# afford: room for a leaked allocation to sit until the reconciler collects
# it, and room to add a second OSD per node without touching this file.
#
# IPAM
#
# whereabouts, because neither alternative works on this segment: dhcp needs
# a server that must not exist here, and host-local keeps its state per node
# with no cluster-wide coordination, so two nodes would hand out the same
# address on shared L2. See infrastructure/multus/whereabouts-daemonset.yaml.
#
# MTU 9000 matches the link. macvlan children inherit the master's MTU, but
# it is stated so that a change to the parent does not silently halve
# replication throughput without anything in the tree recording the
# expectation.
apiVersion: k8s.cni.cncf.io/v1
kind: NetworkAttachmentDefinition
metadata:
name: ceph-san
namespace: rook-ceph
spec:
# `master` is an interface name. enp2s0f1np1 is the second X710 SFP+ port,
# a busPath-derived predictable name (net.ifnames=1 via the Image Factory
# schematic) that is identical on k8s-1/2/3 and cannot shuffle across
# reboots.
config: |
{
"cniVersion": "0.3.1",
"name": "ceph-san",
"type": "macvlan",
"master": "enp2s0f1np1",
"mode": "bridge",
"mtu": 9000,
"ipam": {
"type": "whereabouts",
"range": "10.99.0.0/29",
"range_start": "10.99.0.1",
"range_end": "10.99.0.6"
}
}
+27 -4
View File
@@ -20,16 +20,39 @@ machine:
# the MS-01 mesh later needs neither a new image
# nor a reinstall — which is exactly the property
# lost by installing without it.
# siderolabs/i915 Intel GPU microcode and kernel modules for the
# Alder Lake-P Iris Xe in the MS-01. No workload
# requests /dev/dri today; it is here for the same
# reason as thunderbolt, so that wanting hardware
# transcoding later is a config change rather than
# another rolling upgrade of every node.
#
# a21cec8f… is the bare-metal schematic described in RUNBOOK-cold-rebuild.md:
# same net.ifnames=1 as the Proxmox one (the predictable interface names the
# per-node VLAN parents match against), minus qemu-guest-agent.
# Not included, and why, so the absences are not mistaken for oversights:
# the X710 (i40e) and I226 (igc) NICs need no firmware extension —
# intel-ice-firmware covers E810/ice only. mei is a prerequisite for Intel
# Arc discrete GPUs, of which there are none. iscsi-tools, nvme-cli and
# util-linux-tools have no consumer: storage is Ceph RBD, and device health
# is reported by Ceph itself rather than a node-level exporter.
#
# 0f6fb8bd… is the bare-metal schematic: same net.ifnames=1 as the Proxmox
# one (the predictable interface names the per-node VLAN parents match
# against), minus qemu-guest-agent. It supersedes a21cec8f…, which was
# identical but without i915 — see RUNBOOK-cold-rebuild.md.
#
# Only read at install and upgrade time. Changing it here does nothing to a
# running node until that node is upgraded. Bump the tag with the Talos
# version — it must match the running version, or the upgrade is a downgrade.
#
# Upgrades follow the documented path: migration is only tested between
# adjacent minor releases, so go to the latest patch of each intermediate
# minor rather than skipping. 1.12.11 -> 1.13.9 satisfies that — one minor
# step from the last 1.12 patch, no intermediate needed.
#
# Kubernetes is a separate decision and is not forced by this. Talos 1.13
# supports Kubernetes 1.36, 1.35, 1.34, 1.33, 1.32 and 1.31, so the cluster
# stays on 1.35.2 until `talosctl upgrade-k8s` moves it deliberately.
install:
image: factory.talos.dev/metal-installer/a21cec8f35ae32ab5e9a452e7b13500ca8776053930b8e182b9cb23eed186b64:v1.12.6
image: factory.talos.dev/metal-installer/0f6fb8bd8bb53013e9743b7c7b099d96fb9c32fd2464ced32693c2dc0ea5feb9:v1.13.9
features:
rbac: true
stableHostname: true
+59 -5
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,29 @@ machine:
# un-translated SYN-ACK -> client kernel RST, verified live 2026-07-23).
# This disables v6 entirely on that link, including link-local.
net.ipv6.conf.ens19.disable_ipv6: "1"
# Same argument, applied to the physical ports rather than a VLAN child.
#
# enp2s0f0np0 is nothing but the trunk parent for mgmt0 and ens19, and
# enp87s0 is unused. Both sit on the untagged fallback network, where by
# design nothing is supposed to run — and both were autoconfiguring
# themselves from its router advertisements: an fd00::/64 ULA each, plus
# an IPv6 default route each.
#
# The result was four IPv6 default routes per node at identical priority
# 1024 — mgmt0, enp2s0f0np0, enp87s0 and lo — of which only mgmt0 has a
# globally routable source address. With nothing to break the tie,
# outbound IPv6 mostly left through an interface whose only usable source
# was a ULA, so the cluster had no IPv6 egress at all while IPv4 worked
# normally. It surfaced as two NetBird probes reporting the proxies down
# for 30 hours; the proxies were fine and answered IPv6 in 13 ms from
# outside.
#
# Verified on k8s-1 before rolling to the others: disabling v6 on a VLAN
# parent leaves the VLAN child alone. mgmt0 kept its global address and
# its fd40:: address, Ceph did not notice, and every failing probe
# recovered on the next scrape.
net.ipv6.conf.enp2s0f0np0.disable_ipv6: "1"
net.ipv6.conf.enp87s0.disable_ipv6: "1"
install:
# Three NVMe drives are ordinary block devices to Talos here: the Kingston
# OM8PGP41024Q-A0 system disk, the Samsung PM983 that Rook claims as the
@@ -94,6 +117,30 @@ vlanID: 40
parent: enp2s0f0np0
up: true
---
# Management addressing is DHCP and the lease is NOT reserved anywhere in this
# repo — the k8s-{1,2,3}.srv.renner.uno reservations live on the UDM out of band
# and opentofu/unifi.tf declares no live resources. The addresses do move under
# a running node: k8s-3 went 10.2.40.168 -> .138 mid-flight on 2026-08-26
# without its Node object ever re-registering (issue #635).
#
# kube-apiserver does not follow when that happens. Talos starts it with
# `--advertise-address=$(POD_IP)` and no `--endpoint-reconciler-type` override,
# so the advertised address is fixed at pod start and the default lease
# reconciler goes on renewing the masterlease under the OLD address. Nothing
# expires it while the process lives, so `default/kubernetes` keeps handing out
# a dead endpoint and the node's live address is never registered at all — 19h
# of TargetDown on job="apiserver", a monitoring blind spot on one of three
# apiservers, and it cleared only when the static pod restarted.
#
# So after any node re-IPs, check that
# `kubectl get endpoints kubernetes -n default` agrees with
# `kubectl get nodes -o wide`, and restart the offending node
# (`talosctl -n <node> reboot`) if it does not.
#
# Pinning mgmt0 with a static AddressConfig alongside this document would remove
# the trigger, but it needs an address outside the UDM's DHCP pool — which is
# not declared in this repo — and §6 of RUNBOOK-baremetal-conversion.md applies:
# prove it with `talosctl apply-config --mode=try` before making it permanent.
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: DHCPv4Config
name: mgmt0
@@ -117,13 +164,20 @@ parent: enp2s0f0np0
up: true
---
# Dedicated Ceph cluster network on X710 port 1, VLAN 49 / 10.99.0.0/29,
# untagged on the wire. Used by Rook for OSD<->OSD replication via
# CephCluster.spec.network.addressRanges.cluster. Not routed off its own
# segment, and deliberately has no default route.
# untagged on the wire. Carries OSD<->OSD replication and nothing else.
#
# The node deliberately holds NO address here. Rook attaches this link to the
# OSD pods through a Multus macvlan (infrastructure/rook-ceph-cluster/
# san-network-attachment.yaml), and a macvlan parent only has to be up — it
# does not need an address of its own for its children to work.
#
# It used to carry 10.99.0.1/29, because reaching this link required
# CephCluster.spec.network.provider: host, and that put every Ceph daemon on
# host networking, mons included. Nothing needs it now, and by the rule this
# segment is built on — Ceph-internal traffic and nothing else — the node has
# no business on it either.
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: LinkConfig
name: enp2s0f1np1
up: true
mtu: 9000
addresses:
- address: 10.99.0.1/29
+18 -2
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,15 @@ machine:
# macvlan parent for the v30iot pod attachments; host addresses on that L2
# make node replies bypass the UDM and break every UDM-DNATed flow.
net.ipv6.conf.ens19.disable_ipv6: "1"
# Same argument for the physical ports: enp2s0f0np0 is only the trunk
# parent for mgmt0 and ens19, enp87s0 is unused, and both sit on the
# untagged fallback network where nothing is supposed to run. Both were
# taking an fd00::/64 and an IPv6 default route from its router
# advertisements, leaving four equal-priority default routes per node of
# which only mgmt0 has a globally routable source. See k8s-1.yaml for the
# full reasoning and how it was verified.
net.ipv6.conf.enp2s0f0np0.disable_ipv6: "1"
net.ipv6.conf.enp87s0.disable_ipv6: "1"
install:
# Three NVMe drives are visible on bare metal. Select the installer target
# by serial so it cannot land on the OSD drive or on EPHEMERAL, whatever
@@ -89,10 +98,17 @@ up: true
# Dedicated Ceph cluster network on X710 port 1, VLAN 49 / 10.99.0.0/29,
# untagged on the wire. OSD<->OSD replication only. Not routed off its own
# segment and deliberately has no default route.
#
# The node deliberately holds NO address here. Rook attaches this link to the
# OSD pods through a Multus macvlan (infrastructure/rook-ceph-cluster/
# san-network-attachment.yaml), and a macvlan parent only has to be up — it
# does not need an address of its own for its children to work.
#
# It used to carry 10.99.0.2/29, because reaching this link required
# CephCluster.spec.network.provider: host, which put every Ceph daemon on
# host networking, mons included. Nothing needs it now.
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: LinkConfig
name: enp2s0f1np1
up: true
mtu: 9000
addresses:
- address: 10.99.0.2/29
+17 -2
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,15 @@ machine:
sysctls:
# v30iot NIC carries no host addressing — see k8s-1.yaml.
net.ipv6.conf.ens19.disable_ipv6: "1"
# Same argument for the physical ports: enp2s0f0np0 is only the trunk
# parent for mgmt0 and ens19, enp87s0 is unused, and both sit on the
# untagged fallback network where nothing is supposed to run. Both were
# taking an fd00::/64 and an IPv6 default route from its router
# advertisements, leaving four equal-priority default routes per node of
# which only mgmt0 has a globally routable source. See k8s-1.yaml for the
# full reasoning and how it was verified.
net.ipv6.conf.enp2s0f0np0.disable_ipv6: "1"
net.ipv6.conf.enp87s0.disable_ipv6: "1"
install:
# Three NVMe drives are visible on bare metal. Select the installer target
# by serial so it cannot land on the OSD drive or on EPHEMERAL, whatever
@@ -73,10 +82,16 @@ parent: enp2s0f0np0
up: true
---
# Dedicated Ceph cluster network — see k8s-1.yaml.
# The node deliberately holds NO address here. Rook attaches this link to the
# OSD pods through a Multus macvlan (infrastructure/rook-ceph-cluster/
# san-network-attachment.yaml), and a macvlan parent only has to be up — it
# does not need an address of its own for its children to work.
#
# It used to carry 10.99.0.3/29, because reaching this link required
# CephCluster.spec.network.provider: host, which put every Ceph daemon on
# host networking, mons included. Nothing needs it now.
apiVersion: v1alpha1
kind: LinkConfig
name: enp2s0f1np1
up: true
mtu: 9000
addresses:
- address: 10.99.0.3/29