Compare commits

..
Author SHA1 Message Date
claude-botandClaude Opus 5 e30d833624 fix(llama-embed): raise the memory limit to match its own context and batch
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-scripts-test Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci-manifests-test Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/pr/pr-review Pipeline was successful
#739 raised the context from 2048 to 4096 and the micro-batch from an effective
512 to 1024, both to match how Paperless chunks documents. It left memory at
2Gi/4Gi, which was sized for the smaller values.

The pod ran fine interactively and was OOMKilled (exit 137) partway through the
first sustained run, around 300 documents into an embedding pass. Nothing in the
server log marked it — the process was killed outright, so the last line is a
half-finished task and the reason is only visible in the container's
lastState.terminated.

This would have surfaced when Paperless first indexed the archive, i.e. on the
first real use rather than under test.

The weights are only ~600 MiB. What sets the footprint is four slots at 4096
context with a 1024-token micro-batch, plus Vulkan allocating the iGPU working
set from system RAM where it counts against this cgroup — the same effect that
put llama-server at 32Gi for 19 GiB of weights.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 08:14:19 +02:00
42 changed files with 68 additions and 2480 deletions
-14
View File
@@ -7,21 +7,7 @@ when:
# install-netbird-proxy.yml also applies the netbird-proxy-watchdog role,
# so changes to it must redeploy this host too.
- "ansible/roles/netbird-proxy-watchdog/**"
# install-netbird-proxy.yml also applies the edge bouncer.
- "ansible/roles/crowdsec-edge-bouncer/**"
- "ansible/plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml"
# The variables that steer those roles, not just the roles themselves.
# Without these two, a change that only touches inventory never deploys
# and nothing says so: arming the bouncer lives in host_vars, and its
# LAPI key lives in group_vars, so both would sit in git looking applied
# while the hosts kept running the previous configuration.
#
# pve_hosts.yml is deliberately NOT listed. It is the single inventory
# file for the whole fleet, so listing it would redeploy the proxies for
# any unrelated host edit. The cost is that a change to [netbird_proxy]
# group membership needs a manual deployment run.
- "ansible/inventory/host_vars/proxy-*.yml"
- "ansible/inventory/group_vars/netbird_proxy/**"
- ".woodpecker/deploy-netbird-proxy.yml"
- event: deployment
evaluate: 'CI_PIPELINE_DEPLOY_TARGET == "deploy-netbird-proxy"'
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
---
# Bouncer key for crowdsec-edge-bouncer, scoped to the proxy hosts.
#
# A single encrypted VALUE rather than a whole-file vault like its siblings in
# group_vars/all and group_vars/edge_host. Deliberate: adding this variable to
# an existing whole-file vault means decrypting that file first, which exposes
# every other secret in it for the sake of appending one line. encrypt_string
# keeps the blast radius at this one value.
#
# Same value as OpenBao homelab/infrastructure/crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key, which
# the crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key ExternalSecret feeds to BOUNCER_KEY_edge on the
# LAPI. Both sides must move together — and unlike crowdsec-bouncer-key, this
# one is NOT in the quarterly rotator, because nothing on these hosts re-reads
# OpenBao on a schedule. Rotating it means updating OpenBao and re-running
# plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml.
vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key: !vault |
$ANSIBLE_VAULT;1.1;AES256
32653764333536316163303838333839616562663862666637626165303837633866643033393239
3363376538656236643161386432326437633232643564630a633635306365323537346139626364
36613033343938363366306239363638383466396337623333623136313234656366333366623433
6437656632373364340a346566343866366433306533353431383064356362346536383136323663
39333864643534326433653233303137373162663066633132623931316135323733333863306330
6366623463666435636362376238313639666263323163303733
-4
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,3 @@
- docker-install
- netbird-proxy
- netbird-proxy-watchdog
# Enforces the cluster's CrowdSec decisions here, where public traffic
# enters. Deployed in dry-run: it logs what it would block and creates no
# nftables rules until crowdsec_bouncer_mode is flipped per host.
- crowdsec-edge-bouncer
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
---
# CrowdSec firewall bouncer on the NetBird proxy hosts.
#
# Enforces the decisions the in-cluster CrowdSec already detects, at the point
# where public traffic actually enters: these hosts terminate TLS for every
# *.renner.uno name. A drop here never reaches the mesh, the relay or the
# cluster.
#
# Detection stays in the cluster. The reverse-proxy produces no parseable
# access log and there is no CrowdSec collection for it, while Traefik has a
# working one — and every scenario in use needs HTTP detail (paths, status
# codes, user agents) that does not exist at this layer.
# Pinned. A release tarball URL is immutable, and this checksum is of the
# amd64 asset for exactly this tag.
crowdsec_bouncer_version: v0.0.36
crowdsec_bouncer_sha256: f86e4b72693549d99f40a9402abefb894108f047a3fbe6e72fada25ee17ce88b
# The LAPI over the public path these hosts already serve, see
# kubernetes/infrastructure/crowdsec/lapi-ingress.yaml. The proxies cannot
# reach it over the mesh: the reverse-proxy container runs non-root, so its
# embedded NetBird client terminates the tunnel in userspace and the tunnel
# belongs to that process rather than to the host netns.
#
# No ca_cert_path: Traefik serves a Let's Encrypt certificate for this name,
# and the bouncer adds ca_cert_path to the system pool rather than replacing
# it — the system pool already trusts LE.
crowdsec_bouncer_api_url: https://crowdsec.renner.uno/
crowdsec_bouncer_api_key: "{{ vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key }}"
# Enforcing. The bouncer creates two nftables tables (ip crowdsec, ip6
# crowdsec6) holding the decisions it pulled, touches no existing chain and
# sets no chain policy — SSH and :443 stay open unless the source is banned.
#
# `dry-run` is the other value: it pulls and logs what it would block without
# creating a single rule. That is what a new host should be given before it
# enforces, and what an existing one can be dropped back to, per host through
# inventory/host_vars, without disarming the rest.
#
# Worth knowing before arming anything new: the first bouncer on a path
# enforces the whole CAPI set at once — around 15k addresses today — so the
# false-positive window belongs before the switch, not after it. And because
# this chain sits on the INPUT hook while these hosts run no other firewall,
# there is no conntrack rule accepting established flows ahead of it: a banned
# address is dropped even when it is answering our own outbound connection.
# That is why capi_whitelists.yaml carries the proxies and netbird.renner.uno.
crowdsec_bouncer_mode: nftables
crowdsec_bouncer_update_frequency: 10s
crowdsec_bouncer_log_level: info
# Bound to loopback deliberately. These hosts are public and have no metrics
# collection path at all today — opening :60601 to the internet to gain a
# scrape target is the wrong trade. Revisit when host metrics exist.
crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen: 127.0.0.1
crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port: 60601
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
---
# A restart drops both nftables tables and rebuilds them from the next
# successful LAPI pull, so there is a short window with no blocklist. That is
# the documented behaviour of a clean shutdown, not a defect — and it is why
# retry_initial_connect matters.
- name: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
ansible.builtin.systemd:
name: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
state: restarted
daemon_reload: true
@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
---
# See defaults/main.yml for why this exists and why it starts inert.
#
# The static release tarball, not a distribution package: the AUR package
# `crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-nftables` depends on `crowdsec` and would pull the
# whole Security Engine onto hosts that only need the bouncer, the group is
# mixed (proxy-1 Arch, VPS-1 Debian), and the AUR would be a new pattern this
# repo does not otherwise have. The tarball is the same artefact the AUR
# package downloads.
- name: Ensure nftables is present (the enforcing backend)
ansible.builtin.package:
name: nftables
state: present
- name: Ensure the bouncer config directory exists
ansible.builtin.file:
path: /etc/crowdsec/bouncers
state: directory
mode: "0755"
# Fetched on the CONTROLLER and pushed, not pulled by the host.
#
# proxy-1 is IPv6-only, and neither github.com nor objects.githubusercontent.com
# publishes an AAAA record — a get_url on the host fails with "Network is
# unreachable" and no amount of retrying fixes it. Mirroring into
# gitea.renner.uno is no help either: its public records are the internal LB
# VIP (10.2.99.86 / fd99::86), so it is unreachable from outside the LAN. And
# upstream ships no container image for this bouncer, which is expected —
# it manipulates host netfilter.
#
# The CI runner has v4, so it does the fetching. The checksum is verified
# there, before anything is copied to a host.
- name: Fetch the pinned bouncer release on the controller
ansible.builtin.get_url:
url: >-
https://github.com/crowdsecurity/cs-firewall-bouncer/releases/download/{{
crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-linux-amd64.tgz
dest: /tmp/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
checksum: sha256:{{ crowdsec_bouncer_sha256 }}
mode: "0644"
delegate_to: localhost
become: false
run_once: true
# Only the download had to move to the controller — the extraction stays on
# the host. The ci-ansible image ships a tar that ansible rejects ("detected as
# tar type None. GNU tar required"), while both host distributions have GNU
# tar. Shipping the archive rather than the unpacked binary also keeps the
# artefact that the checksum was verified against intact all the way to the
# host.
- name: Copy the bouncer archive to the host
ansible.builtin.copy:
src: /tmp/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
dest: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
mode: "0644"
# Only the binary. The tarball also carries install.sh / upgrade.sh /
# uninstall.sh, which manage systemd and config themselves — that is this
# role's job, and letting them run would leave two owners for the same files.
- name: Unpack the bouncer binary
ansible.builtin.unarchive:
src: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}.tgz
dest: /opt
remote_src: true
include:
- crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
creates: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
- name: Install the bouncer binary
ansible.builtin.copy:
src: /opt/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer-{{ crowdsec_bouncer_version }}/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
dest: /usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
remote_src: true
mode: "0755"
notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
# 0600: this file carries the LAPI key.
- name: Deploy the bouncer configuration
ansible.builtin.template:
src: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml.j2
dest: /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml
mode: "0600"
notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
- name: Deploy the bouncer systemd unit
ansible.builtin.template:
src: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service.j2
dest: /etc/systemd/system/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
mode: "0644"
notify: Restart crowdsec firewall bouncer
- name: Enable and start the bouncer
ansible.builtin.systemd:
name: crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.service
enabled: true
state: started
daemon_reload: true
- name: Report how to read it
ansible.builtin.debug:
msg: |
crowdsec-firewall-bouncer deployed in mode "{{ crowdsec_bouncer_mode }}".
What it would block: journalctl -u crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -f
What it does block: nft list table ip crowdsec ; nft list table ip6 crowdsec6
Metrics: curl -s {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen }}:{{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port }}/metrics
Rollback: systemctl stop crowdsec-firewall-bouncer. A clean stop deletes
both nftables tables by itself. Only after a kill -9 do they need
removing by hand: nft delete table ip crowdsec ; nft delete table ip6 crowdsec6
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
# Managed by Ansible (crowdsec-edge-bouncer role) — do not edit.
#
# Upstream's shipped unit orders itself After=crowdsec.service. There is no
# local Security Engine on these hosts — the LAPI is in the cluster — so that
# dependency is dropped; nss-lookup instead, because api_url is a public name
# that has to resolve before the first connect.
[Unit]
Description=CrowdSec firewall bouncer (edge enforcement for the NetBird proxy)
After=network-online.target nss-lookup.target
Wants=network-online.target
[Service]
Type=notify
# -t validates the config and exits non-zero on a bad one, so a broken config
# fails the start instead of taking the running rules down with it.
ExecStartPre=/usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -c /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml -t
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer -c /etc/crowdsec/bouncers/crowdsec-firewall-bouncer.yaml
Restart=always
RestartSec=10
LimitNOFILE=65536
KillMode=mixed
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
# Managed by Ansible (crowdsec-edge-bouncer role) — do not edit.
mode: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_mode }}
update_frequency: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_update_frequency }}
# stdout, so journald owns the log and there is no second rotation policy to
# keep in sync. The shipped example writes to /var/log; that only matters for
# hosts without journald.
log_mode: stdout
log_level: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_log_level }}
api_url: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_api_url }}
api_key: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_api_key }}
# Without this the process EXITS when the LAPI is unreachable at startup —
# there is no retry on the first connect. And because a clean shutdown deletes
# the nftables tables, the systemd restart loop would leave the host with no
# blocklist at all until the first successful connect. Present in the code,
# absent from the shipped example config.
retry_initial_connect: true
disable_ipv4: false
disable_ipv6: false
deny_action: DROP
supported_decisions_types:
- ban
# Separate tables per family; the bouncer never touches an existing table or
# chain, and never sets a chain policy. Priority -10 puts it ahead of anything
# at the default filter priority.
nftables:
ipv4:
enabled: true
set-only: false
table: crowdsec
chain: crowdsec-chain
priority: -10
ipv6:
enabled: true
set-only: false
table: crowdsec6
chain: crowdsec6-chain
priority: -10
# input is the traffic this exists for: the reverse-proxy is host-networked and
# owns :443, so its packets traverse INPUT. forward covers the bridge-networked
# http-redirect sidecar, whose packets never do.
nftables_hooks:
- input
- forward
prometheus:
enabled: true
listen_addr: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_listen }}
listen_port: {{ crowdsec_bouncer_metrics_port }}
+1 -6
View File
@@ -2,12 +2,7 @@
Converts one MS-01 from "Proxmox host running a Talos VM" to "Talos on bare
metal", and swaps its Ceph OSD onto a Samsung PM983 at the same time. Written
after doing jupiter on 2026-08-25.
All three nodes are now on bare metal — `talosctl get systeminformation`
reports Minisforum MS-01 hardware with distinct chassis serials for k8s-1,
k8s-2 and k8s-3, with no hypervisor in between. Kept as the procedure for a
rebuild, not as outstanding work.
after doing jupiter on 2026-08-25; saturn and neptune remain.
Everything here that reads like an over-specific warning is something that
actually happened. The conversion itself is straightforward — the failures were
@@ -111,23 +111,9 @@ statistics max_id=13323904 max_start_ts=1787162400.0
statistics_short_term max_id=159205762 max_start_ts=1787166000.0
```
## Phase 2c — cutover: DONE
## Phase 2c — cutover (REMAINING)
Verified 2026-09-02 against the live database:
| table | rows | span |
|---|---|---|
| `statistics` | 11,092,586 | 2024-03-13 20:00 → current |
| `statistics_short_term` | 1,883,709 | rolling ~7 days |
| `statistics_meta` | 1,480 | |
The 2024-03-13 origin is the proof that matters. It is unchanged from the
pre-migration count in "What is at risk" above, so the history was copied
across engines rather than started from zero — which is the failure this
document exists to prevent. `states` carries current rows, so `db_url` points
at Postgres.
The procedure below is kept as the record of what was done.
Do not start until phase 1 is verified.
**Migrate statistics only.** Copying all 18M `states` rows is slow, needs a long
HA outage, and buys a table that is discarded within 7 days anyway.
@@ -56,9 +56,10 @@ spec:
# Re-rendered on every pod start, so a CNPG password rotation takes
# effect rather than silently leaving a stale URI behind.
#
# Load-bearing: `db_url: !secret recorder_db_url` in the homeassistant
# repo's configuration.yaml reads this key, so HA does not start
# without it. Removing this init container takes the recorder down.
# INERT until the recorder is repointed: nothing reads this key until
# `db_url: !secret recorder_db_url` lands in configuration.yaml in the
# homeassistant repo. That ordering is required — HA refuses to start
# when a referenced secret is missing.
- name: render-db-url
image: busybox:1.36
command:
@@ -95,7 +96,7 @@ spec:
memory: 32Mi
containers:
- name: home-assistant
image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.9.0 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
image: ghcr.io/home-assistant/home-assistant:2026.8.3 # {"$imagepolicy": "flux-system:home-assistant"}
env:
- name: TZ
value: Europe/Berlin
@@ -18,12 +18,12 @@
# That is the point of the move — it attacks the multiplier rather than trimming
# what gets recorded, which would only hide the problem.
#
# This is the live recorder database. HA writes here; the SQLite file is no
# longer the system of record. The 2.4 years of long-term statistics were
# copied across engines rather than regenerated — HA does not migrate data
# between database engines, so an empty Postgres would have silently started
# from zero and taken the energy dashboard's history with it.
# MIGRATION-recorder-postgres.md holds the sequence that was followed.
# STAGING
# Phase 1 (this manifest): the cluster comes up EMPTY and HA keeps using SQLite.
# Nothing depends on it, so a failure here is inert. Verify Ready, WAL archiving
# to Hetzner, and a successful base backup before going further.
# Phase 2: migrate the statistics tables and repoint recorder.db_url.
# See MIGRATION-recorder-postgres.md for the sequence and the rollback.
apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
kind: Cluster
metadata:
@@ -60,8 +60,9 @@ resources:
- zigbee2mqtt-gate-service.yaml
- zigbee2mqtt-ingress.yaml
# Postgres backend for the recorder (MIGRATION-recorder-postgres.md).
# Live: recorder.db_url in the homeassistant repo points here, and the
# long-term statistics carry their full history from 2024.
# PHASE 1: this cluster comes up EMPTY and nothing consumes it — HA is still
# on SQLite. Deploying it is therefore inert; phase 2 migrates the statistics
# tables and repoints recorder.db_url in the homeassistant repo.
- ha-pg-hetzner-creds-externalsecret.yaml
- ha-pg-objectstore.yaml
- ha-pg-cluster.yaml
+10 -12
View File
@@ -10,15 +10,15 @@ metadata:
# Kept permanently as a standing guard.
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/prune: disabled
spec:
# A replica is viable because nothing here writes pg_vectors any more. Both
# vector indexes run on vchordrq and the vectors extension is gone, so the
# long pg_vectors/indexes/<uuid> paths are absent — pg_basebackup's tar
# format cannot represent them, and that is what blocks a replica join.
instances: 2
# See ak-pg cluster.yaml for rationale. The barman-plugin shutdown wedge
# (cloudnative-pg#9770) holds an instance up until SIGKILL, so bounding
# terminationGracePeriod (stopDelay) is what keeps a failover from waiting
# on it. smartShutdownTimeout keeps pod restarts quick.
# Single instance during pgvecto.rs → VectorChord migration window;
# pg_basebackup tar format chokes on the long pg_vectors/indexes/<uuid>
# paths, blocking replica join. Bump back to 2 once Immich's in-app
# vchord migration drops the vectors extension.
instances: 1
# See ak-pg cluster.yaml for rationale. Single-instance, so no failover, but
# the barman-plugin shutdown wedge (cloudnative-pg#9770) takes the whole DB
# down until SIGKILL — bounding terminationGracePeriod (stopDelay) matters
# even without a standby. smartShutdownTimeout keeps pod restarts quick.
smartShutdownTimeout: 10
stopDelay: 60
imageName: ghcr.io/corentingiraud/cnpg-pgvector-vectorchord:16-migration
@@ -36,10 +36,8 @@ spec:
database: immich
owner: immich
postgresql:
# vchord only. The image also ships pgvecto.rs (vectors.so), but its
# extension is not installed and preloading it would recreate pg_vectors
# in PGDATA for nothing. pgvector needs no preloading.
shared_preload_libraries:
- vectors.so
- vchord.so
parameters:
shared_buffers: "512MB"
+3 -54
View File
@@ -75,62 +75,11 @@ spec:
# many small per-expert matmuls that sets the pace, not bandwidth.
- --threads
- "4"
# 16k is room to spare, not a safety limit. The limit that matters
# is not set here at all.
#
# Isolated by bisection on a scratch pod: this stack breaks on
# PROMPT length, and the value of --ctx-size makes no difference to
# it. Measured at --ctx-size 65536 with a single slot, so with four
# times the headroom:
#
# 13588 prompt tokens coherent answer
# 15086 one token, immediate EOS, empty content
# 16088 CJK characters and digit runs
#
# A single request past that boundary then poisons the slot: the
# same 13588-token prompt that answered cleanly a minute earlier
# returns one empty token afterwards, and stays broken until the
# pod restarts. That is why it looked intermittent, and why a
# 650-token classification once came back as 1025 tokens of "!" —
# it followed Home Assistant's ~19k prompts through the same slot.
#
# Nothing reports any of it: finish_reason "stop", a well-formed
# OpenAI response, HTTP 200, /health green.
#
# So the operating rule is about callers, not this flag. Paperless
# sits near 5k and is safe; Home Assistant's Assist prompt measured
# 18910 and never had a chance. An earlier version of this comment
# blamed --ctx-size 32768, which the bisection disproves — 32768
# and 65536 both answer correctly as long as the prompt stays under
# the boundary.
#
# The same stack also fails hard at --ubatch-size 2048, which is
# the loud version of a limit this one keeps quiet about.
#
# 16k rather than 8k because the measured prefill falloff is mild
# and this model's KV cache is unusually cheap — only 10 of its 40
# layers use full attention.
- --ctx-size
- "16384"
# One slot, so the 16384 belongs to one request at a time.
#
# Left on auto, llama.cpp opens four slots and — because auto is
# also what enables --kv-unified — has them share a single buffer
# of this size. Four Paperless requests at once wanted 6209, 6472,
# 4303 and 1271 tokens against those 16384, and all four died with
# "Context size has been exceeded".
#
# They were concurrent because a client timeout does not stop the
# generation behind it: each abandoned request keeps consuming the
# shared budget the next one needs, so one slow document is enough
# to start the pile-up. Queueing is the behaviour worth having
# here — nothing calls this server in parallel on purpose, and
# Paperless's celery worker runs at concurrency 1.
#
# No liveness probe change goes with this. The server recovered on
# its own once the batch drained, so a probe that restarted the pod
# would have made the incident worse; with a single slot, one that
# asked for a real completion would also queue behind live work and
# kill healthy pods during a long document.
- --parallel
- "1"
# A micro-batch of 2048 or more makes this Vulkan/Mesa stack fail
# with ErrorDeviceLost.
- --ubatch-size
+28 -39
View File
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ spec:
image: ghcr.io/ggml-org/llama.cpp:server-vulkan-b10731
args:
- --hf-repo
- gpustack/bge-m3-GGUF:Q8_0
- Qwen/Qwen3-Embedding-0.6B-GGUF:Q8_0
# Serves POST /v1/embeddings.
- --embeddings
# A short, stable id for consumers. Without it the model is
@@ -50,41 +50,28 @@ spec:
# One name only: llama-server keeps aliases in a sorted set and
# reports the first as the id, so a second name can steal it.
- --alias
- bge-m3
# bge-m3 is trained for CLS pooling — a different type from the
# Qwen family this replaces, which uses last-token. Left unspecified
# llama-server takes the GGUF default, which is not visible from
# outside and would silently produce vectors the model was not
# trained to emit. Read from the model's own 1_Pooling/config.json
# rather than assumed; of the candidates measured, three different
# pooling types were needed.
- qwen3-embedding-0.6b
# Qwen3-Embedding is trained for last-token pooling. Left
# unspecified llama-server takes the GGUF's default, which is not
# visible from outside and would silently produce vectors the model
# was not trained to emit. Set before anything is indexed: changing
# pooling later invalidates every stored embedding.
- --pooling
- cls
- last
- --n-gpu-layers
- "99"
- --threads
- "2"
# Paperless chunks at 1024 tokens, but counts them with its own
# tokenizer while this server measures the batch in bge-m3's.
# Those disagree: XLM-RoBERTa splits German into more pieces than
# llama_index's counter does, so a chunk Paperless considers full
# at 1024 arrived here as 1069 and the request failed outright —
# "input (1069 tokens) is too large to process".
#
# The headroom therefore has to absorb a tokenizer ratio, not just
# a rounding error, and 1.5x covers far more than the 1.044 that
# broke it. The defaults are batch 2048 / ubatch 512, and with
# --embeddings llama-server clamps both to the smaller rather than
# run them mismatched, so both are set.
#
# 2048 stays avoided: that is where the chat model met
# ErrorDeviceLost on this Vulkan stack. That failure came under a
# 20 GB model's memory pressure and may not bind a 600 MB one, but
# this does not need to find out.
# Paperless chunks documents at 1024 tokens. The defaults are
# batch 2048 / ubatch 512, and with --embeddings llama-server
# clamps both down to 512 rather than run them mismatched — below
# the chunk size. Matching both to 1024 fits a whole chunk in one
# pass; 2048 is deliberately avoided, since that is where this
# Vulkan stack fails with ErrorDeviceLost.
- --batch-size
- "1536"
- "1024"
- --ubatch-size
- "1536"
- "1024"
# Room for a full chunk plus overhead rather than exactly one.
- --ctx-size
- "4096"
@@ -104,22 +91,24 @@ spec:
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
# Measured, not estimated: embedding 400 real documents peaked at
# 1.6 GiB (Prometheus max_over_time on the working set). The limit is
# well above that because the footprint is dominated by the four slots
# at 4096 context and the Vulkan working set rather than by the
# weights — the Qwen model this replaces peaked at 10.6 GiB on the
# same settings for the same 600 MiB of weights, and several
# candidates were OOMKilled at limits that looked generous against
# their model size.
# The weights are only ~600 MiB, but that is not what sets the
# footprint: four slots at 4096 context with a 1024-token micro-batch,
# and Vulkan allocating the iGPU's working set from system RAM where
# it counts against this cgroup.
#
# 4Gi was sized for the earlier 2048 context and 512 micro-batch. Both
# were raised to match Paperless's chunking without raising this, and
# the pod then survived interactive use and was OOMKilled (137) partway
# through the first sustained run — roughly 300 documents in. Indexing
# the archive would have hit it on day one.
resources:
requests:
cpu: 250m
memory: 2Gi
memory: 4Gi
gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"
limits:
cpu: "2"
memory: 8Gi
memory: 10Gi
gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"
# ~600 MiB rather than ~5 GiB, so a much shorter budget than the chat
# model needs, but still sized for a cold download.
+6 -16
View File
@@ -1,20 +1,10 @@
---
# Holds the GGUF weights, downloaded once by llama-server itself via --hf-repo.
# Prune-disabled so retiring this Kustomization does not throw away tens of GiB
# of model files that would have to be pulled from Hugging Face again.
# Holds the GGUF weights, downloaded once by the Deployment's initContainer.
# Prune-disabled so retiring this Kustomization does not throw away several
# GiB of model files that would have to be pulled from Hugging Face again.
#
# ReadWriteMany so a second replica, a one-off benchmark Job, or a candidate
# model being evaluated can mount the same weights; the models are read-only at
# inference time.
#
# Sized well beyond the two deployed models. The cache is shared by every
# candidate under evaluation (scripts/embed-eval-real.sh), and on a slow
# connection the download is the long pole — a shared cache lets the large
# candidates pull in the background while the small ones are already being
# measured, and means a model is never fetched twice across runs.
#
# CephFS supports online expansion (allowVolumeExpansion on the storage class),
# so growing this does not disturb the running pods.
# ReadWriteMany so a second replica or a one-off benchmark Job can mount the
# same weights; the models are read-only at inference time.
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
@@ -28,4 +18,4 @@ spec:
storageClassName: ceph-filesystem
resources:
requests:
storage: 120Gi
storage: 40Gi
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
# Scrapes CrowdSec. Until this landed, nothing did: `up{namespace="crowdsec"}`
# returned zero series and Prometheus held no cs_* metric at all, so the
# detection side of the ingress path was invisible — including whether the
# agents were reading logs and whether any bouncer was pulling decisions.
#
# One monitor for both services. They carry the same shape (a `metrics` port on
# 6060) and differ only in `app`, so a matchExpressions selector keeps this to
# a single object rather than two near-identical ones:
#
# crowdsec-service the LAPI — decisions, bouncer + machine requests
# crowdsec-agent-service the agents — acquisition, parsers, scenarios
#
# The crowdsec-ns CiliumNetworkPolicy already admits the monitoring namespace
# without a port restriction, so no policy change is needed.
#
# `release: kube-prometheus-stack` is what the chart's Prometheus selects on.
apiVersion: monitoring.coreos.com/v1
kind: ServiceMonitor
metadata:
name: crowdsec
namespace: crowdsec
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: crowdsec
release: kube-prometheus-stack
spec:
selector:
matchExpressions:
- key: app
operator: In
values:
- crowdsec-service
- crowdsec-agent-service
endpoints:
- port: metrics
path: /metrics
interval: 30s
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ resources:
- prometheusrule-cnpg-backup.yaml
- alloy-servicemonitor.yaml
- cnpg-podmonitors.yaml
- crowdsec-servicemonitor.yaml
- home-assistant-servicemonitor.yaml
- immich-servicemonitor.yaml
- loki-servicemonitor.yaml
@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
{
"annotations": {"list": []},
"description": "CrowdSec: Erkennung im Cluster, Durchsetzung am NetBird-Edge",
"editable": true,
"fiscalYearStartMonth": 0,
"graphTooltip": 1,
"id": null,
"links": [],
"panels": [
{
"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
"description": "Aktive Ban-Entscheidungen in der LAPI, ganz überwiegend aus den CAPI-Community-Blocklisten. Das ist die Menge, die ein scharfgeschalteter Bouncer durchsetzt.",
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {"color": {"mode": "thresholds"}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "text", "value": null}]}, "unit": "short"},
"overrides": []
},
"gridPos": {"h": 4, "w": 6, "x": 0, "y": 0},
"id": 1,
"options": {"colorMode": "value", "graphMode": "area", "justifyMode": "auto", "orientation": "auto", "reduceOptions": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "fields": "", "values": false}, "textMode": "auto"},
"targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(cs_active_decisions)", "refId": "A"}],
"title": "Aktive Decisions",
"type": "stat"
},
{
"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
"description": "Bouncer, die in den letzten 10 Minuten Decisions abgeholt haben. Fällt das unter die erwartete Zahl, holt ein Bouncer nichts mehr — und setzt damit einen veralteten Stand durch, ohne dass irgendetwas ausfällt.",
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {"color": {"mode": "thresholds"}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "red", "value": null}, {"color": "green", "value": 1}]}, "unit": "short"},
"overrides": []
},
"gridPos": {"h": 4, "w": 6, "x": 6, "y": 0},
"id": 2,
"options": {"colorMode": "value", "graphMode": "none", "justifyMode": "auto", "orientation": "auto", "reduceOptions": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "fields": "", "values": false}, "textMode": "auto"},
"targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "count(sum by (bouncer) (rate(cs_lapi_bouncer_requests_total[10m])) > 0)", "refId": "A"}],
"title": "Bouncer, die abholen",
"type": "stat"
},
{
"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
"description": "Vom Agent gelesene Logzeilen pro Sekunde. Steht das auf 0, detektiert CrowdSec nichts mehr — der häufigste stille Ausfall, weil alles andere weiterläuft.",
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {"color": {"mode": "thresholds"}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "red", "value": null}, {"color": "green", "value": 0.01}]}, "unit": "reqps"},
"overrides": []
},
"gridPos": {"h": 4, "w": 6, "x": 12, "y": 0},
"id": 3,
"options": {"colorMode": "value", "graphMode": "area", "justifyMode": "auto", "orientation": "auto", "reduceOptions": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "fields": "", "values": false}, "textMode": "auto"},
"targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(rate(cs_filesource_hits_total[5m]))", "refId": "A"}],
"title": "Gelesene Logzeilen/s",
"type": "stat"
},
{
"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
"description": "Szenario-Overflows der letzten 24 h — also lokal erkannte Angriffe, im Gegensatz zu den von CAPI übernommenen.",
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {"color": {"mode": "thresholds"}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "text", "value": null}]}, "unit": "short"},
"overrides": []
},
"gridPos": {"h": 4, "w": 6, "x": 18, "y": 0},
"id": 4,
"options": {"colorMode": "value", "graphMode": "area", "justifyMode": "auto", "orientation": "auto", "reduceOptions": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "fields": "", "values": false}, "textMode": "auto"},
"targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(increase(cs_bucket_overflowed_total[24h]))", "refId": "A"}],
"title": "Lokale Overflows (24 h)",
"type": "stat"
},
{
"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
"description": "Abholrate je Bouncer. Der Firewall-Bouncer auf den Proxies fragt alle 10 s. Die LAPI legt bei jeder neuen beobachteten Client-Adresse einen Eintrag `<name>@<ip>` an, und beobachtet wird die Pod-IP des netbird-ingress-Peers — deshalb erscheint ein logischer Bouncer hier mehrfach und nach Pod-Rollen unter neuen Namen.",
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "line", "fillOpacity": 10, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "none"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "reqps"},
"overrides": []
},
"gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 0, "y": 4},
"id": 5,
"options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "displayMode": "table", "placement": "right", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
"targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum by (bouncer) (rate(cs_lapi_bouncer_requests_total[5m]))", "legendFormat": "{{bouncer}}", "refId": "A"}],
"title": "Bouncer-Abholrate",
"type": "timeseries"
},
{
"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
"description": "Aktive Decisions nach Grund. `http:scan` dominiert und stammt aus den CAPI-Blocklisten.",
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "line", "fillOpacity": 20, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "normal"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "short"},
"overrides": []
},
"gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 12, "y": 4},
"id": 6,
"options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "displayMode": "table", "placement": "right", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
"targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum by (reason) (cs_active_decisions)", "legendFormat": "{{reason}}", "refId": "A"}],
"title": "Aktive Decisions nach Grund",
"type": "timeseries"
},
{
"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
"description": "Welche Szenarien lokal auslösen. Das ist das, was CrowdSec selbst aus den Traefik-Logs erkennt.",
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "bars", "fillOpacity": 70, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "normal"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "short"},
"overrides": []
},
"gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 0, "y": 12},
"id": 7,
"options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["sum"], "displayMode": "table", "placement": "right", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
"targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum by (name) (increase(cs_bucket_overflowed_total[1h]))", "legendFormat": "{{name}}", "refId": "A"}],
"title": "Szenario-Overflows (je Stunde)",
"type": "timeseries"
},
{
"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
"description": "Geparste gegen nicht geparste Zeilen. Ein Anstieg bei `ko` heißt meist, dass sich ein Logformat geändert hat und der Parser nicht mehr greift — CrowdSec liest dann weiter, erkennt aber nichts mehr.",
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "line", "fillOpacity": 10, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "none"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "reqps"},
"overrides": []
},
"gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 12, "y": 12},
"id": 8,
"options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "displayMode": "list", "placement": "bottom", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
"targets": [
{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(rate(cs_parser_hits_ok_total[5m]))", "legendFormat": "geparst", "refId": "A"},
{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum(rate(cs_parser_hits_ko_total[5m]))", "legendFormat": "nicht geparst", "refId": "B"}
],
"title": "Parser",
"type": "timeseries"
},
{
"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
"description": "Whitelist-Treffer nach Grund. Nützlich beim Scharfschalten: was hier zählt, wäre sonst ein Kandidat für einen Ban gewesen.",
"fieldConfig": {
"defaults": {"color": {"mode": "palette-classic"}, "custom": {"axisCenteredZero": false, "axisColorMode": "text", "axisLabel": "", "axisPlacement": "auto", "barAlignment": 0, "drawStyle": "line", "fillOpacity": 10, "gradientMode": "none", "hideFrom": {"legend": false, "tooltip": false, "viz": false}, "lineInterpolation": "linear", "lineWidth": 1, "pointSize": 5, "scaleDistribution": {"type": "linear"}, "showPoints": "never", "spanNulls": false, "stacking": {"group": "A", "mode": "none"}, "thresholdsStyle": {"mode": "off"}}, "mappings": [], "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": [{"color": "green", "value": null}]}, "unit": "reqps"},
"overrides": []
},
"gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 0, "y": 20},
"id": 9,
"options": {"legend": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "displayMode": "table", "placement": "right", "showLegend": true}, "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}},
"targets": [{"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"}, "expr": "sum by (reason) (rate(cs_node_wl_hits_ok_total[5m]))", "legendFormat": "{{reason}}", "refId": "A"}],
"title": "Whitelist-Treffer",
"type": "timeseries"
},
{
"datasource": {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "prometheus"},
"gridPos": {"h": 8, "w": 12, "x": 12, "y": 20},
"id": 10,
"options": {
"code": {"language": "plaintext", "showLineNumbers": false, "showMiniMap": false},
"content": "## Was dieses Dashboard NICHT zeigt\n\nAlle Panels stammen aus der LAPI und den Agents im Cluster. Die **Bouncer auf proxy-1 und proxy-2 exportieren eigene Metriken**, die hier fehlen:\n\n- `fw_bouncer_active_decisions` — was tatsächlich in den nftables-Sets steht\n- `fw_bouncer_dropped_packets` / `_bytes` — was wirklich verworfen wurde\n- `lapi_requests_total` / `_failures_total` — aus Sicht des Bouncers\n\nSie liegen auf `127.0.0.1:60601` der Proxy-Hosts. Die Hosts sind öffentlich und haben bisher keinerlei Metrik-Pfad; den Port ins Internet zu öffnen, nur um ein Scrape-Ziel zu bekommen, wäre der falsche Tausch.\n\n**Konsequenz:** „Bouncer-Abholrate\" oben zeigt, dass ein Bouncer *fragt* — nicht, dass er die Antwort auch angewandt hat. Solange der Modus `dry-run` ist, wendet er ohnehin nichts an.\n\nEin Scrape-Pfad für die Hosts ist eigene Arbeit und Voraussetzung dafür, dass „was wird wirklich geblockt\" beantwortbar wird."
},
"title": "Blinder Fleck",
"type": "text"
}
],
"refresh": "30s",
"schemaVersion": 38,
"style": "dark",
"tags": ["homelab", "crowdsec", "security"],
"templating": {"list": []},
"time": {"from": "now-6h", "to": "now"},
"timepicker": {},
"timezone": "",
"title": "CrowdSec Overview",
"uid": "crowdsec-overview",
"version": 1,
"weekStart": ""
}
@@ -38,9 +38,6 @@ configMapGenerator:
- name: dashboard-blackbox-overview
files:
- blackbox-overview.json
- name: dashboard-crowdsec-overview
files:
- crowdsec-overview.json
- name: dashboard-disk-health
files:
- disk-health.json
-116
View File
@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
---
# A read-only view of paperless's backup store, used as a recovery source and
# nothing else.
#
# It points at the production prefix, which is the whole point — the eval
# instance is a copy of the real archive's metadata — and that makes what is
# ABSENT here the safety-critical part:
#
# no retentionPolicy The production store has "30d". Without one here
# there is no policy to enforce, and enforcement is not
# tied to taking a backup: the plugin runs it from the
# instance sidecar on a timer
# (instanceSidecarConfiguration.retentionPolicyIntervalSeconds,
# default 1800). So "this cluster never backs up" would
# not have been enough on its own.
#
# A second property makes it belt-and-braces. Retention runs
# barman-cloud-backup-delete, which takes a server name and works inside
# <destinationPath>/<serverName> — the store's own status keys its recovery
# window by "pprl-pg", confirming that layout. This cluster is pprleval-pg, so
# even an accidental retention policy would address a prefix that holds nothing
# rather than production's backups.
#
# The cluster below completes the guarantee with isWALArchiver: false, so
# nothing is written back either. It does load the plugin — that is required
# for the restore to work at all — and read-only comes from the flag rather
# than from leaving the plugin out.
apiVersion: barmancloud.cnpg.io/v1
kind: ObjectStore
metadata:
name: pprleval-pg-source
namespace: paperless-eval
spec:
configuration:
destinationPath: s3://renner-uno-k8s-cnpg/pprl-pg
endpointURL: https://fsn1.your-objectstorage.com
s3Credentials:
accessKeyId:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
key: ACCESS_KEY_ID
secretAccessKey:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
key: ACCESS_SECRET_KEY
region:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
key: REGION
wal:
compression: gzip
data:
compression: gzip
---
# A disposable clone of the paperless database, for measuring how well the
# local LLM classifies documents without running the experiment against the
# live archive.
#
# Losing this cluster costs a re-restore and nothing else, which is the intent
# — it is rebuilt whenever a test needs a clean starting point.
#
# One instance, not two. Replication buys availability, and an eval instance
# that is down is simply an eval that waits.
apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
kind: Cluster
metadata:
name: pprleval-pg
namespace: paperless-eval
spec:
instances: 1
imageName: ghcr.io/cloudnative-pg/postgresql:16
enableSuperuserAccess: true
storage:
# Delete-reclaim, unlike the Retain default: this volume is a copy that
# gets rebuilt, so it should vanish with the cluster rather than leave a
# Released PV and an orphaned RBD image behind (issue #262).
storageClass: ceph-block-ephemeral
size: 10Gi
# Declared with isWALArchiver: false, which is what kubernetes/RECOVERY.md
# arrived at after an earlier version of that runbook said to omit it: the
# instance manager loads this plugin to replay WAL during the restore, and
# without it the instance never starts ("Unknown plugin:
# barman-cloud.cloudnative-pg.io").
#
# externalClusters below only says WHERE the backup is; it does not get the
# plugin injected into the pod. So "no plugin" is not the way to keep this
# read-only — "plugin, not archiving" is, and it is the combination verified
# on im-pg on 2026-07-25.
plugins:
- name: barman-cloud.cloudnative-pg.io
enabled: true
isWALArchiver: false
parameters:
barmanObjectName: pprleval-pg-source
bootstrap:
recovery:
source: pprl-pg
database: paperless
owner: paperless
externalClusters:
- name: pprl-pg
plugin:
name: barman-cloud.cloudnative-pg.io
parameters:
barmanObjectName: pprleval-pg-source
serverName: pprl-pg
postgresql:
parameters:
shared_buffers: "256MB"
max_connections: "100"
# The production tuning for write reduction is deliberately not copied.
# It exists to spare the SSDs under a database that runs for years; this
# one is read-only for hours at a time and then deleted.
resources:
requests:
cpu: 200m
memory: 512Mi
limits:
memory: 1Gi
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
namespace: paperless-eval
# The instance only. The measurement harness lives in scripts/paperless-eval/
# and is applied by hand — a Job is immutable, re-running one means deleting and
# recreating it, and Flux would just put the old one back. Nothing here should
# converge on a finished measurement.
resources:
- secrets.yaml
- cluster.yaml
- pvcs.yaml
- redis.yaml
- paperless.yaml
@@ -1,203 +0,0 @@
---
# Deliberately much smaller than the production ConfigMap. Everything that
# exists to serve people is gone: no remote-user auth, no CSRF origins, no
# barcode or mail consumption, no Tika/Gotenberg. Nothing consumes documents
# here, and nothing signs in.
#
# What remains is the database connection and the AI settings, because those
# are what the evaluation measures.
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: paperless-eval-config
namespace: paperless-eval
data:
PAPERLESS_URL: "http://paperless.paperless-eval.svc.cluster.local"
PAPERLESS_ALLOWED_HOSTS: "*"
PAPERLESS_TIME_ZONE: "Europe/Berlin"
PAPERLESS_REDIS: "redis://redis:6379"
PAPERLESS_DBENGINE: "postgresql"
PAPERLESS_DBHOST: "pprleval-pg-rw"
PAPERLESS_DBNAME: "paperless"
# Polling off, so a pod that finds an empty consume volume does not spend a
# thread looking at it every ten seconds for the length of a run.
PAPERLESS_CONSUMER_POLLING_INTERVAL: "0"
# The AI settings under test. The endpoints are placeholders that each eval
# job overrides for the model it is measuring — a job runs its own
# llama-server beside paperless in the same pod, so the value that matters at
# run time is the one in the job, not the one here.
#
# Same caveat as production, and sharper here: paperless reads these from an
# ApplicationConfiguration row and falls back to the environment only when
# that row is empty. The row comes across in the restored database, so
# anything configured in the production admin UI arrives with it and silently
# wins over this ConfigMap — an eval would then measure production's settings
# while appearing to measure the job's.
#
# Check it before trusting any result, and after every fresh restore:
#
# select llm_backend, llm_model, llm_embedding_backend, llm_embedding_model
# from paperless_applicationconfiguration;
#
# Every column must be null for the environment to apply.
PAPERLESS_AI_ENABLED: "true"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_BACKEND: "openai-like"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_ENDPOINT: "http://127.0.0.1:8080/v1"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_MODEL: "qwen3.6-35b-a3b"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_ALLOW_INTERNAL_ENDPOINTS: "true"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_CONTEXT_SIZE: "12288"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT: "900"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_OUTPUT_LANGUAGE: "de-de"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_BACKEND: "openai-like"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_ENDPOINT: "http://llama-embed.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080/v1"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_MODEL: "bge-m3"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_CHUNK_SIZE: "1024"
---
# A base instance that proves the restored database is usable and that the
# search index and classifier build against it. The evaluation itself does not
# run here — each job brings its own paperless container so it can point at its
# own model — but this is what makes a broken clone visible before a job spends
# hours on it.
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: paperless
namespace: paperless-eval
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperless
annotations:
configmap.reloader.stakater.com/reload: paperless-eval-config
# Both, like production: the secret refreshes on the same 10m cycle, and
# without this the pod would keep a rotated key until something else
# restarted it — which defeats the point of matching the interval.
secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: paperless-eval-secrets
spec:
replicas: 1
strategy:
type: Recreate
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperless
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperless
spec:
enableServiceLinks: false
securityContext:
fsGroup: 1000
fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: paperless
# No $imagepolicy marker, unlike apps/paperless: a measurement is
# only comparable against a fixed version, so this tag moves when
# somebody decides to re-measure, not when a release lands.
image: ghcr.io/paperless-ngx/paperless-ngx:3.1.2
ports:
- name: http
containerPort: 8000
envFrom:
- configMapRef:
name: paperless-eval-config
env:
- name: PAPERLESS_SECRET_KEY
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: paperless-eval-secrets
key: secret-key
- name: PAPERLESS_DBUSER
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: pprleval-pg-app
key: username
- name: PAPERLESS_DBPASS
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: pprleval-pg-app
key: password
volumeMounts:
- name: data
mountPath: /usr/src/paperless/data
- name: media
mountPath: /usr/src/paperless/media
- name: consume
mountPath: /usr/src/paperless/consume
# 60 minutes, against production's 10, and matching this app's Flux
# Kustomization timeout.
#
# Production's budget was sized for a from-scratch boot on this same
# corpus and held, so 10 would probably do — but there the volume is
# Retain and the index survives, making that a one-off. Here the
# volume is ephemeral and the index is rebuilt on every re-test, so
# the expensive path is the normal one. A killed pod starts the work
# over rather than resuming, which turns a slow boot into a
# crash-loop that stalls Flux behind wait: true.
#
# The LLM index is not in this budget: it is a celery task, and boot
# only runs init-llmindex-migrate, a migration check.
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /accounts/login/
port: http
periodSeconds: 20
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 180
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /accounts/login/
port: http
initialDelaySeconds: 120
periodSeconds: 30
timeoutSeconds: 10
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /accounts/login/
port: http
initialDelaySeconds: 30
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
resources:
requests:
cpu: 200m
memory: 512Mi
limits:
memory: 2Gi
# Production's context verbatim, and it has to be: the paperless-ngx
# entrypoint starts as root, chowns the mounted data/media/consume
# volumes and then drops to uid 1000 via setgid/setuid. Without these
# the same image fails that sequence with EPERM.
#
# It bites harder here than in production, where those volumes were
# chowned once years ago and keep their ownership. These are fresh on
# every rebuild, so the chown is not a no-op.
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: false
allowPrivilegeEscalation: true
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
add: ["CHOWN", "DAC_OVERRIDE", "FOWNER", "SETGID", "SETUID"]
volumes:
- name: data
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: paperless-eval-golden
- name: media
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: paperless-eval-media
- name: consume
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: paperless-eval-consume
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: paperless
namespace: paperless-eval
spec:
selector:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperless
ports:
- port: 80
targetPort: http
-129
View File
@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
---
# All four use ceph-block-ephemeral rather than the Retain default. Everything
# here is derived — a restored database, an index built from it, a cache — so
# the volumes should go when the namespace does instead of leaving Released PVs
# and orphaned RBD images to reclaim by hand (issue #262).
#
# /data holds the Tantivy search index and the classifier pickle, both rebuilt
# from the database, and the LLM index — which is the expensive one at roughly
# three hours for the full corpus.
#
# Measured on production for the same ~3900 documents: 36 MiB search index,
# 125 MiB LLM index. 10Gi is far more than that needs, and deliberately so —
# an embedding model with wider vectors than bge-m3's 1024 dimensions is
# exactly what phase two varies, and running out of space mid-run would cost
# the whole rebuild.
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
# Named for its role rather than its mount point: the smoke-test deployment
# builds /data here, and every eval job copies it out. Replaces the earlier
# RWO paperless-eval-data, whose access mode could not be widened in place —
# a bound claim's spec is immutable.
name: paperless-eval-golden
namespace: paperless-eval
labels:
velero.io/exclude-from-backup: "true"
spec:
# RWX, because the eval jobs read it too — each copies it into its own
# emptyDir rather than mounting it live. The vector store is SQLite, and
# SQLite locking across pods over CephFS is not something to rely on.
accessModes:
- ReadWriteMany
storageClassName: ceph-filesystem-ephemeral
resources:
requests:
storage: 10Gi
---
# Empty, and stays that way. Paperless refuses to start without the path, but
# the AI path reads title, content and filename out of the database and never
# opens a file — so the documents themselves are not copied here. That is what
# keeps this instance cheap and keeps a second copy of the archive off the
# cluster.
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: paperless-eval-media
namespace: paperless-eval
labels:
velero.io/exclude-from-backup: "true"
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteOnce
storageClassName: ceph-block-ephemeral
resources:
requests:
storage: 1Gi
---
# Also empty: nothing is consumed here, but the path has to exist.
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: paperless-eval-consume
namespace: paperless-eval
labels:
velero.io/exclude-from-backup: "true"
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteOnce
storageClassName: ceph-block-ephemeral
resources:
requests:
storage: 1Gi
---
# The eval jobs' model cache, RWX so several jobs can read the same weights at
# once — that is the whole point of measuring two candidates in parallel.
#
# Separate from the ai namespace's llama-server-models despite holding some of
# the same files: PVCs do not cross namespaces. A model therefore downloads
# once here and is then shared by every job, which is the cost a new candidate
# carries anyway.
#
# NOT ephemeral, unlike everything else in this namespace: re-downloading tens
# of gigabytes on a slow uplink is a worse outcome than an orphaned volume.
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: llama-models
namespace: paperless-eval
labels:
velero.io/exclude-from-backup: "true"
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteMany
storageClassName: ceph-filesystem
resources:
requests:
storage: 120Gi
---
# Results outlive the jobs that produce them: a Job is deleted and recreated to
# re-run a configuration, and comparing configurations is the entire exercise.
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: paperless-eval-results
namespace: paperless-eval
labels:
velero.io/exclude-from-backup: "true"
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteMany
storageClassName: ceph-filesystem
resources:
requests:
storage: 1Gi
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: paperless-eval-redis
namespace: paperless-eval
labels:
velero.io/exclude-from-backup: "true"
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteOnce
storageClassName: ceph-block-ephemeral
resources:
requests:
storage: 1Gi
-81
View File
@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
---
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: redis
namespace: paperless-eval
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: redis
spec:
replicas: 1
strategy:
type: Recreate
selector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: redis
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: redis
spec:
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 999
fsGroup: 999
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
containers:
- name: redis
# No $imagepolicy marker; see the note on the paperless image.
image: redis:8.10.1-alpine
# No --save: this holds the celery queue and the suggestion cache,
# both of which are regenerated. Persisting them across a restart of
# a throwaway instance would only preserve stale suggestions.
args:
- redis-server
- --save
- ""
- --loglevel
- warning
ports:
- name: redis
containerPort: 6379
volumeMounts:
- name: data
mountPath: /data
livenessProbe:
tcpSocket:
port: redis
initialDelaySeconds: 10
readinessProbe:
exec:
command: ["redis-cli", "ping"]
initialDelaySeconds: 5
periodSeconds: 10
resources:
requests:
cpu: 20m
memory: 64Mi
limits:
memory: 256Mi
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
volumes:
- name: data
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: paperless-eval-redis
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: redis
namespace: paperless-eval
spec:
selector:
app.kubernetes.io/name: redis
ports:
- port: 6379
targetPort: redis
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
---
# The same Hetzner S3 key every CNPG-using namespace pulls, needed here only so
# the recovery source can be read. See apps/paperless for why one shared key
# rather than per-app paths.
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
namespace: paperless-eval
spec:
refreshInterval: 1h
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao
target:
name: hetzner-s3-creds
dataFrom:
- extract:
key: infrastructure/hetzner-s3
---
# Django's secret key, shared with the production instance rather than given
# its own vault entry.
#
# It signs sessions and CSRF tokens, and this instance has no ingress and no
# users — nothing signs in, so nothing is at stake in sharing it. A separate
# entry would mean a vault write before the namespace can start, for a
# throwaway instance that gets rebuilt.
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: paperless-eval-secrets
namespace: paperless-eval
spec:
# 10m, matching apps/paperless rather than the 1h default: the point of
# sharing the key is that the two hold the same value, and a slower refresh
# here would let them diverge for up to an hour after a rotation.
refreshInterval: 10m
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao
target:
name: paperless-eval-secrets
dataFrom:
- extract:
key: apps/paperless
+1 -4
View File
@@ -82,10 +82,7 @@ data:
# primarily English archives — the better fit for a German corpus.
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_BACKEND: "openai-like"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_ENDPOINT: "http://llama-embed.ai.svc.cluster.local:8080/v1"
# Must match --alias in kubernetes/apps/llama-server/embed.yaml. Changing the
# embedding model invalidates every stored vector, so a swap means the LLM
# index has to be rebuilt.
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_MODEL: "bge-m3"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_MODEL: "qwen3-embedding-0.6b"
PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_EMBEDDING_CHUNK_SIZE: "1024"
---
apiVersion: apps/v1
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
apiVersion: kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
kind: Kustomization
metadata:
name: paperless-eval
namespace: flux-system
spec:
# A throwaway copy of paperless for measuring the local LLM against the real
# corpus. Its Cluster restores from paperless's backup store and archives
# nothing back; see kubernetes/apps/paperless-eval/cluster.yaml.
#
# prune: true and no prune-disabled annotations anywhere underneath — the
# data here is a copy, and being able to delete the whole namespace by
# removing this file is the point.
interval: 10m
retryInterval: 1m
# 30m is not enough: the first start restores the database and then builds
# the search index over ~3900 documents before the webserver answers.
timeout: 60m
sourceRef:
kind: GitRepository
name: flux-system
path: ./kubernetes/apps/paperless-eval
prune: true
wait: true
dependsOn:
- name: infrastructure
- name: infrastructure-crds
- name: infrastructure-ceph-cluster
- name: infrastructure-cnpg-barman
healthCheckExprs:
- apiVersion: postgresql.cnpg.io/v1
kind: Cluster
failed: "has(status.phase) && status.phase.startsWith('Failed')"
current: "has(status.phase) && (status.phase == 'Cluster in healthy state' || status.readyInstances > 0)"
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
# Bouncer key for the firewall bouncers on proxy-1/proxy-2.
#
# Separate from crowdsec-bouncer-key ON PURPOSE. That key is rotated
# quarterly by kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/crowdsec-bouncer-key.yaml,
# and both of its consumers live in the cluster, so ESO propagates a rotation
# within 10m. The edge bouncers are Ansible-managed hosts: nothing there
# re-reads OpenBao on a schedule, so a rotated key would leave them 401ing
# against the LAPI until someone runs the playbook. This key is therefore
# deliberately NOT enrolled in the rotator — it rotates when the playbook runs,
# and the playbook is what carries the new value to the hosts.
#
# The value must match ansible vault_crowdsec_edge_bouncer_key.
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
namespace: crowdsec
spec:
refreshInterval: 10m
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: openbao
target:
name: crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
dataFrom:
- extract:
key: infrastructure/crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
@@ -36,51 +36,6 @@ spec:
values:
container_runtime: containerd
# Addresses a community blocklist must never be allowed to ban.
#
# This is the ONLY declarative allowlist the chart offers. `cscli
# allowlists` objects live in the LAPI database, and that database runs
# without persistence here on purpose (see lapi.persistentVolume below),
# so anything created through cscli is gone at the next restart. This file
# is a ConfigMap mount, so it survives by construction. Upstream marks it
# deprecated in favour of centralized allowlists; it is still the only
# thing that works against a LAPI with no PVC.
#
# Scope: CAPI decisions only. Locally generated decisions are not filtered
# here — they currently carry real client IPs (verified), because Traefik
# resolves X-Forwarded-For past the netbird-ingress pod IP.
#
# The home WAN address is deliberately absent and is not needed: LAN
# clients never present it. opentofu/unifi_nat_hairpin.tf DNATs the public
# proxy addresses to the Traefik VIP on the UDM, so on-LAN traffic reaches
# the cluster directly with a LAN source and never traverses the proxies.
# Private ranges cannot appear in a community blocklist either way.
config:
capi_whitelists.yaml: |
cidrs:
# The proxy hosts themselves. Same three addresses as the
# netbird-ingress-egress toCIDRSet and the hairpin endpoints —
# keep all three lists in sync. proxy-1 is the v6-only member,
# proxy-2 the dual-stack one.
- 45.157.177.26/32
- 2a03:4000:4b:c1e:4474:43ff:fedf:8f85/128
- 2a03:4000:28:f6e:a4c7:59ff:fe1e:9a29/128
# netbird.renner.uno — management, signal, relay and TURN.
#
# Not optional once a bouncer is armed. Its chain sits on the INPUT
# hook, the proxy hosts run no other firewall, and there is therefore
# no conntrack rule accepting established flows ahead of it. A ban on
# this address would drop the RETURN traffic of the proxies' own
# outbound control connection and take them off the mesh — with no
# inbound attack involved at all.
#
# Checked when this was added: none of these addresses appear in the
# current decision set. That is the state today, not a guarantee —
# these are rented addresses on a hoster whose ranges do end up on
# community blocklists.
- 162.55.50.97/32
- 2a01:4f8:c2c:4579::1/128
# mTLS between agents and the LAPI. Do not switch back to password auth:
# the LAPI runs without persistence, so its machine-registration DB is
# wiped on every restart, and password-registered agents then get 401
@@ -123,24 +78,6 @@ spec:
lapi:
replicas: 1
service:
# Backend wiring for the public LAPI Ingress (lapi-ingress.yaml).
#
# These belong on the SERVICE, not on the Ingress: under the Kubernetes
# Ingress provider `traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.*` are service
# annotations, and on an Ingress they are silently ignored. The symptom
# is Traefik speaking plaintext to a TLS-only backend, which the LAPI
# answers with "Client sent an HTTP request to an HTTPS server." and a
# 400 — an error that looks like a malformed request rather than a
# scheme mismatch.
#
# With tls.enabled the LAPI serves HTTPS on 8080 and offers no
# plaintext port, so https here is mandatory rather than a hardening
# choice. The ServersTransport carries the chart's own CA, since that
# certificate is self-signed.
annotations:
traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serversscheme: https
traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.serverstransport: crowdsec-crowdsec-lapi@kubernetescrd
# Far below the chart default, which reserves half a core per LAPI for a
# workload that draws single-digit millicores — enough to leave the
# cluster unschedulable with one node out. Only the reservation shrinks;
@@ -149,18 +86,10 @@ spec:
requests:
cpu: 50m
podAnnotations:
# Reloader restarts the LAPI when either bouncer key changes. Both are
# consumed as env vars from a secretKeyRef, and env is fixed at pod
# start — without a restart the LAPI keeps trusting the old value while
# the bouncer already presents the new one, which is a 401 at exactly
# the moment a rotation is supposed to be seamless.
#
# crowdsec-bouncer-key rotates on a schedule, see
# Reloader restarts the LAPI when crowdsec-bouncer-key changes (it's an
# env-var secret, so a restart is required to pick up a rotated key). See
# kubernetes/infrastructure/openbao/rotation/crowdsec-bouncer-key.yaml.
# crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key rotates by hand together with
# ansible/plays/install-netbird-proxy.yml; it still needs to be listed
# here, because the LAPI side of that rotation is this env var.
secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: crowdsec-bouncer-key,crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
secret.reloader.stakater.com/reload: crowdsec-bouncer-key
persistentVolume:
data:
# Kept OFF deliberately. The #337 attempt to set this `true` (persist
@@ -189,17 +118,6 @@ spec:
secretKeyRef:
name: crowdsec-bouncer-key
key: key
# The firewall bouncers on proxy-1/proxy-2, over the public LAPI
# endpoint (lapi-ingress.yaml). The chart's entrypoint re-runs
# `register_bouncer` for every BOUNCER_KEY_* on each start and skips
# names that already exist, so this survives the LAPI's wiped
# registration DB the same way BOUNCER_KEY_ingress does — the env var
# is the source of truth, not the database.
- name: BOUNCER_KEY_edge
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: crowdsec-edge-bouncer-key
key: key
agent:
# Same reasoning as lapi.resources above, multiplied by three: this is a
@@ -217,32 +135,6 @@ spec:
- namespace: ingress
podName: traefik-*
program: traefik
# Read by polling, not inotify. Every path under
# /var/log/containers is a symlink into /var/log/pods, and kubelet
# rotates the target once it reaches containerLogMaxSize (10Mi,
# roughly every eight hours for Traefik here). An inotify tailer
# does not survive that rotation: it reopens the path, waits for a
# file that is in fact already present, and never reads another
# line. Nothing about that state looks broken from outside — the
# pod stays Running and Ready, the LAPI keeps answering, and the
# cumulative counters keep displaying whatever they reached, so the
# only symptom is that no scenario ever fires again.
#
# CrowdSec detects the hazard itself and logs it at startup, with
# this exact remedy in the message: "is a symlink, but inotify
# polling is enabled. Crowdsec will not be able to detect rotation.
# Consider setting poll_without_inotify to true". Upstream carries
# the same case as crowdsec#2449 (k3s + Traefik), and the chart
# gained this field in helm-charts#109 specifically to fix it.
#
# Orthogonal to the force_inotify: true that the chart hardcodes
# into acquis.yaml and offers no way to unset. That one governs the
# fsnotify watch on the directory, i.e. discovering the log of a
# replacement Traefik pod; this one governs how an already
# discovered file is read. Both true is the supported combination.
#
# Costs CPU per open file per upstream docs — two files per node.
poll_without_inotify: true
env:
- name: COLLECTIONS
value: "crowdsecurity/traefik crowdsecurity/http-cve crowdsecurity/appsec-virtual-patching crowdsecurity/appsec-generic-rules"
@@ -2,6 +2,4 @@ apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
resources:
- bouncer-key-externalsecret.yaml
- edge-bouncer-key-externalsecret.yaml
- lapi-ingress.yaml
- helmrelease.yaml
@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
# Public LAPI endpoint for the firewall bouncers on proxy-1/proxy-2.
#
# WHY PUBLIC AT ALL. The bouncers run as host processes on the proxies, and
# the proxies have no mesh access: the netbird-proxy container runs non-root
# (see the ip_unprivileged_port_start task in the netbird-proxy role), so it
# has no NET_ADMIN and no /dev/net/tun, and its embedded NetBird client
# therefore terminates the tunnel in userspace. The tunnel belongs to that
# process, not to the host netns — a second process on the same host cannot
# route through it. The alternative was a host-level NetBird client plus the
# LAPI on a LoadBalancer VIP; this reuses the path every other service already
# takes instead of adding two peers and an ACL policy.
#
# NO IP ALLOWLIST, deliberately. The bouncer key is the access control.
#
# An allowlist was the obvious second factor and it does not work here. A
# request originating on a proxy host does not arrive carrying that host's
# public address: the client connects to the local proxy on 127.0.0.1, the
# reverse-proxy puts what it saw into X-Forwarded-For, and Traefik resolves
# that. Measured against the netbird-proxy-watchdog, which makes exactly this
# kind of request every round:
#
# 172.18.0.3 - - [02/Sep/2026:10:12:01] "GET /" 200 websecure-immich-...
# 172.18.0.3 - - [02/Sep/2026:10:12:01] "GET /" 200 websecure-home-...
#
# 172.18.0.3 is a Docker bridge address on the proxy side. Allowlisting the
# published proxy addresses would have rejected the bouncer with 403;
# allowlisting 172.18.0.0/16 would be a private range on a host we do not
# control the addressing of, which is not a security control.
#
# What remains is the API key, which is the real control anyway: this endpoint
# serves read-only decision streams to a valid bouncer key and nothing else.
# The admin surface is cscli, in-cluster. If the source address ever becomes
# deterministic, an ipAllowList can be added on top.
---
# The LAPI serves HTTPS only once tls.enabled is set — there is no plaintext
# fallback and no second port; 8080 is the TLS port. Its certificate comes
# from the chart's own self-signed CA, so Traefik needs that CA to verify the
# backend. SANs include crowdsec-service.crowdsec.svc.cluster.local, which is
# what the Service resolves to.
apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
kind: ServersTransport
metadata:
name: crowdsec-lapi
namespace: crowdsec
spec:
serverName: crowdsec-service.crowdsec.svc.cluster.local
rootCAs:
- secret: crowdsec-root-secret
---
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Ingress
metadata:
name: crowdsec-lapi
namespace: crowdsec
labels:
# Public DNS via Cloudflare; the proxies resolve it from outside. The UDM
# external-dns instance skips it, LAN reaches it via the hairpin NAT.
dns.renner.uno/public: "true"
annotations:
cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-cluster
# NOT behind the Authentik gate: the client is a daemon with an API key,
# not a browser that can complete an OIDC flow.
#
# The backend scheme and ServersTransport are NOT set here. Under the
# Kubernetes Ingress provider, `traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/service.*`
# are SERVICE annotations — on an Ingress they are silently ignored, and
# Traefik then talks plaintext to a TLS-only backend. They live on the
# chart's Service instead, via lapi.service.annotations in helmrelease.yaml.
spec:
ingressClassName: traefik
rules:
- host: crowdsec.renner.uno
http:
paths:
- path: /
pathType: Prefix
backend:
service:
name: crowdsec-service
port:
number: 8080
tls:
- secretName: crowdsec-lapi-public-tls
hosts:
- crowdsec.renner.uno
@@ -69,13 +69,6 @@ kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: paperless
---
# A disposable copy of paperless's database, for measuring how the local LLM
# classifies documents without experimenting on the live archive.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: paperless-eval
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
@@ -34,33 +34,6 @@ spec:
- ports:
- port: "8080"
protocol: TCP
# The paperless-eval namespace reaches the embedding endpoint for the same
# reason paperless does; its chat model runs inside each eval job's own pod
# and needs no grant here.
#
# Scoped to the namespace rather than to an app label, unlike the grants
# around it: that namespace exists only to run evaluations, and its
# workload is jobs created per measurement whose labels vary with what is
# being measured. A label match would be a trap that presents as an
# embedding call silently dropped.
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": paperless-eval
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "8080"
protocol: TCP
# Home Assistant's llama.cpp conversation agent calls the chat model only —
# it has no use for the embedding endpoint, so unlike paperless above this
# grant does not extend to llama-embed.
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": home-assistant
app.kubernetes.io/name: home-assistant
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "8080"
protocol: TCP
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": monitoring
@@ -167,18 +167,6 @@ spec:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": influxdb
# The cluster's own chat model, for the llama.cpp conversation agent that
# backs Assist. Scoped to the one pod and port rather than the ai namespace
# as a whole, so this grant cannot widen if something else is placed there —
# the embedding endpoint next to it is deliberately not included.
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ai
app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-server
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "8080"
protocol: TCP
# traefik for east-west OIDC roundtrips that go through the
# public hostname via k8s_gateway.
- toEndpoints:
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ resources:
- ingress-isolation.yaml
- authentik-ns.yaml
- paperless-ns.yaml
- paperless-eval-ns.yaml
- audiobookshelf-ns.yaml
- home-assistant-ns.yaml
- spegel-ns.yaml
@@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
# Narrower than paperless-ns.yaml, because this namespace serves nobody.
#
# There is no ingress, no gate outpost and no hostname: the only things that
# talk to it are its own pods. Monitoring is admitted so a run can be watched,
# and host/remote-node for the kubelet probes.
#
# Egress reaches the ai namespace for the embedding endpoint, which is the one
# dependency an eval job has outside its own pod, and world:443 so the CNPG
# recovery can read the backup store on Hetzner.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: default-deny-ingress
namespace: paperless-eval
spec:
endpointSelector: {}
ingress:
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": paperless-eval
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": monitoring
- fromEntities:
- host
- remote-node
# ICMP — all standard ICMPv4 + ICMPv6 from any cluster pod. See
# home-assistant-ns.yaml for the rationale.
- fromEndpoints:
- matchExpressions:
- key: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace
operator: Exists
icmps:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
egress:
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": paperless-eval
# The embedding endpoint. The chat model runs inside each job's own pod, so
# it needs no grant; the embedder is shared with production because it is
# read-only and cheap, and swapping it is a phase-two concern.
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": ai
app.kubernetes.io/name: llama-embed
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "8080"
protocol: TCP
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": rook-ceph
- toEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": kube-system
k8s-app: kube-dns
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "53"
protocol: UDP
- toEntities:
- host
- remote-node
# world:443 — the CNPG recovery reads the backup store on Hetzner Object
# Storage, and image pulls.
- toEntities:
- world
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "443"
protocol: TCP
# ICMP — egress mirror; see ingress block above.
- toEndpoints:
- matchExpressions:
- key: io.kubernetes.pod.namespace
operator: Exists
icmps:
- fields:
- { type: 0, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 8, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 11, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 12, family: IPv4 }
- { type: 1, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 2, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 3, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 4, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 128, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 129, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 133, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 134, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 135, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 136, family: IPv6 }
- { type: 143, family: IPv6 }
---
# The CNPG operator polls each instance's status endpoint over HTTPS
# (https://<pod-ip>:8000/pg/status) to populate Cluster status. Without it the
# Cluster reports "Instance Status Extraction Error: HTTP communication issue"
# while Postgres serves normally — issue #433, where the operator's dial timed
# out because the apps baseline never allowed the database namespace.
#
# It matters here even for a throwaway: the Flux Kustomization waits on
# Cluster status, and a smoke test that cannot report its own health is not one.
#
# Scoped to the pprleval-pg endpoints and that one port, like the equivalent
# rules for wp-pg and ha-pg: the barman and mariadb operators sharing the
# database namespace have no reason to reach anything here.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: pprleval-pg-allow-cnpg-operator
namespace: paperless-eval
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels:
cnpg.io/cluster: pprleval-pg
ingress:
- fromEndpoints:
- matchLabels:
"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": database
app.kubernetes.io/name: cloudnative-pg
toPorts:
- ports:
- port: "8000"
protocol: TCP
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ spec:
- ingress
- monitoring
- paperless
- paperless-eval # same apps/paperless key plus the shared barman S3 creds
- trmnl
- velero
- woodpecker # wp-pg barman creds; woodpecker moving out of `apps` (#433)
-72
View File
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
# Measuring Paperless suggestions against the real corpus
Compares the two engines Paperless ships — the scikit-learn classifier and the
LLM path — over documents whose labels a human already chose, in the
`paperless-eval` namespace rather than against the live archive.
**Applied by hand, not by Flux.** A Job is immutable, so re-running a
configuration means deleting and recreating it, and a Flux-managed Job would
simply come back. The namespace itself *is* managed
(`kubernetes/apps/paperless-eval/`); only the measurement is not.
## Running one
```sh
kubectl -n paperless-eval create configmap paperless-eval-script \
--from-file=eval.py=scripts/paperless-eval/eval.py --dry-run=client -o yaml \
| kubectl apply -f -
kubectl apply -f scripts/paperless-eval/job-qwen35.yaml
kubectl -n paperless-eval logs -f job/eval-qwen35 -c eval
```
Results land on the `paperless-eval-results` PVC as `<label>.jsonl` (one row per
document) and `<label>.summary.json`, and in the pod log.
Re-running after editing `eval.py` means re-creating the ConfigMap and deleting
the Job first — `kubectl -n paperless-eval delete job eval-qwen35`.
## Adding a candidate
Copy `job-qwen35.yaml`, then change four things: the Job name, the
`--hf-repo`/`--alias` on the `llama-server` sidecar, `PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_MODEL` on
the `paperless` sidecar (it must match the alias), and `EVAL_LABEL` on the
`eval` container (it names the output files).
Two run in parallel — the pod anti-affinity puts one per node, and only k8s-1
and k8s-2 have a free iGPU. A third waits.
## Reading the output
`complement` in the summary is the number the exercise exists for. The two
engines are not alternatives: the classifier costs 0.6 s per document and keeps
running whatever the LLM does, so what matters is what the LLM adds where the
classifier is wrong — `llm_rescued` against `llm_only_wrong`. Two aggregate
percentages cannot show that; 74% against 72% could overlap almost entirely or
barely at all.
`correspondent_offered` against `correspondent_recognised` is the
`MATCH_THRESHOLD = 0.8` gap: the model names the right entity and difflib
rejects it, as with "Generali Deutschland Krankenversicherung AG" against the
stored "Generali AG".
`type_specific` against `type_catchall` splits on whether the true type is
"Sonstige", which holds 1133 of ~3900 documents and is the one label with no
semantic content. The classifier can memorise it; a model reading the document
has to infer "none of the above".
## What to watch for
Two things make a result look like a bad model when it is not:
**Prompt length.** Past roughly 14k tokens this stack stops producing language
and starts producing garbage or nothing, without any error — and a single such
request poisons the llama.cpp slot until the pod restarts. Paperless prompts sit
near 5k, but the 252 documents over 14000 characters push toward the boundary
with their RAG neighbours. A run that starts scoring zeros mid-way is more
likely this than the model.
**Ground truth.** It is the current filing, and over ten years conventions
change. A disagreement with an old document is not automatically an error. The
comparison between engines is the durable result; the absolute numbers are
indicative.
-390
View File
@@ -1,390 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Measure what Paperless suggests for documents whose labels a human already chose.
Runs both engines against the same documents:
/api/documents/<id>/suggestions/ the built-in scikit-learn classifier
/api/documents/<id>/ai_suggestions/ the LLM path, with RAG
WHAT THIS ANSWERS, AND WHAT AN EARLIER VERSION DID NOT
The two engines are not alternatives — the classifier costs 0.6 s per document
and keeps running whatever the LLM does. So the useful question is not "which
scores higher" but "what does the LLM add where the classifier is wrong", and
that cannot be recovered from two aggregate percentages: 74% and 72% could
overlap almost entirely or barely at all, and the difference between those two
worlds is the entire value of running an LLM.
So every document is written out individually, with both engines' verdicts, and
the summary is derived from that rather than counted along the way.
SCORING
Correspondent and document type are each scored twice:
offered the true label's id came back in `correspondents` /
`document_types` — what the UI actually presents
recognised also counting the true label's name appearing wordwise in
`suggested_correspondents` / `suggested_document_types`
The gap between them is one specific failure: the model names the right entity
but paperless_ai.matching cannot resolve it, because difflib runs at
MATCH_THRESHOLD = 0.8 and a correct but more verbose answer falls below it —
"Generali Deutschland Krankenversicherung AG" against the existing "Generali
AG". Reporting only the first blames the model for a matcher problem; only the
second claims a usefulness the UI does not deliver.
Document type is additionally split on whether the true type is "Sonstige",
which holds 1133 of ~3900 documents and is the one label with no semantic
content — a restaurant reservation lands there because nothing else fits. The
classifier can memorise that; a model reading the document has to infer "none
of the above". Scored separately rather than dropped, because the model does
sometimes get it right.
GROUND TRUTH
The current filing, which deserves care: over ten years conventions change, and
a disagreement with an old document is not automatically an error. Treat the
comparison between engines as the result and the absolute numbers as
indicative.
Env:
PAPERLESS_URL default http://127.0.0.1:8000
PGHOST/PGDATABASE standard libpq, for ground truth and the API token
EVAL_SAMPLE documents to score, default 50
EVAL_ENGINES comma-separated subset of classic,ai — default both
EVAL_LABEL free-text name for this configuration, recorded in the
output so results from different jobs stay distinguishable
EVAL_OUT directory for results, default /results
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import json
import os
import re
import secrets
import sys
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
import psycopg
PAPERLESS_URL = os.environ.get("PAPERLESS_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:8000")
SAMPLE = int(os.environ.get("EVAL_SAMPLE", "50"))
ENGINES = os.environ.get("EVAL_ENGINES", "classic,ai").split(",")
LABEL = os.environ.get("EVAL_LABEL", "unlabelled")
OUT_DIR = os.environ.get("EVAL_OUT", "/results")
# A backstop, not the real bound. Generation is capped server-side by
# --n-predict on the llama-server sidecar, which is what actually stops a model
# that will not terminate; this catches everything else — a wedged sidecar, a
# request that never reaches it.
#
# 300 s against the ~73 s a healthy document takes end to end, prompt included.
# It does work: llama-server logs `stop: cancel task` on the disconnect and
# starts the next request 0.4 s later.
REQUEST_TIMEOUT = 300
CATCHALL_TYPE = "Sonstige"
def log(msg: str) -> None:
print(f"[eval] {msg}", flush=True)
def api_token(conn) -> str:
"""A token for this run, created in the database.
The API needs one and this database is a disposable clone, so the run
issues its own against a superuser rather than depending on a token that
happened to come across in the restore.
"""
token = secrets.token_hex(20)
with conn.cursor() as cur:
cur.execute(
"select id from auth_user where is_superuser and is_active order by id limit 1",
)
row = cur.fetchone()
if row is None:
raise SystemExit("no active superuser in the restored database")
user_id = row[0]
cur.execute("delete from authtoken_token where user_id = %s", (user_id,))
cur.execute(
"insert into authtoken_token (key, created, user_id) values (%s, now(), %s)",
(token, user_id),
)
conn.commit()
return token
def sample(conn) -> list[dict]:
"""The documents to score, ordered by md5 of the id.
Deterministic, so every engine and every configuration sees the same
documents and results stay comparable across jobs. Only documents carrying
both labels are usable as ground truth.
"""
with conn.cursor() as cur:
cur.execute(
"""
select d.id, d.correspondent_id, d.document_type_id, c.name, t.name
from documents_document d
join documents_correspondent c on c.id = d.correspondent_id
join documents_documenttype t on t.id = d.document_type_id
where d.correspondent_id is not null
and d.document_type_id is not null
and length(d.content) > 400
order by md5(d.id::text)
limit %s
""",
(SAMPLE,),
)
return [
{
"id": r[0],
"correspondent_id": r[1],
"document_type_id": r[2],
"correspondent_name": r[3],
"document_type_name": r[4],
}
for r in cur.fetchall()
]
def floor(conn) -> float:
"""Always guessing the most frequent correspondent.
Without it a number like "70% correct" cannot be read: one correspondent
holds several hundred of ~3900 documents.
"""
with conn.cursor() as cur:
cur.execute(
"""
select max(c), sum(c) from (
select count(*) c from documents_document
where correspondent_id is not null group by correspondent_id
) x
""",
)
top, total = cur.fetchone()
# float() on both: psycopg returns Postgres numerics as Decimal, and
# mixing that with a float literal raises TypeError rather than coercing.
return 100.0 * float(top) / float(total) if total else 0.0
def fetch(path: str, token: str) -> tuple[dict | None, str | None, float]:
req = urllib.request.Request(
f"{PAPERLESS_URL}{path}",
headers={"Authorization": f"Token {token}"},
)
start = time.monotonic()
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=REQUEST_TIMEOUT) as resp:
body = resp.read()
return json.loads(body), None, time.monotonic() - start
except urllib.error.HTTPError as err:
return None, f"HTTP {err.code}: {err.read()[:200]!r}", time.monotonic() - start
except Exception as err: # noqa: BLE001 — a failed document is data, not a crash
return None, f"{type(err).__name__}: {err}", time.monotonic() - start
def normalise(text: str) -> set[str]:
return {w for w in re.split(r"[^\w]+", text.lower()) if w}
def recognised(payload: dict, field: str, want_name: str) -> bool:
"""True when a suggested name contains every word of the true label's name.
Handles the observed failure directly: the model answers with a superset of
the stored name, which difflib rejects at 0.8 but a reader would accept.
"""
want = normalise(want_name)
return any(want <= normalise(name) for name in payload.get(field) or [])
def degenerate(payload: dict) -> str | None:
"""Whether this looks like broken inference rather than a wrong guess.
Past roughly 14k prompt tokens this stack stops producing language — first
empty completions, then runs of digits and CJK characters — and one such
request poisons the llama.cpp slot until the pod restarts. Nothing in the
HTTP response says so: status 200, finish_reason "stop", well-formed JSON.
Scored as a wrong answer it would silently depress a candidate's numbers,
and because the slot stays poisoned it would take the rest of the run with
it. Flagged instead, so the failure is visible as itself.
"""
title = payload.get("title") or ""
if not title.strip():
return "empty title"
# Digits, punctuation and whitespace are normal in a document title —
# "Rechnung 2025-5425541" is 8 letters in 21 characters and tripped an
# earlier version of this check. What broken inference produces is
# characters from other scripts, so look for those directly rather than
# inferring them from a shortage of Latin ones.
foreign = sum(c.isalpha() and not (c.isascii() or c in "äöüÄÖÜßáéèêíóúàçñ") for c in title)
if foreign > 0.2 * len(title):
return f"non-latin title: {title[:40]!r}"
return None
def score_document(payload: dict, doc: dict) -> dict:
offered_corr = doc["correspondent_id"] in (payload.get("correspondents") or [])
offered_type = doc["document_type_id"] in (payload.get("document_types") or [])
return {
"correspondent_offered": offered_corr,
"correspondent_recognised": offered_corr
or recognised(payload, "suggested_correspondents", doc["correspondent_name"]),
"type_offered": offered_type,
"type_recognised": offered_type
or recognised(payload, "suggested_document_types", doc["document_type_name"]),
"suggested_correspondents": payload.get("suggested_correspondents") or [],
"suggested_document_types": payload.get("suggested_document_types") or [],
"title": payload.get("title"),
}
def run(engine: str, suffix: str, docs: list[dict], token: str) -> list[dict]:
log(f"=== {engine}: {len(docs)} documents")
rows = []
for n, doc in enumerate(docs, 1):
payload, error, elapsed = fetch(
f"/api/documents/{doc['id']}/{suffix}",
token,
)
row = {
"engine": engine,
"document_id": doc["id"],
"seconds": round(elapsed, 1),
"truth_correspondent": doc["correspondent_name"],
"truth_type": doc["document_type_name"],
"catchall_type": doc["document_type_name"] == CATCHALL_TYPE,
}
if payload is None:
row["error"] = error
log(f" {doc['id']}: {error}")
else:
row.update(score_document(payload, doc))
# Only the AI path returns a title; the classifier answers with ids
# alone, so an "empty title" there is normal rather than broken.
if engine == "ai" and (broken := degenerate(payload)) is not None:
row["degenerate"] = broken
log(f" {doc['id']}: DEGENERATE — {broken}")
rows.append(row)
if n % 10 == 0:
log(f" {n}/{len(docs)}")
return rows
def pct(hits: int, total: int) -> float:
return round(100.0 * hits / total, 1) if total else 0.0
def summarise(rows: list[dict], engine: str) -> dict:
mine = [r for r in rows if r["engine"] == engine]
# Degenerate rows are excluded from the accuracy figures: they measure the
# backend giving up, not the model choosing wrongly, and leaving them in
# would quietly punish whichever candidate happened to trip the slot.
scored = [r for r in mine if "error" not in r and "degenerate" not in r]
failed = [r for r in mine if "error" in r]
broken = [r for r in mine if "degenerate" in r]
specific = [r for r in scored if not r["catchall_type"]]
catchall = [r for r in scored if r["catchall_type"]]
return {
"engine": engine,
"scored": len(scored),
"failed": len(failed),
# Non-zero means the run is suspect from that point on, not that the
# model is bad — the slot stays poisoned until the pod restarts.
"degenerate": len(broken),
"seconds_total": round(sum(r["seconds"] for r in mine)),
"correspondent_offered": pct(
sum(r["correspondent_offered"] for r in scored), len(scored)
),
"correspondent_recognised": pct(
sum(r["correspondent_recognised"] for r in scored), len(scored)
),
"type_offered": pct(sum(r["type_offered"] for r in scored), len(scored)),
"type_specific": pct(
sum(r["type_offered"] for r in specific), len(specific)
),
"type_catchall": pct(
sum(r["type_offered"] for r in catchall), len(catchall)
),
}
def complement(rows: list[dict]) -> dict | None:
"""What the LLM adds where the classifier is wrong, and what it costs.
The reason this script writes per-document rows at all. Only computed when
both engines ran, and only over documents both actually scored.
"""
by_engine = {"classic": {}, "ai": {}}
for row in rows:
usable = "error" not in row and "degenerate" not in row
if usable and row["engine"] in by_engine:
by_engine[row["engine"]][row["document_id"]] = row
both = set(by_engine["classic"]) & set(by_engine["ai"])
if not both or not by_engine["ai"]:
return None
rescued = missed = broken = agreed = 0
for doc_id in both:
classic_hit = by_engine["classic"][doc_id]["correspondent_offered"]
ai_hit = by_engine["ai"][doc_id]["correspondent_offered"]
if classic_hit and ai_hit:
agreed += 1
elif not classic_hit and ai_hit:
rescued += 1
elif classic_hit and not ai_hit:
broken += 1
else:
missed += 1
return {
"documents": len(both),
"both_right": agreed,
"llm_rescued": rescued,
"llm_only_wrong": broken,
"both_wrong": missed,
}
def main() -> int:
os.makedirs(OUT_DIR, exist_ok=True)
with psycopg.connect() as conn:
token = api_token(conn)
docs = sample(conn)
guess_floor = floor(conn)
log(f"label={LABEL} documents={len(docs)} floor={guess_floor:.1f}%")
rows: list[dict] = []
for engine, suffix in (("classic", "suggestions/"), ("ai", "ai_suggestions/")):
if engine in ENGINES:
rows.extend(run(engine, suffix, docs, token))
result = {
"label": LABEL,
"sample": len(docs),
"floor": round(guess_floor, 1),
"summaries": [summarise(rows, e) for e in ENGINES if e in ("classic", "ai")],
"complement": complement(rows),
}
with open(f"{OUT_DIR}/{LABEL}.jsonl", "w") as handle:
for row in rows:
handle.write(json.dumps(row, ensure_ascii=False) + "\n")
with open(f"{OUT_DIR}/{LABEL}.summary.json", "w") as handle:
json.dump(result, handle, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)
# Also to stdout, so the numbers are in the pod log and reachable via Loki
# without mounting the volume.
log(json.dumps(result, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2))
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
-324
View File
@@ -1,324 +0,0 @@
---
# One configuration under test, complete in one pod.
#
# A paperless instance can only point at one chat endpoint, so measuring two
# candidates at once means two paperless instances — which makes the pod, not
# the namespace, the right unit. Everything a measurement needs is here except
# the database and the embedding endpoint, both of which are read-only and
# shared.
#
# The three services are native sidecars (initContainers with
# restartPolicy: Always), not regular containers. That matters twice: they
# start in order and each must pass its probes before the next begins, which
# is what keeps paperless from racing the database; and when the eval
# container exits they are torn down, so the Job actually completes instead of
# running forever behind a llama-server that never returns.
apiVersion: batch/v1
kind: Job
metadata:
name: eval-qwen35
namespace: paperless-eval
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperless-eval
app.kubernetes.io/component: eval
spec:
# A failed run is re-read, not retried blind: a retry would spend another
# hour reproducing whatever went wrong.
backoffLimit: 0
template:
metadata:
labels:
app.kubernetes.io/name: paperless-eval
app.kubernetes.io/component: eval
spec:
restartPolicy: Never
enableServiceLinks: false
# One measurement per node. Two jobs sharing a node would share its iGPU,
# and every timing in the result would then describe contention rather
# than the model — which is exactly how a decode rate of 4.7 tokens/s got
# attributed to context length once already.
affinity:
podAntiAffinity:
requiredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution:
- labelSelector:
matchLabels:
app.kubernetes.io/component: eval
topologyKey: kubernetes.io/hostname
securityContext:
fsGroup: 1000
fsGroupChangePolicy: OnRootMismatch
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
initContainers:
# A private copy of /data — the search index and, the expensive part,
# the LLM index the RAG path needs.
#
# It cannot be mounted live and shared: LLM_INDEX_DIR is hardcoded to
# DATA_DIR / "llm_index", the store behind it is SQLite, and SQLite
# locking across pods over CephFS is not dependable. Nor can it be left
# out — an empty llm_index makes retrieve_similar_nodes return nothing,
# and the job would quietly measure the no-RAG path while reporting a
# RAG result.
#
# ~160 MiB, so seconds. A regular initContainer: it must finish before
# the sidecars start.
- name: seed-data
image: ghcr.io/paperless-ngx/paperless-ngx:3.1.2
command:
- sh
- -c
- |
set -e
# -r, not -a: preserving ownership needs CHOWN, which this
# container does not have, and cp then exits non-zero after
# copying the files anyway. Running as 1000 makes the copy land
# with the ownership paperless needs — it writes to the LLM index
# while serving.
cp -r /golden/. /data/
du -sh /data/index /data/llm_index
# Refuse to start rather than measure the wrong thing. An empty
# llm_index makes retrieve_similar_nodes return nothing, and the
# run would report a RAG result having never retrieved anything —
# which is exactly what the first attempt at this job did, because
# the golden volume had not been populated yet. The index is
# ~125 MiB once built; anything under 1 MiB is not one.
bytes=$(du -sb /data/llm_index | cut -f1)
if [ "$bytes" -lt 1000000 ]; then
echo "FATAL: llm_index is ${bytes} bytes — build it on the" >&2
echo "smoke-test deployment first:" >&2
echo " kubectl -n paperless-eval exec deploy/paperless -- \\" >&2
echo " python manage.py document_llmindex rebuild" >&2
exit 1
fi
volumeMounts:
- name: golden
mountPath: /golden
readOnly: true
- name: data
mountPath: /data
securityContext:
runAsUser: 1000
runAsGroup: 1000
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
- name: llama-server
image: ghcr.io/ggml-org/llama.cpp:server-vulkan-b10731
restartPolicy: Always
args:
- --hf-repo
- ggml-org/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-GGUF:Q4_K_M
- --alias
- qwen3.6-35b-a3b
- --n-gpu-layers
- "99"
- --threads
- "4"
# The production ceiling. Not because the flag value itself breaks
# anything — bisection showed the corruption boundary is prompt
# length, around 14000 tokens, whatever --ctx-size says — but
# because measuring against a different ceiling than production
# runs would not describe production.
- --ctx-size
- "16384"
- --parallel
- "1"
- --ubatch-size
- "1024"
# The default is -1, infinity: nothing on the server caps how long
# a request generates, and paperless sets no budget of its own and
# waits. A classification that needs ~300 tokens ran to 10269 at a
# healthy 11 tok/s, and three of the first eleven documents did it
# — 900 s each, most of an hour spent on four documents.
#
# 768 is generous against the ~300 a correct answer takes, and a
# truncated response is better evidence than a timeout: it shows
# what the model was doing instead of stopping.
- --n-predict
- "768"
# Without this, Qwen3.6 spends the response on reasoning_content
# and returns empty content — 983 tokens into a classification that
# needs a hundred, at a perfectly healthy 11 tok/s. It reads as a
# slow or broken model and is neither.
#
# A candidate whose template has no such switch has to be measured
# as it comes, and that is a fair part of its result: paperless
# gives the model no token budget and waits.
- --chat-template-kwargs
- '{"enable_thinking": false}'
- --no-webui
env:
- name: LLAMA_CACHE
value: /models
ports:
- name: llm
containerPort: 8080
volumeMounts:
- name: models
mountPath: /models
# ~20 GB of weights off CephFS, so a generous budget: 60 * 20s.
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /health
port: llm
periodSeconds: 20
failureThreshold: 60
resources:
requests:
cpu: "1"
memory: 24Gi
gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"
limits:
memory: 32Gi
gpu.intel.com/i915: "1"
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
- name: redis
# Its own, not the namespace's: two paperless instances sharing a
# celery broker would take each other's tasks.
image: redis:8.10.1-alpine
restartPolicy: Always
args: ["redis-server", "--save", "", "--loglevel", "warning"]
startupProbe:
tcpSocket:
port: 6379
periodSeconds: 2
failureThreshold: 30
resources:
requests:
cpu: 20m
memory: 64Mi
limits:
memory: 256Mi
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
- name: paperless
image: ghcr.io/paperless-ngx/paperless-ngx:3.1.2
restartPolicy: Always
envFrom:
- configMapRef:
name: paperless-eval-config
env:
# Overrides the namespace ConfigMap: this pod's own llama-server,
# and its own redis rather than the shared Service.
- name: PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_ENDPOINT
value: http://127.0.0.1:8080/v1
- name: PAPERLESS_AI_LLM_MODEL
value: qwen3.6-35b-a3b
- name: PAPERLESS_REDIS
value: redis://127.0.0.1:6379
- name: PAPERLESS_SECRET_KEY
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: paperless-eval-secrets
key: secret-key
- name: PAPERLESS_DBUSER
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: pprleval-pg-app
key: username
- name: PAPERLESS_DBPASS
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: pprleval-pg-app
key: password
ports:
- name: http
containerPort: 8000
volumeMounts:
- name: data
mountPath: /usr/src/paperless/data
- name: media
mountPath: /usr/src/paperless/media
- name: consume
mountPath: /usr/src/paperless/consume
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /accounts/login/
port: http
periodSeconds: 20
failureThreshold: 180
# Same as production, and required: the entrypoint starts as root,
# chowns the volumes and drops to uid 1000 via setgid/setuid.
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: false
allowPrivilegeEscalation: true
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
add: ["CHOWN", "DAC_OVERRIDE", "FOWNER", "SETGID", "SETUID"]
resources:
requests:
cpu: 200m
memory: 512Mi
limits:
memory: 2Gi
containers:
- name: eval
# The paperless image again, for psycopg and a python that matches
# the application — not because the script needs paperless itself.
image: ghcr.io/paperless-ngx/paperless-ngx:3.1.2
command: ["python3", "/eval/eval.py"]
env:
- name: EVAL_LABEL
value: qwen35
- name: EVAL_SAMPLE
value: "50"
- name: PGHOST
value: pprleval-pg-rw
- name: PGDATABASE
value: paperless
- name: PGUSER
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: pprleval-pg-app
key: username
- name: PGPASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: pprleval-pg-app
key: password
volumeMounts:
- name: script
mountPath: /eval
- name: results
mountPath: /results
resources:
requests:
cpu: 100m
memory: 256Mi
limits:
memory: 512Mi
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities:
drop: ["ALL"]
volumes:
- name: models
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: llama-models
- name: results
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: paperless-eval-results
- name: script
configMap:
name: paperless-eval-script
# The namespace's /data, mounted read-only and copied out by seed-data
# above. Never mounted as the live /data of a job.
- name: golden
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: paperless-eval-golden
readOnly: true
# paperless insists on all three paths existing. media and consume stay
# empty — nothing is consumed during a measurement — while data is
# seeded with the copy.
- name: data
emptyDir: {}
- name: media
emptyDir: {}
- name: consume
emptyDir: {}